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Partnerships With Monarchs: Unveiling And
Reexamining The Pattern Of ““Third World””
Economic Development In The Petroleum And
Energy Sector

By Wendy N. Duong1

***
L’Eveque D’York: “Le Roi est la force et it est la loi.”
Becket: “Il est la loi ecrite, mais il est une autre loi, non ecrite, qui finit toujours par
courber la tete des rois.”
J.Anouilh, Becket ou L’honneur de Dieu, 3ieme acte (1958)
Translation:
L’Eveque of York: The King is the force and he is the law.
Becket: “He is the written law, but it is another kind of law, the unwritten one, that
finishes by making the royal head turn…”
From the third act of Anouilh’s “Becket or the Honor of God” (1958)

***
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INTRODUCTION
As the first of a series, this Article explores and critiques the current
patterns of “Third World” economic development in the capital-intensive
petroleum and energy sector.2 The overall purpose of this series is to raise the
level of awareness in the international and legal academic communities with
respect to special issues in the negotiation of foreign direct investment (FDI)
contracts3 in this important industry, in order to spur further studies and
dialogues.

Preliminary Remarks
For decades, the developing nations have served as the new frontiers for
multinational corporate expansion, as U.S. big businesses took their activities
abroad in search of new consumer markets, new discoveries of natural
resources, and drastically cheaper labor.4

2

The term “petroleum industry” is used herein to refer to integrated companies that specialize in, inter
alia, the exploration and discovery of petroleum, including both Crude Oil and Natural Gas. For
examples of Crude Oil and Natural Gas legal definitions in petroleum agreements, see Note 286, infra. The
term “energy,” when used to describe the sector, includes companies whose business is in the generation
and trading of energy as a commodity, whether or not the source of energy is petroleum.
All terms capitalized, bold-faced, and italicized in this Part are either legal concepts, industry jargon
that has evolved into legal concepts, generally established defined terms in investment contracts,
which have become legal norms by customary usage, and/or acronyms and shorthanded terms
adopted for the convenience of reference.

3

The phrase “foreign direct investment” (FDI) refers to the type of transaction that generates a direct
flow of capital, labor and services across borders. FDI is distinguishable from “portfolio” investment such
as ownership of shares in a mutual fund or passive stock ownership. R. Folsom, M. Gordon & J. Spanogle,
International Business Transactions Hornbook (2d Ed. West Group). See also George Thomas Ellinidis,
“Foreign Direct Investment in Developing and Newly Liberalized Nations,” 4 J. Int’l L. & Prac. 299
(1995); compare Enrique r. Carrasco & Randall Thomas, “Encouraging Relational Investment and
Controlling Portfolio Investment in Developing Countries in the Aftermath of the Mexican Financial
Crisis,” 34 Colum. J. Transn’l L. 539, n.3 (1996) (distinguishing foreign direct investment from portfolio
management that results in no managerial responsibilities despite investment in financial assets). By 1998,
FDI volume in the industrialized nation-members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) reached $465 billion. OECD, Recent Trends in Foreign Direct Investment 1998) at
113 (1999).

4

See, e.g., W. Friedmann & J.P. Beguin, Joint International Business Ventures in Developing Countries
(New York: Columbia University Press 1971). Compare George Thomas Ellinidis, ”Foreign Direct
Investment in Developing and Newly Liberalized Nations,” 4 J. Int’l L. & Prac. 299 (1995). See also
Aaron Bernstein, “Welch’s March to the South,” BUS.WEEK (Dec. 6, 1999) at 77 (from 1986 to 1999,
General Electric’s U.S. workforce fell by nearly 50%, while its foreign work force nearly doubled). The
world’s resources are returned to the northern industrialized nations to feed the need of consumerism.
Tony McAdams, “Globalization: New Demands for the Legal Environment of Business Course,” 19
J.Legal Studies Education 239, 251, n. 159-160, citing WolfGangSachs et al, Greening the North: A PostIndustrial Blueprints for Ecology and Equity 70 (1998) (the northern industrialized nations, with 20-25%
percent of the world’s population, use about 80% of world resources; the U.S. uses a quarter of the world’s

6

The 1980s and 1990s represented a major transitional period for the
global economy. During this period of time, Eastern and Central Europe
transitioned into market economies following the collapse of the Berlin Wall
and the breakup of the Soviet Union.5 The European Union approved new
memberships and continued to harmonize national laws as part of its regional
integration policy.6 China actively sought membership in the World Trade
Organization (WTO) and, after much controversy, succeeded.7 Small countries
geographically distant from Europe such as Cambodia and Vietnam initiated
economic reforms, actively soliciting Western investment. The developing
markets, especially Asia (prior to the currency crises of the late 1990s),8 were
believed to have grown faster than the developed nations.9 Trends of
privatization and deregulation in the former centralized economies offered US
businesses a lesser-regulated environment where the strength of the U.S.
dollar also increased the investor’s economic power. Overall, because the
transitional economies needed technology, infrastructures and new commodity
markets (by way of both imports and exports), the investment horizon there
oil, a third of its paper, and about 40% of its beef and veal); see also Michael Casey, “Emerging Markets
Re-Emerge as Attractive Places to Invest” (Wall Street Journal March 13,2002). .
5

See, e.g., Gray and Jaroz, “Law and the Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment: The Experience from
Central and Eastern Europe,” 33 Columbia J. Transnt’l Law 1 (1995).

6

The European Union’s efforts to harmonize national laws and strengthen the common market as a unified
trade bloc could be seen in regional legal measures such as (i) the EC Merger Control Law, see Thrieffry,
“The New EC Merger Control Regulation,” 24 Int’l Law 543 (1990); accord Reynolds, “The Future of
Merger Control in Europe,” 26 Int’l Bus. Law. 100 (1998); and (ii) the enactment of the European
Company Statute to create a new corporate form for doing business in the EU, the Societas Europeae
(SE),to be implemented in 2004. See, e.g., Statute for a European Company (SE), Council Regulation
2157/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 294) 1 Accord Kenneth J. Hamner, “The Globalization of Law: International
Merger Control and Competition Law in the United States, the European Union, Latin America and
China,” J. Transnat’l L.& Policy 385-405 (2002).

7

See, e.g., Anyuan Yuan, “China’s Entry into the WTO: Impact on China’s Regulating Regime of
Foreign Direct Investment,” 35 The Int’l Lawyer No. 1, 195 (Spring 2001); Bhala, Enter the Dragon: An
Essay on China’s WTO Accession Saga, 15 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 1469 (2000); Harders-Chen, China MFN:
A Reaffirmation of Tradition or Regulatory Reform?, 5 Minn. J. Global Trade 381 (1996). As to China’s
entry into the World Trade Organization, see http://wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/pr252_e.htm., “WTO
Ministerial Conference Approves China’s Accession (Pres/252 10 November 2001). See also “WTO
Successfully Concludes Negotiations on China’s Entry” (Pres/243 17 September 2001) (WTO 2001 Press
Releases).
8

For an example of the impact the Asian currency crises has produced on a Southeast Asian oil-producing
country, see Joe Friedman and James Levisohn, “The Distributional Impacts of Indonesia’s Financial Crisis
on Household Welfare: A ‘Rapid Response’ Methodology,” The World Bank Economic Review,, Vol. 16,
No. 3, at pp. 397-423 (2002).

9

See, e.g., Harold Dichter, “Legal Implications of an Asia-Pacific Economic Grouping,” 16 U.Pa. J. Int’l
Econ. L. 99 (1995); Kanneth W. Abbott and Gregory W. Bowman, “Economic Integration for the Asian
Century: An Early Look at New Approaches,” 4 Transnt’l Law & Contemp. Probs. 159 (1994). See also
Dennis Unkovic, “Doing Business in China and the Pacific Rim,” Int’l Quarterly Vol. 15-2, 189-219, 190
(2003) (attributing $13 trillion of estimated gross national product (GNP) to Pacific Rim economies,
excluding the United States, for the year 2002, even with the economic crises of the late 1990s.)
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was most suited for major-scaled and capital-intensive investments by the
multinational corporations (MNCs).10 The economic prosperity of the Clinton
era (with its restoration of balance to the global market after the Asia and Latin
America currency crises in the late 1990s) reinforced the U.S.’s position as an
economic superpower, fortifying the dominance of corporate America in the
global economy.11
In particular, because domestic reserves have been depleted or
otherwise off limit due to environmental restrictions, U.S.-based oil and gas
companies continued to expand their exploration activities to the “frontier”
land that previously was closed to the West. The international petroleum and
energy industry has always spoken the language of tremendous wealth, and

10

Although the worldwide conduct of MNCs has been a focal point for the international legal community.
there is no universally accepted legal definition for an MNC, even if such definition is critically needed for
regulatory purposes. See, e.g.,David Weisbrodt and Muria Kruger, “Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights,” 97 Amer. J.
Int’l L. No. 4, 901 (October 2003) (discussing definitional issues for enterprises governed by U.N.
initiatives attempting to regulate MNC conduct).

Rather than proposing a legal definition, Professor Mark Baker described MNEs as “entities[who]
potentially [are] more economically powerful than Stalin’s Soviet Union, and with more broad-based
political influence than the Third Reich.” Mark B. Baker, “Tightening the Toothless Vise: Codes of
Conduct and the proposed American Multinational Enterprise,” 20 Wis. Int’l L.J. 89 (2001-02). But see
Tony McAdams, “Globalization: New Demands for the Legal Environment of Business Course,” 19 J.
Legal Studies Education 239, 244 (2001 (attempting definitions for “international company,”
“multinational company,” and “global company,” observing that most multinational firms are more
national and regional in nature, rather than truly global). Some efforts at a loose definition developed for
the convenience of discussion and consensus building have been made by authors. For example, an MNC
is defined as an entity who “owns (in whole or in part), controls, and manages value-adding activities in
more than one country,” and who “engages in production and/or service activities across national
boundaries, financed by foreign direct investment [FDI].” Thomas L. Brewer & Stephen Young, The
Multilateral Investment System and Multinational Enterprises 11 (Oxford Univ. Press 1998). Accord
W.H. Meyer, Human Rights and MNCs: Theory v. Qauntitative Analysis, 18 H.R.Q. 369 (1996) (defining
MNCs simplistically as corporations with affiliates or business establishments in more than one country).
See also )P. Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law 12-15 (1995); Detlev. F. Vagts, “The
Multinational Enterprise: A New Challenge for Transnational Law,” 83 Harv. L.Rev. 739 (1970).
See also Regulatory Encounters: Multinational Corporations and American Legal Adversarialism, Ed. By
Robert A. Kagan and Lee Axelrad. (University of California Press: Berkeley, Los Angeles and London
(2000); Sidney A. Shapiro, Book Review, 50 The Am. J. Comp. L. 229 (2002); Cynthia Williams,
“Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic Globalization,” 35 U.C. Davis L.Rev. 705
(February 2002); Westfield, “Globalization, Governance, and Multinational Enterprise Responsibility:
Corporate Code of Conduct in the 21st Century,” 42 Virginia Journal Int. Law 1075 (2002); Beth Stephens,
“The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and Human Rights,” 2002 Berkley J. Int’l L.45
(Stefan A. Riesenfeld Symposium 2001). (acknowleding the difficulty of regulating MNCs and examining
the philosophy of “corporate amorality”).
11

Recent economic studies challenge the conclusion that economic integration among the developed
economies has fundamentally raised the correlation of U.S. growth with growth in other G-7 nations
(Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom). See, e.g., Doyle & Faust, “An
Investigation of Co-Movements among the Growth Rates of the G-7 Countries,” Federal Reserve Bulletin
428 (October 2002).

8

with wealth has come power and leverage. Petroleum resources often dominate
a national economy, constituting the “crown jewels” of a country. Major
international oil and gas companies (IOGCs), therefore, have quickly partnered
with petroleum-producing governments.12 Yet, the “crown jewels” of the “Third
World”13 may, or may not have brought about a better life for the average
“Third World” citizen.14 To date, many developing nations with petroleum

12

In this Article, the acronym MNC will be used to refer to “Multinational Corporations,” and IOGC
will refer to “International Oil and Gas Companies,” as a specific type of MNCs.

13

I ask for my readers’ indulgence and tolerance with my use of this term. The term ““Third
World”” is used herein for convenience only, referring collectively to the newly industrialized
economies, the transitional economies, the developing economies, the lesser-developed economies,
and the least developed economies. Terminologies such as “developing country” and “leastdeveloped country” have been used in the GATT-WTO framework to grant exemptions, preferences,
or transitional grace periods to nations that need economic help in order to achieve parity with the
developed nations of North America and Western Europe. See, e.g., Agreement on Trade-Related
Investment Measures (TRIMS). IS THIS THE BLUE BOOK FORMAT FOR THIS CITE? In this
Article, “Third World” simply refers to any and all countries that do not belong to Western Europe
or the developed North America, both of which exemplify the Anglo-American Common Law and
the Civil Law traditions.
In the 1980s, the term “Third World” was still used in the general community at large to refer to “a
collection of disparate nations which may have some similarities in their relative poverty and in their
aspirations; but their economies are careering in different directions at a bewildering rate.” Anatole
Kaletsky, “A Dismal Look – For Some; Less-Developed Countries” (Financial Times May 25, 1984). In
more recent scholarly literature, the term “Third World” has been used in phraseologies such as “Third
World poverty, violence, and lack of resources,” in connection with challenges made against the common
characterization of non-European societies as “backward and inferior.” See, e.g., Antony Anghie,
“Civilization and Commerce: The Concept of Governance in Historical Perspective,” 45 Vill. L. Rev. 887,
911 (2000) (author used terms such as “Third World state” and “Third World poverty” to discuss race,
history, and international law) (emphasis added). See also Balakrishnan Rajagopal, “Locating the Third
World in Cultural Geography,” Third World Legal Studies, 1, 7-11 (1998-1999) (arguing that conception
of impurity and backwardness is essential to all understandings of “Third World”) (emphasis added); Karin
Mcielson, “Rhetoric and Rage: Third World Voices in International Legal Discourse,” 16 Wis. Int’l L.J.
353, 361-62 (1998) (observing “Third World” challenge to accepted Western notions of history and
international law) (emphasis added).
Recently, the term “Fourth World” has emerged, referring to the collective grouping of indigenous
peoples or “nations” whose cultural properties, traditions, territories, and right of self-determination have
been at risk or historically displaced, such that the conventional notion of “statehood” can no longer
squarely apply to them under traditional concepts of international law. See, e.g., “Ward Churchill, “Social
Justice Movements and Latcrit Community: The Law Stood Squarely on Its Head: U.S. Legal Doctrine,
Indigenous Self-Determination and The Questions of World Order,” 81 OR. L.Rev. 663, 700 (2002)
(describing the “Fourth World” as one comprised of indigenous nations, possessing the least right to
genuine self-determination; referring to the “fourth world” as being a "Host World" upon which the other
three have been constructed) . Accord. Franz Schurmann, The Logic of World Power (1974); Jacqueline
Stevens, Reproducing the State (1999); Sadruddin Aga Khan & Hassan bin Talal, Indigenous Peoples: A
Global Quest for Justice (1987); Julian Burger, Report from the Frontier: The State of the World’s
Indigenous Peoples (1987).
14

Baker, 20 Wis.Int’l L.J. at 102-105. See also Roger D. Billings, Jr., “Why Business Fails in Russia,”
(35 The Int’l Lawyer No. 1, 123 (Spring 2001) (discussing social and legal problems in post-Yeltsin Russia
as example that natural resource and attempt at democracy did not guarantee economic or societal success).
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resources are still struggling with poverty, corruption,15 and the social turmoil
often associated with the unhealthy economic gap between the rich and the
poor within their own populace. For example, both the Republic of Chad and
Nigeria offer examples that rich petroleum reserves have not cured poverty
issues or otherwise helped stabilize society. 16
The dawn of the new millennium has borne witness to significant events
that further impact the global economic landscape: the atrocities of September
11, 2001, the U.S.-led global coalition for fighting terrorism, and the unilateral
approach of the U.S. (and its U.K. ally) in striking preemptive war against

15

See, e.g., Okechuskwu Oko, “Subverting the Scourge of Corruption in Nigeria: A Reform Prospectus,”
34 N.Y.U.J. Int’l L. & Pol. 397 (2002); “Nigeria under Shagari Called Garden of Graft,” (New York Times,
Jan. 20, 1984) at 1, col. 3. See also Transparency International Annual Report 1994-2002 (Transparency
International is a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) specializing in fighting corruption, due notably
to the efforts of, among others, a former corporate counsel of General Electric. See Kenneth Abbott and
Duncan Snidal, “Values and Interests: International Legalization in the Fight Against Corruption,” The
Journal of Legal Studies Vol XXXI S141, S174 (January 2002) [GET VOLUME]. For the latest scandals
regarding bribery in the “Third World,” see Jeff Gerth, “U.S. Businessman Is Accused of Oil Bribes to
Kazakhstan” (New York Times April 1, 2003) (news report on corruption scandal prosecuted under the
U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act involving the President of Kazahkstan, the Kazahk government and its
U.S. agent, in conjunction with an oil producing project then acquired by the now defunct Mobil
Corporation); New York Times, “Nigeria Orders an Investigation of Halliburton Gas Payments” (NYT Feb.
7, 2004); Dow Jones Newswires, “Nigeria to Probe Halliburton Bribe Allegations” (Wall Street Journal
Feb. 6, 2004); Russell Gold & John R. Wilke, “Data Sought in Halliburton Inquiry” (U.S. Business News
Feb. 5,2004); Dow Jones Newswires,”Halliburton Unit Probed Over Bribery Claims in Nigeria” (Wall
Street Journal Feb. 4, 2004) (alleged corruption scandal involving payments made to Nigerian officials by
a Halliburton subsidiary for a gas plant contract). .
16

See, e.g., Baker, 20 Wis. Int’l L.J. at 102 (discussing inequality of income and gap between rich and
poor in developing nations, as well as gap in economic power between North and South).

•Chad has recoverable reserves estimated at one billion barrels. Present in Chad is a consortium
comprised of Chevron, Conoco, ExxonMobil, and Shell. See “An Mbendi Profile: Chad: Oil and Gas
Industry–Overview,” found at http://www.mbendi.co.za/indy/oilg/af/ch/p005.htm. Major petroleum
activities in connection with oilfield and pipeline projects began as of 2000. See CIA The World Factbook,
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/cd.html (access as of 10/23/2003). Approximately 80%
of Chad’s population is reportedly living below the poverty line. The infant mortality rate is at 95.75
percent. The average life expectancy from birth is approximately 48.51 years. Id.
•Nigeria is OPEC’s 12th largest overall producer, the 10th largest oil producer in the world, the third largest
in Africa, and the most prolific oil producer in Sub-Saharan Africa. The estimated proven oil reserves are
22.5 billion barrels with production at 2 million barrels per day. The estimated proven natural gas reserves
are 124 trillion cubic feet. Nigeria also has four refineries with a total capacity of 445,000 bbl/d.
http://www.mbendi.co.za/indy/oilg/ng/p005.htm Nigeria has continuously been listed by Transparency
International as the most corrupt country in the world. See Transparency Annual Report 1994 (Chairman’s
Foreword); New York Times, “Nigeria Under Shagari Called Garden of Draft” (Jan. 20, 1984) at 1 col. 3.
See also Transparent International 1996-2002 Corruption Indices. http://www.transparency.org. As of
2000, approximately 60% of the Nigeria’s population is reportedly living below poverty line. The infant
mortality rate is approximately 71.35 percent. Life expectancy at birth is approximately 51 years. See
CIA The World Factbook, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/ni.html (access as of
10/23/2003).
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Iraq.17 These events provide at least two new opportunities for corporate
America to engage itself, again, in the economic reconstruction of remote
countries such as landlocked Afghanistan and oil-rich Iraq.18 While geopolitical
factors and local or regional interests may be different, the reconstruction and
development of Afghanistan and Iraq will bear similar characteristics to
patterns that have been observed in the transitional economies during the
1980s and 1990s.19

17

See, e.g., Michael J. Kelly, “The Bush Foreign Policy 2001-2003: Unilateralist Theory in a Multilateral
World, and the Opportunity for Change Offered by Iraq,” 2 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 221 (2003). See
also Raneta Lawson Mack and Michael Kelly, Equal Justice in the Balance, Assessing America’s Legal
Responses to the Emerging Terrorist Threat (2004).

18

With respect to the US-UK political and military alliance and occupation of Iraq (contrasted against
France’s vehement objection), the following facts suggest a similar (perhaps coincidental) alliance between
U.S.- and U.K.-based IOGCs (as contrasted against French interests) in the petroleum and energy industry:
1) In the late 1990s, prior to the Exxon-Mobil merger, Mobil Corporation sold many of its downstream
assets (refineries and service stations) in Europe to British Petroleum (BP), and the two companies formed
alliances for the European market. See,e.g., David Lascelles, “BP and Mobil aim to get in front and stay
there:,” (Financial Times, Feb. 29, 1996); Peggy Hollinger, “BP and Mobil in European fuels merger:
Annual Sales of Joint Operation to Exceed Dollars 20bn” (Financial Times, Feb. 29,1996). See also Martha
M. Hamilton, “Three Big Oil Firms Weigh Joint Venture; Merger of Refining, Marketing Operations
Redefine Industry” (The Washington Post Oct. 8,1996) (discussing merger trends: Mobil-BP and ShellTexaco-Saudi Arabia’s Armaco alliances).
2)
In
the
late
1990s,
BP
acquired
U.S.-based
Amoco.
See
http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=2010124&contentId=2001153. See also Bhushan Bahree,
Christopher Cooper and Steve Liesman, “British Petroleum to Buy Amoco In Biggest Industrial Merger
Ever (Wall Street Journal, August 12, 1998); Financial Times, “The Bp-Amoco Merger: Bp-Amoco Pledge
to Challenge Industry Leaders” (August 12, 1998); Wall Street Journal, “How Sweet it is,” (August 17,
1998) (“long-suffering shareowners of Amoco , the Chicago oil giant, finally have something to cheer
about: the planned $50 billion deal with BP”).
3) As explained below, the Royal Dutch-Shell group’s subsidiaries and affiliates have substantial presence
in both the U.S. and the U.K, and occupy substantial shares of those national markets. See
http://www.shell.com/home/Framework?siteId=uk-en&FC2=/uken/html/iwgen/about_shell/zzz_lhn.html&FC3=/uk-en&FC2=uken/html/iwgen/about_shell/shellinukoverview_09100930.html
See
also
10K
Annual
Report
of
Shell
Oil
Company
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/89629/0000950129-99-000930.txt;
http://www.shellus.com/welcome/who/shell.html.

(1998),

found

at

Thus, an observer may say that as of today, the dominant international players in the petroleum industry are
U.S. and U.K interests. In contrast, France’s Total-FinaElf (a combination of two Western European
interests, TotalFina and Elf Aquitaine) today stands alone against its US-UK competitors such as ExxonMobil, Texaco-Chevron, and BP-Amoco. The French integrated oil and gas company was created
through two successive mergers: 1) The former Total joined with Belgian oil company Petrofina to form
Totalfina, and 2) Totalfina combined with French oil company Elf Aquitaine to create TotalFinaElf. See
http://www.total.com/ho/en/profile/history/index.htm and www.totalfinaelf.com
19

The terms “reconstruction” and “development” are used herein as laymen’s terms. The Articles of
Agreement of the two International Financial Institutions within the World Bank Group, the International
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Summary Of Objectives: This Article establishes two propositions,
and hence serves the following two-fold purpose:
1. Confidential negotiation between MNCs and governments of the developing
economies has long shaped the pattern of “Third World” economic development. Quite
often, the host government of a developing nation, or its instrumentality, acts as the
MNC’s business partner. A stern cynical critic may exclaim that a substantial part of
global economic development has remained the prerogatives of corporate moguls and
“Third World” “monarchs.”20 Their contractual arrangements demonstrate ways in
which MNCs seek, inter alia, to reduce political risks and to form long-term governmentforeign investor partnerships. As an example, the “Production Sharing Contract” or its
variation – a cooperative model between IOGCs and host governments – has evolved
into a standardized model for petroleum exploration all around the world, and has
dominated startup foreign direct investment (FDI) in the petroleum industry for the
past three decades. An IOGC-host government partnership such as the Production
Sharing Contract model presents special legal issues, due not only to the unique nature
of multinationals doing business in the developing nations, but also the special
status and sovereign powers of governments, well-supported in international
law and political philosophy.21 This Article explores these unique issues in the
context of petroleum and energy FDI transactions, typically supported by
complex corporate financing, a “non-recourse” method of third-party funding
called “Project Financing,” and/or funding provided by the Multilateral
Organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World
Bank group (hereafter called “Multilateral Financing”).22 The petroleum and
Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association
(IDA), do not define “reconstruction” or “development.”
I am not sure that it is possible or feasible to coordinate or orchestrate asymmetry or parallelism between
the building of a democratic political system and economic development projects such as infrastructure
building or natural resources development. Compare, Dexter Filkins, “Irquis Receive U.S. Approval of
Constitution” (New York Times March 2,2004), to Yochi J. Dreazen, “How a 24-Year-Old Got a Job
Rebuilding Iraq’s Stock Market” (Wall Street Journal Jan. 28, 2004). See also Andrew Higgins, “US.
Ambitions Run into Reality on an Afghan Road” (Wall Street Journal Feb. 6, 2004) (describing obstacles in
the early steps of infrastructure construction in Afghanistan).
20

The term “monarch” was first used by Mr. N.E. Maryan, formerly senior counsel for Exxon-Mobil, and
adjunct professor of law at Georgetown University. See N.E. Maryan, Jr., Negotiating with the Monarch:
Special Problems when the Sovereign is your Partner, 745 PLI/Comm, 11, 130 (1996).

21

See, e.g., Janis, An Introduction to International Law (3d Ed. Aspen NY 1999) at p. 159. See also T.
Hobbes, Leviathan (Everyman’s Library Ed. 1987) (celebrating the sovereign state).

22

After the global depression of the 1930s and the Second World War, delegates of some 44 participating
nations met at the Bretton Woods Conference in New Hampshire in 1944, and fashioned two multilateral
institutions of the then new economic order: the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) (hereinafter called the
“Multilaterals,” “Multilateral Agencies,” “Multilateral Organizations,” or “Multilateral
Institutions”). See Bederman, International Law Frameworks (Foundation Press 2001). These two
institutions, comprising some 183 state-members, are the grandest and most established Multilaterals.
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energy sector is selected as a case study because of its global workforce and its
vast economic power, both of which have physically changed the face of the
world. (After all, it is the U.S. petroleum and energy sector that accumulates
multi-million-dollar foreign asset base, and dispatches U.S. expatriates to
handle transactions and projects in remote parts of the world such as Vietnam,
Indonesia, Nigeria, or Chad.)
2.
The nuts and bolts of the negotiation between MNCs and “Third
World” governments are veiled from the general public. The legal and business
issues involved in “Third World” economic development often remain the
esoteric domain of a handful of sectoral lawyers and business executives,
further obscured by industry jargon and technological nuances. As a result, the
job of examining the conduct of MNCs tends to become a cry from the ivory
tower, which studies the pivotal role of MNCs from a non-industry perspective.
Although there is abundant literature calling attention to, and challenging the
conduct of MNCs,23 there exist at least two gaps in the stream of scholarly
literature seeking to analyze the impact of, MNCs’ conduct. (By “gaps,” I don’t
mean a total absence of well-crafted literature; rather, I refer to the scarcity of
in-depth scholarly literature written from an industry’s critical analysis.) These
gaps are explained below.
The first is the kind of legal academic literature that identifies and
analyzes certain transactional patterns representing MNCs’ behaviors, as these
transactional patterns become part of the “law of the contract” (lex contractus)
governing the parties’ conduct.24 When these transactional patterns are
Multilaterals also include the regional institutions such as the Inter-American Development Bank, the
Asia Development Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, as well as
other World Bank affiliates such as the Multilateral Investment Guaranty Agency (MIGA) and the
International Finance Corporation (IFC). These Multilaterals are also called the “International
Financial Institutions (IFI).” See, e.g., Margaret Hanson, “The Global Promotion of Transparency in
Emerging Markets,” Global Governance 9, 63-79 (2003) (discussing roles of IFI’s). The term
“Multilateral Financing,” therefore, refers to funding provided by these Multilateral Agencies.
23

See, e.g., John G. Scriven, “Corporate Responsibility and Regulating the Global Enterprise,” 16
Transnat’l L. 153 (2002) (Symposium: The Globalization of Corporate and Securities Law in the 21st
Century). See also Note 10, supra (inventory of scholarship discussing MNCs’ conduct).
24
I identify the following sources of law as governing MNCs’ conduct: (i) lex loci, the national laws of the
home jurisdiction (where the MNC is incorporated) and the host jurisdiction (where the MNC does
business and builds or acquires assets) Lex loci can be divided into lex loci contractus (the law of the place
of contracting) and lex loci solutionis (the law of the place of performance); (ii) lex situs (the law of the
place where the investment project is located); (iii) lex fori (the law of the forum that adjudicates disputes
involving MNCs’ conduct); (iv) lex mercatoria, the body of international economic law that represents the
universal and customary norms of commerce observed by an international “merchant” community; and last
but not least, (v) lex contractus, the body of contract law selected as the choice of law governing the
investment contract, including all provisions of the investment contract resulting from the parties’
negotiation, so long as such provisions do not conflict with the governing contract law. The transactional
patterns conducted by MNCs in connection with their FDI projects (as examined in this Article) become
part of lex contractus, as well as lex mercatoria, potentially.

Of these sources of applicable law, lex fori is the least influential and the least invoked, unless it is the law
of the more developed jurisdiction that serves as the situs for dispute solution. See, generally, Donald C.

13

repeatedly used, they are elevated to legal norms that help shape international
economic law, or modern lex mercatoria.25 In-depth scholarly literatures in this
category are few and far between. Existing literatures are either practitioners’
succinct contributions to law review discourse, or are often practice guides
written by, and designed for, sectoral specialists in the private bar in order to
enhance their practice experience, or to provide them with a forum for
discussion and a source of continuing legal education material. Between the
two ends of the spectrum – from specialty law textbooks to the practice guides there exists a vacuum, a demand for a more abundant and meaningful
scholarly literatures focusing on the transactional patterns that drive trends in
global economic development and help form modern lex mercatoria and lex
contractus. Accordingly, I perceive a great need for the legal community at large
to examine the dynamics involved in the formation of these multi-million-dollar
MNC-government partnerships. With this Article, I hope to meet that need by
unveling and explaining the esoteric and technically complex international
Dowling, “Forum Shopping and Other Reflections on Litigation Involving U.S. and European Businesses,”
7 Pace Int’l L.Rev. 465 (1995). The norm of dispute resolution in international business transactions has
been either institutional or ad hoc consensual, binding, and final arbitration, rather than full-blown judicial
resolution in a court of law. See Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration in the United States
(Kluwer 1994). Accord Daniele Favalli, “Survey of Recent Developments in International Arbitration,”
Texas Transnational L. Quarterly 14-18 (August 2001).
25

Modern international commercial law (as well as the broader category of “international business law” or
“international economic law”) is rooted in the ancient lex mercatoria (the “law merchant”), a medieval
body of customary legal rules used in international trades to supplement the often incomplete commercial
laws of nation-states. See, generally, Friedrich K. Juenger, “American Conflicts Scholarship and the New
Law Merchant,” 28 Vand.J.Trans. L. 487 (1995) (also discussing rules of decisions applied by international
arbitrators); Karyn S. Weinberg, “Equity in International Arbitration: How Fair is ‘Fair’? A Study of Lex
Mercatoria and Amiable Composition,” 12 B.U.Int’l L.J. 227 (1994). Lex mercatoria was common at least
to European nations, but obviously Asian countries, the Arab world, the Americas, and Africa also
observed customary rules of commerce. Ancient creative literature originated from non-Western European
traditions such as the anonymously authored Arabian Nights made endless references to traveling
merchants trading transnationally, in regions such as the Middle East, Asia Minor, the Far East, and Africa.
For a discussion of lex mercatoria from the Western perspective, see, e.g., Hononold, The Influence of the
Law of International Trade on the Development and Character of English and American Commercial Law,
The Sources of International Trade 70-71 (Schmitthoff ed. 1964); F. De Ly, International Business Law
and Lex Mercatoria 15-20 (1992). Accord Janis, An Introduction to International Law (Aspen 3d ed. 1999)
at pp. 282-283. Accord Eric Engle, “Corporate Social Responsibility: Market-Based Remedies for
International Human Rights Violations?” 40 Williamette L.Rev. 103 (Winter 2004) (“Medieval lex
mercatoria...was fundamentally a private law of contract and arbitration. Lex mercatoria concerned only
private parties, was binding, and was a result of voluntary agreement...
The phrase “international economic law” or “transnational economic law” has broader meaning than
“international commercial law,” which governs international sales, export-import transactions, and the
shipment and distribution of goods and services. The concept of a broader body of “international economic
law” was envisioned by Jessup to denote the equivalent of “customary international law” in the domain of
economic and commercial relations. Jessup, Transnational Law 2 (1956) (on Jessup, see Schacter, “Philip
Jessup’s Life and Ideals”, 80 Am. J. Int’l 878 (1986); Hazel Fox, International Economic Law and
Developing Countries (1992); Bederman, supra at 141. Cf. Michael Wallace Gordon, “A Comment on the
Recent Change of the Name of the University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Business Law to
Journal of International Economic Law,” in Folsom, Gordon 7 Spanogle, International Business
Transaction: A Reader, at 25 (West Publishing Co. 1997) (satire on the emerging use of the phrase
“international economic law”).
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petroleum and energy transactions, in order to dispel myths and develop a
general understanding of the processes and some of the key legal issues
involved.
The second gap in legal literature concerns the need for the scientific
gathering of empirical data and their interpretations, reflecting or pointing to
any correlations between “Third World” poverty, “Third World” governments’
behavior, and MNCs’ corporate behavior as well as their FDI business
strategies, in order to prove or disprove general notions that may have been
taken for granted.26 Without such interpretation and established linkage, the
tasks of analyzing or monitoring MNCs’ conduct or fashioning policies and relief
for effective “Third World” economic development may run the risks of becoming
cliché, rhetoric, and even euphemism. So far, any such empirical undertakings
have been the exclusive province of economists, international think-tanks, and
the Multilateral Institutions in support of their own missions.27 Legal academia

26

For example, the international law debates continue as to whether foreign investment is highly
beneficial to the developing states (the “neo-classical theory”), or whether FDI as practiced by MNCs is
generally detrimental to Third World development (the “dependency theory”). Compare T.J. Biersteker,
Multinationals, The State And The Control Of The Nigerian Economy 3-51 (1987) and Burns H. Weston,
“The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States and the Deprivation of Foreign-Owned Wealth,” 75
Am. J. Int’l L. 437, 460 (1981). Accord, James D. Nolan, “A Comparative Analysis of the Laotian Law on
Foreign Investment, the World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, and
Normative Rules of International Law on Foreign Direct Investment,” 15 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 659
(Spring 1998).
27

See, e.g., Martin Dent, The Crisis and Poverty and Debt in the Third World (Ashgate Pub. 1999), John
Baffoe-Bonnie, Contemporary Economic Issue in Developing Countries (Praeger, Westport, Ct: 2003). See
also, http://www.wto.org/English/news_e/pres00_e/pr181_e.htm.; Annex to “Codes of Conduct –
Exploring
Their
Economic
Significance”
(OECD
May
11,
2001),
found
at
http://www.oecd.org/dtaoecd/0/15/2681579.pdf and http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/46/36/2075173.pdf;
World Bank Group, “Does More International Trade Openness Increase World Poverty?” FACTSHEETS:
ASSESSING GLOBALIZATION, at http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/pb/globalization/paper2.htm
(as of April 2000); Ralph Bryant, Turbulent Waters: Cross-Border Finance and International Governance
(Washington, D.C. Brookings Institution, 2003)’ Nancy Bearg Dyke, Persistent Poverty in Developing
Countries: Determining the Causes and Closing the Gaps (The Brookings Institution, The Aspen Institute
1998).
For an individual effort at drawing correlations between free trade-NAFTA and “Third World” poverty
using Mexico as an example, see Richard C. Williams, “Globalization and its Effects on the Developing
World” (Rocky Mountains Harvard University Club presentation, April 27, 2003) (unpublished manuscript
available on file with the author). Richard C. Williams, Ph.D., concludes that since the execution of
NAFTA, poverty statistics have become worse, based on statistical data from websites for the Alliance for
Responsible Trade, the London School of Economics, the International Labour Organization (ILO) and
research websites of the World Bank and its affiliates. For example, since the implementation of NAFTA,
the percentage of the Mexican population living in poverty (i.e., below $7.30 a day) falls from 58.5% to
79%. At the beginning of globalization (approximately the 1960s), the rate of world unemployment,
underemployment, and incomes under $1/day was less than 20%. As of 2003, this percentage stood at
approximately 40%, according to ILO data. These conclusions represent Dr. Willliams’ views and work,
and sources supporting Dr. Williams’ conclusions have not been verified for purposes of this Article.
Interestingly, other interpretation of World Bank data contradict Dr. Williams’ conclusion – global poverty
rate did fall from 29 percent to 24 percent, according to 2000 World Bank factsheets. See Tony McAdams,
19 J. Legal Studies Education at 254, n. 100, citing World Bank Group, “Does More International Trade

15

should undertake similar inquiries, as they are the premier group to voice
critical and interpretative analyses of prescriptive standards and normative
behaviors, especially when law, politics, and cultures collide and intertwine, as
in the case of “Third World” economic development. Specifically, questions must
be raised by way of objective data establishing the linkage between “Third
World” poverty, FDI patterns, the cause-effect relationships between trade and
FDI, “Third World” inhabitants’ cultural norms, “Third World” governments’
political behaviors and macroeconomic policies (or lack thereof), MNCs’ profitdriven behaviors and corporate policies, and last but not least, the international
relations and global economic policies of MNCs’ home countries.28 This
mammoth task can either be the solitary effort of legal academia, or better still
a joint project for the interdisciplinary scholarly community, the think-tanks,
and the international organizations (including the Multilaterals). It is hoped
that this Article will contribute to the spurring of further studies conducted by
the legal academy, and to firmly establish the need to draw empirical data and

Openness Increase World Poverty?” FACTSHEETS: ASSESSING GLOBALIZATION, at
http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/pb/globalization/paper2.htm (as of April 2000). The same World
Bank data support the conclusion that globalization and free trade have increased the gap in income
between the rich and the poor. Id.
28

Cf. Charles E. Mueller, “Why is Islam so Poor? From Wealth to Poverty in 900 Years,” 31 Antitrust
Law & Econ. Rev. 1 (2002) (attributing the poverty of some 57 Islamic nations or 20% of world citizens to
the lack of pluralism and monopoly-poverty linkage in Islam culture, rather than lack of resources or
capital); Dmitriy N. Podosyonov & Charles Mueller, “Why is Russia still so Poor 10 Years After The Fall
of Communism?” 31 Antritrust Law & Econ. Rev. XX (2002) (attributing poverty of the 25-nation postSoviet bloc to the demoralization and corruption associated with the clash between capitalism and the
remnant/austerity of former communist indoctrination – the “severed nerves” aftermath; author suggesting
full private ownership of land and a return to agricultural growth). These allegations, however, are without
empirical support or documented with case studies. Compare Gene R. Nichol, “Poverty and Equality: A
Distant Mirror ,” 100 Mich.L.Rev. 1661, 1671 (May 2002) (book review of Joel Schwartz, Fight Poverty
with Virtue: Moral Reform and America’s Urban Poor (Indiana University Press 2000) and Elliott J. Gorn,
Mother Jones: The Most Dangerous Woman in America (New York: Hill & Wang 2001) (discussing 21st
century democracy and poverty in America: 11.3% of Americans (31 million people) live in poverty;
approximately 22% of black and Latino youths are impoverished); Rah Bhala, “The Third World, The
Muslim World, and The New Trade Round: Part 1, Int’l T.L.R. 2002, 8(4), 118-127 (examining the “Doha
Development Agenda” of the new WTO trade round and discussing issues of poverty in the Islamic World
and the Third World). Accord Ved P. Nanda, “East Trade Rules to Help Developing Nations” (Denver
Post Sept. 19, 2003).
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make meaningful conclusions.29 In other words, better studies and statistics
are needed to support causative claims.30

Summary of Arguments: This Article will proceed as follows:
Part A describes a real-life situation, using the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam as an example where an MNC-IOGC partnered with a “Third World”
“monarch.” (This real-life situation will serve as context for Part B).
Part B dissects and explains the principal legal and business issues, as
well as the dynamics of negotiation, in two types of FDI transactions: (i) the
international “upstream” petroleum project, and (ii) the international
“midstream” independent power-generation project (IPP) in which natural gas
discovered is used to generate electricity. The discussion in Part B encompasses
four unique legal and business issues encountered by the international
petroleum and energy sector in its partnerships with “Third World”
governments, together with my specific recommendations for improvement:
(1) The transfer and sharing of risks among dominant corporate players in
the international petroleum and energy sector. I argue that this pattern may
create de facto monopolistic cartels, precluding and suppressing the embryonic
growth of a true entrepreneurial middle class in the native population,
notwithstanding the government’s “free enterprise” open-door economy policy
that invites the MNC to be in the country in the first place! These de facto
cartels may foster, promote, and fortify the power base of the host government’s
ruling elites, who become the “monarchs” of the 20th and 21st century. This
monopolistic pattern defeats the ultimate objective of free enterprise: the
spreading of wealth and attainment of prosperity based on level-playing field

29

See, e.g.,Tamara Lothian & Katharina Pistor, “Local Institutions, Foreign Investment and Alternative
Strategies of Development: Some Views from Practice,” 42 Colum.J.Transn’l L. 101 (2003) (Conclusions
by commentators after panel discussion with practitioners: “Today, there is much more empirical support
for the claim that law matters for foreign investment. Nevertheless, new law and development initiatives
that use these data...are as problematic today as they were in the early 1960s...There are three main
problems: (A) the data are poorly specified; (B) the concepts are incoherent; and (C) the promise of new
reforms is rarely realized in practice...A further gap in the current understanding of investment patterns
arises from the lack of detailed case studies...Given this lack of useful data, new insights likely could be
drawn from the experiences of practical people in real-world investment projects located in countries at
the forefront of market reform...” Commentators also acknowledged the need for “an agenda for further
research,” and the lack of information describing investment patterns due to lack of first-hand knowledge)
(emphasis added).
30

For example, one such causative claim that needs to be examined is whether the shareholder wealthmaximization model of U.S. corporate laws and its underlying philosophy has occasioned more economic
inequality in the U.S., compared to other nation-members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD). OECD statistics since 1996 seem to support this conclusion. See, e.g., OECD
Analysis of Economic Inequality, cited in Mark Roe, Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from
Corporate Control: The Incompatibility of the American Public Firm with Social Democracy,” 53 Stan. L.
Rev. 539, 577 (2000). To the best of my knowledge, the impact of the U.S. shareholder wealth
maximization model upon global economic inequality, especially in the “Third World,” has not been tested,
challenged, or otherwise examined or reexamined by way of empirical data or sampling studies.
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and individual innovation and creativity, toward the creation of a healthier and
larger middle class in those places that need it the most.
(2) The payment of bonuses by MNCs to governments, and the need to
substitute cash bonuses and payments with industry-sponsored social programs.
This pattern may create an opportunity for legitimized corruption under the
guise of discretionary exercise of sovereign power, and may turn global
economic development projects into auctions, thereby feeding more “grease”31
into a governmental apparatus that may already be plagued with corruption
and abuse of power, if that is the case.32 Accordingly, I suggest that the
industry should join efforts to lobby “Third World” governments for the
abolishment of cash bonuses required as a means for the nation-state to
capture Economic Rents in Production Sharing Contracts or similar investment
contracts. Cash bonuses should be replaced with direct social programs
designed to contribute directly to the local community of ““Third World””
inhabitants.
(3) The popular “Stabilization Clause” as a risk-management tool, and a
negotiated contractual restriction upon a nation-state’s legislative or rule-making
sovereign power. While the Stabilization Clause serves the purpose of
eliminating and controlling political risks, it may help perpetuate the close-knit
and collaborative nature of certain economic partnerships between governments
and MNCs. Both sides to the deal may be motivated to solidify their long-term
presence or elitist foothold in the country. Further, the very nature and purpose
of the Clause makes it inherently incongruent and legally problematic. The
Clause also evidences the lack of bargaining power in “Third World” economic
negotiations, cloaking the MNC as the preferred, desired business partner of a
poor country’s ruling elites. Finally, the Clause (together with all other
contractual provisions supporting it) demonstrates the paradoxical negotiating
objective of the MNC in structuring the contracting capacity of the host
government or its State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) -- the MNC needs to recognize
the sovereignty’s power and, at the same time, must limit and denounce such
sovereign power when the “monarch” is engaging in commercial activities.

31

Interestingly, the United States’ anti-corruption law in international business, the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (FCPA), 15 U.S.C. §78dd-1(1998), creates an exception from liability commonly described
by lawyers and corporate executives as the “grease payment” exception. 15 U.S.C. §78dd-1(b)(1998).
Payments to expedite the performance of routine governmental action are permitted under the Act,
provided that all statutory criteria constituting the exception are met. U.S. v Kay, No. 02-20588, 2004 U.S.
App. Lexis 1740 (5th Cir. 2004); United States v. Castle, 925 F.2d 831, 833 (5th Cir. 1991) (recognizing that
“grease” payments are not illegal under the FCPA because they are considered part of the custom of doing
business in a certain foreign country) See also Toral Patel, “Corrupt Practices in India: No Payoff,” 20
Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L.J. 389 (January 1998) (discussing “grease” payment exception in the context of
India).
32

See, e.g., Helena Kolenda, “One Party, Two Systems: Corruption in the People’s Republic of China
and Attempts to Control it,” 4 J. Chinese L. 187 (1990). See Note 15, supra (discussing corruption in
developing countries).
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(4) Non-Recourse Project Financing as a means to isolate MNCs’ corporate
assets from political risk exposures in the developing economies. Project
Financing has poured billions of dollars of funding into the “Third World,”33
either separately or as piggy-backs of Multilateral Financing. (In this regard,
Multilateral Financing serves as a “step-up” credit enhancement tool for Project
Financing). For the corporate investor, both financing structures – Project
Financing and Multilateral Financing -- operate as a risk-allocation mechanism
that ultimately puts risks of loss upon the taxpayers of the developed nations,
as well as the poor inhabitants of the “Third World.” Both financing techniques
can also operate to preclude participation by smaller or medium-sized
entrepreneurships, in favor of mega-MNCs who typically join forces to share
risks among themselves, thereby reinforcing the existence of de facto cartels
dominating the sector and the region. Further, Project Financing should no
longer be the “privileged” financing method exclusively for elitist mega-projects.
Neither “brand-name” recognition of project participants nor the existence or
availability of Multilateral Financing should serve as a ‘”step-up” credit
enhancement tool for private bankers in assessing Project Financing eligibility
for ““Third World”” development projects. Funding from smaller-sized banks
should be made available to smaller or medium-sized entrepreneurships,
including native businesses, so long as the income-producing nature of the
project can be verified and contractually assured under “Project Financing”
concepts.34
Part C: As a conclusion, Part C raises the need for reflection and
further reassessment of the current patterns, including the following
recommendations.35
1) The role played by MNC counsel, international business transactions
(IBT) lawyers and executives in the shaping of global economic development
should be examined and reassessed. Even transactional lawyers should be
made keenly cognizant of their role, not only as zealous counsel advancing the
interest of their clients, but also as members of an international legal
community advocating an “international rule-of-law” system built upon “general

33

Although the post-Eron federal legislation, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Public Company
Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act), Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.), has changed the requirements for the reporting of “off-balance-sheet”
transactions for the protection of the investing public, the new law does not change the principal
characteristic of Project Financing – that ”Project Financed” loans are non-recourse and, hence, helps
shield the borrower and its corporate assets from collateral risks or otherwise from individual obligations
beyond project tasks and revenues.
34

The potential harm of one important benefit of Project Financing, the “off-balance sheet” treatment of
debts popularly enjoyed by corporate project sponsors in the past decades, may have incidentally been
lessened or corrected by the post-Enron legislation, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002). Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 (Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act), Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat.
745 (codified in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.). See also Notes 305-08, infra.
35

The development of these recommendations is reserved for for subsequent articles as part of this same
series.
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principles of law common to the major legal systems of the world,”36 or “the
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.”37 This concept should
expressly be added to various state bar codes of professional responsibilities to
reflect and meet the demand of a global economy. The imposition of this “double
hat” function upon international corporate counsel and IBT lawyers -- both as

36

Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (ALI) Section 102s (1)(c) and (4)
(“Derivation from general principles common to the major legal systems of the world” constitutes a
“source” of the rule of internatioanal law (the “doctrine of sources”); “general principles common to the
major legal systems, even if not incorporated or reflected in customary law or international agreement,
may be invoked as supplementary rules of international law where appropriate”).

37

Statute of the International Court of Justice. STAT. OF THE INT'L CT. OF J., June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1031 (entered into force Oct. 24, 1945).
While legal norms representing the consensus of “civilized nations” as both “source” and “evidence” of
customary international law are well-rooted in modern international jurisprudence, the danger of legal
favortism leaning toward Anglo-American jurisprudence should be guarded against, as this has caused
divergence in the North-South dialogue. Cf., e.g., Rudi Dornbusch, “Check the Laws Before you Invest
Abroad,” Business Week (Oct. 28, 1996) at p. 34 (discussing report published by the National Bureau of
Economic Research characterizing the world’s legal traditions into two major systems: Anglo-American
common law and French civil law; concluding that the rest of nations followed either of the two major
systems as a result of colonialism. Rafael La Porta, et al., Law and Finance, NBER Working Paper
5661(1996) (visited February 24, 2004) <http://www.nber.org/papers/w5661. The conclusion ignores the
hybrid nature of the legal systems of the diverse developing world, as well as their own native legal
heritage, and, in particular, omits traditional Islamic law (the Shari’a). Noel J. Coulson, Commercial Law
in the Gulf States: the Islamic Legal Tradition (1984); S.E. Rayner, The Theory of Contracts in Islamic
Law: A Comparative Analysis with Particular Reference to the Modern Legislation in Kuwait, Bahrain and
United Arab Emirates (1991). See also Konrad Zweigert & Hein Kotz, An Introduction to Comparative
Law (1977) and Parvia Owsia, Formation of Contract (1994). The diversity of legal and cultural traditions
among the developing economies should receive recognition, and the approach universally accepted by
modern anthropologists – that cultural diversity and cultural relativity contributes to the study of normative
and prescriptive behaviors -- should become part of the foundation for international law. See, e.g., Margaret
Mead, Coming of Age in Samoa: A Psychological Study of Primitive Youth for Western Civilization
(1928); New Lives and Old: Cultural Transformation-Manus, 1928-1953 (1956); And Keep Your Power
Dry: An Anthropologist Looks at America (1942); The Study of Culture at a Distance (1953) (with Rhoda
Metraux, editors); A Way of Seeing (1970) (with Rhoda Metraux); World Enough: Rethinking the Future
(1975) (with Ken Heyman).
The incorporation of multiculturalism into customary international law comports with the emerging trend to
reasssess “development” as an economic, political, legal, and cultural concept. For example, the European
Union has vowed to promote, for instance, “the African-Caribbean-Pacific State (ACP)’s efforts to achieve
self-reliant and self-sustained development based on...social values, their human capacities, their natural
resources and their economic potential...” Lome Convention, Part IV, Article 4 (1990) (emphasis added).
The Lome Convention is an agreement based on “a residual sense of responsibility for the colonial past,”
intended to aid the evolution of former dependent territories into the world economy. See European
Commission, “Green Paper on Relations Between the European Union and the ACP Countries on the Eve
Century
–
Challenges
and
Options
for
a
New
Partnership,
of
the
21st
http://www.oneworld.org/euforic/greenpap/chap2.htm.; European Commission, “Development: Bilateral
and Development Cooperation Relations with Africa, the Carribean and the Pacific -- ‘What are the Current
Justifications for Development Aid?’” http://europa/eu.int./en/comm/dg08/faq/enfaq08.htm. Now, it is a
question of whether this commitment is merely lips’ service or may lead to unintended consequences
notwithstanding the best intention.
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zealous advocate and as watchdog of the public interest -- has legal support
because:
(i) In most national legal systems, the doctrine of social responsibility
has helped write public interest concerns directly into the role of profitmaking corporations;38 and
(ii) In modern societies governed by the rule of law such as the U.S,
lawyers are often described as “officers of the court.”39 Correspondingly,
the IBT lawyer, regardless of her transactional specialty or employment,
should be considered a member of the global legal community at large – a
community aspired and inspired by the rule of law recognized by
“civilized nations.”40
2) The regulation of MNCs’ global conduct should be initiated with the
national jurisdiction where the MNC is incorporated and headquartered, by way
of “enforced self-regulation” or “management-based regulation,” a regulatory
model that compels the regulated entities to improve or disclose their internal
management to achieve public goals.41 Mandatory periodic disclosure of
voluntary corporate compliance policies and programs, which should include
multiculturalism training for international executives and lawyers, should be
part of this regulatory model.
3) Existing legal principles common to “civilized nations” that can serve
the prophylactic function against corporate ills such as fiduciary duties, third
party beneficiaries, principal-agency relationship, and the public trust doctrine
in property law should formally be injected into modern international economic
law, and implemented through the existing mechanism of real-life commerce. In
order to achieve this goal, practical modifications to the negotiation and dispute
resolution of publicly or quasi-publicly financed international contracts should
be considered and implemented. The voices of independent public interest and
advocacy groups and non-governmental organizations should be injected into
the negotiation and dispute solution process. This is what I call “a public-

38

See, e.g Model Business Corporation Act, as amended, Section 3.02(13) MBCA (empowering
corporations to “make donations for the public welfare or for charitable, scientific, or educational
purposes); see also Note 197, infra.

39

See Note 406, infra.

40

See Statute of the International Court of Justic, STAT. OF THE INT'L CT. OF J., June 26, 1945, 59
Stat. 1031 (entered into force Oct. 24, 1945). See also Note 37, supra.
41

Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, “Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to
Achieve Public Goals,” Law & Society Review Vol. 37, No. 4, 691-730, at 604 (2003); John Brainwaite,
“Enforce Self-Regulation: A New Strategy for Corporate Crime Control,” 80 Michigan L. Rev. 1466-407
(1982); Mary Graham, Democracy by Disclosure: The Rise of Technopopulism,” Washington D.C., The
Brookings Institution Press (2002); Neil Gunningham & Joseph Rees, “Industry Self-Regulation: An
Institutional Perspective,” 19 Law & Policy 363-414 (1997).; Cass R. Sunstein, “Informational Regulation
and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond,” 147 Univ. Penn. L. Rev. 613-75 (1999). See also
Ronald Coase, “The Problem of Social Costs,” 3 J. Law & Economics 1-44 (1960).
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interest approach” to the formation and interpretation of MNC-“Third World”
government investment contracts in which property of the “people” is
immediately at stake.
###

PART A
NEGOTIATING WITH THE MONARCH -- A TYPICAL SCENARIO
The following real-life scenario, constructed based on public
information,42 is used as a hypothetical to set the stage for discussion, and to
provide the context for legal analyses. All names of private parties have been
omitted.

•

The Case Of Vietnam And The Petroleum Sector

In the heat and humidity of an April day in Hanoi, the dancing tropical
sunshine in the courtyard of the Defense Guesthouse complemented the spirit
of festivity. It was a special day for PetroVietnam, the state-owned oil company
of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, which had approval authority over all
petroleum-related investment projects in the country. PetroVietnam’s chairman
reported directly to the Prime Minister.43 In a deal-closing ceremony to take
place that evening, PetroVietnam would officially be granting a U.S.-based
international oil and gas company (IOGC) exploration rights in a contract area
off the Vietnamese coast (the “Vietnam Deal”).44
For the first time in Hanoi, the national flags of the U.S., Russia, Japan,
and Vietnam stood together, forming the backdrop for the signing table.
(Historically, the U.S. used to be at war with North Vietnam; Japan used to
occupy Vietnam; and the Soviet Union was North Vietnam’s ally in its war
against the U.S.) Ironically, 19 years ago, it was also during an April afternoon
that U.S. ambassador Graham Martin escaped Vietnam on the last helicopter
out, carrying with him the folded American flag, leaving behind broken ideals
and the despair of hundreds of thousands South Vietnamese collaborators

42

See e.g., R. Thomas Collins, Jr., Blue Dragon: Reckoning in the South China Sea (RavensYard
Publishing , Ltd. VA 2002).

43

VIETNAM’S PETROLEUM LAW (Luat Dau Khi) (National Politics Publishers Hanoi 1993) (version
applicable in 1994). See also PetroVietnam Company Overview,
http://www.petrovietnam.com.vn/internet/Promotion.nsf/EXPO2002/PROEXPII_2.htm.
44

As of January 2002, Vietnam reportedly has oil-proved reserves of 1.4 billion bbl, and natural gas
reserves
of
1.3
billion
cu
m.
See
CIA
The
World
Factbook,
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/vm.html. Vietnam has no refinery. Accordingly,
although it exports crude oil in volumes as high as 9 million tons, it also imports processed oil products in
volumes as high as 9.5 million tons. The import value of oil and gas products was estimated at $1,000
million for 1997. Plans for refinery constructions are aimed for the early part of the 21st century. See
STA-USA on the Internet, U.S. Department of Commerce, http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSG/dd75600e.html.
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facing the prospect of communist “reeducation” camps.45 Almost 20 years had
passed since then, but in April, 1994, no U.S. ambassador to Vietnam had been
appointed. Under the Reagan-Bush “roadmap” policy,46 the U.S. and Vietnam
had not even normalized diplomatic relations. President Clinton had just lifted
the trade embargo, once implemented against Vietnam under the Trading With
The Enemy Act.47 For the deal-closing ceremony, the display of national flags
was PetroVietnam’s choice of a symbolic gesture, representing the mutual
economic interests that served to alleviate old-time hostility. Vestiges of that
prolonged, notoriously devastating war between the U.S. and communist North
Vietnam, once making international headlines daily, was surely a creature of
the past.
In 1994, Vietnam was looking forward to its 10th year anniversary of Doi
Moi” (“Renovation”), a market economic policy paradoxically implemented under
a Leninist, single-party political structure. Heated territorial disputes
spearheaded by China over the Spratley Islands were looming over Vietnam’s
sovereignty claims to deep-water offshore drilling projects in the South China
Sea. Yet, the political tension in the region had not deterred IOGCs from
pouring their technology and capital into the Vietnamese continental shelf.48

45

Frank Snepp, Decent Interval (Random House NY 1977) (describing the fall of Saigon from the
perspective of a CIA analyst assigned to Vietnam).

46

Robert G. Sutter, Vietnam-U.S. Relations: The Debate Over Normalization, CRS Issue Brief IB92054
(1992). The “roadmap” policy used a “phased-in” approach and conditioned normalization of diplomatic
relations with Vietnam on step-by-step accomplishments, among which was the resolution of various MIA
issues. See Congressional Research Service (CRS) Brief, “Vietnam - U.S. Relations: The Debate over
Normalization” (Library of Congress, Issue Brief No. IB92054, May 12, 1992).

47

50 USCA App. Section 1 et al. The initial embargo against communist North Vietnam was entered into
in 1954. In 1975, President Ford issued another embargo against South Vietnam under the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. Section 1701 et seq., following the fall of Saigon.

48

To date, the territorial dispute over the groups of islands in the South China Sea has never been resolved,
although claimants had signed the “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea,” a
mechanism
to
ease
tension
yet
falling
short
of
a
code
of
conduct.
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publicfations/factbook/print/vm.html. See also Jonathan I. Charney, “Central East
Asian Maritime Boundaries and the Law of the Sea,” 89 Am. J. Int’l L. 724 (1995); Brian K. Murphy,
“Dangerous Ground: The Spratly Islands and International Law,” 1 Ocean & Coastal L.J. 187 (1995);
Wendy Duong, “The Long Saga of the Spratlys Island: An Overview of the Territorial Disputes in the
South China Sea Among Vietnam, China, and other ASEAN Nations,” Texas Transnational Law Quarterly
(November 1997) and Currents -- International Trade Law Journal (South Texas College of Law Summer
1997). The oil-related South China Sea disputes have spanned over two decades, involving not only the
interest of the ASEAN nations, but also of more economically powerful states such as China and Japan.
Henry Scott Stokes, “Oil Riches Off China’s Shores” (New York Times Jan. 19, 1982).
One reason why the private sector is not deterred by territorial disputes is the relative success of the “Joint
Development Zone (JDZ)” as a method of resolving sovereign claims over competing economic interests.
See, e.g., Ernst Willheim, “Australia-Indonesia Sea-Bed Boundary Negotiations: Proposals for a Joint
Development Zone in the ‘Timor Gap’,” 29 Nat. Resources J. 821 (1989); see also Henry Scott Stokes,
“Oil Riches Off China’s Shores,” NY Times, Jan. 19, 1982, at D1. The concept allows private investors to
develop the contract area economically, and then bring all sovereign interests together to negotiate joint use
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For three reasons, the deal had great significance to Vietnam, both figuratively
and economically. First, the exploration block was named after a Vietnamese
folklore about a holy dragon reigning in the South China Sea, representing the
forefather of the nation. Second, the deal, closed immediately after the U.S.’s
lifting of the trade embargo, could be construed as Vietnam’s welcome-back
gesture for U.S. companies. Third, the deal supposedly benefited the people,
who, under the Vietnamese Constitution,49 collectively owned all land, sea
surfaces, minerals and natural resources. PetroVietnam was simply an agent of
the Central Government,50 which constitutionally represented the people of
Vietnam.
The deal was equally significant to the IOGC, not only for profit-making
reasons and successful financial engineering, but also for historical pride and
perhaps even institutional nostalgia. In 1994, the IOGC was returning to
Vietnam, only to claim the fruit of its work by resuming what it had started 19
years ago. During the 1960s and early 1970s, the IOGC had purchased seismic
data gathered on the continental shelf offshore South Vietnam and had begun
interpretation. In the spring of 1973, South Vietnam invited the IOGC and some
other 26 oil companies to submit bids on some 30 offshore blocks. In June,
1973, the IOGC was awarded exploration rights on two of the 30 blocks. By the
end of 1973, the IOGC had sold 30% of its interest to a Japanese partner. This
U.S.-Japan joint venture was awarded more blocks in February, 1974, and
continued to “farm out” its interest to other international partners. Just before
Christmas of 1974, the well reached its target depth, and the IOGC declared an
oil discovery. But things were changing drastically in South Vietnam back then.
While the well was being spudded in March, 1975, the North Vietnamese army
was also mobilized to advance along the Ho Chi Minh Trail toward Saigon. On
April 30, 1975, a North Vietnamese tank crashed through South Vietnam’s
Presidential Palace in the heart of Saigon, ending the two-decade war. The
IOGC’s expatriate staff had barely had time to copy seismic data surveys and
or sharing in production. This technique has been used to settle boundary disputes between Australia and
Indonesia, Libya and Tunisia, North Yemen and South Yemen, Thailand and Malaysia, and others. David
M. Ong, Joint Development of Common Offshore Oil and Gas Deposits: “Mere” State Practice or
Customary International Law, 93 A.J.I.L. 771 (1999); Symposium on Energy and International Law:
Development, Litigation, and Regulation, 36 Tex. Int’l L. J. 1 (Winter 2001). In particular, the Timor Gap
dispute between East Timor, Indonesia, Australia, and Portugal has recently been resolved politically, with
the United Nations recognizing East Timor as an independent state. See, e.g., Australia-Indonesia Timor
Gap Treaty, 29 I.L.M. 475 (1990); Kym P. Livesley, “The Timor Gap Treaty,” in ENERGY LAW 90 at p.
61 (Int’l Bar Ass’n 1990); Voon, Closing the Gap Between Legitimacy and Legality of Humanitarian
Intervention: Lessons from East Timor and Kosovo, 7 UCLA J. Int’l L. & For. Aff.31, 52-58 (2002); S.C.
Res. 1392, U.N. SCOR, 4463rd mtg., U.N. DOC. S/RES/1392 (2002).
49

CONST. OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM 1992, Art. 17, pmbl., in THE
CONSTITUTIONS OF VIETAM 1946-1959-1980
- 1992 (The Gioi 1995), found at
http://www.isop.ucla.edu/eas/documents/VN-cons.htm.

50

Wendy N. Duong, “Overview of the Institutional and Legal Framework, the Petroleum Law, and
Relevant Matters in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam,” country report written for Mobil Eastern
Exploration & Development, Inc. (1993) (unpublished report on file with author, cited with client’s
permission). Accord VIETNAM’S PETROLEUM LAW (Luat Dau Khi) (National Politics Publishers
Hanoi 1993) (version applicable in 1994).
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well logs, to suspend drilling operations, and then to sail the drilling ship to
Thailand. The IOGC’s oil discovery later became the property of a joint venture
between the new Vietnam and the Soviet Union. The U.S. oil and gas giant had
lost the fruit of its work to the Soviets.51
But things changed again, and in 1994, the IOGC was beginning a new
chapter of commerce with the same government that had chased it out of
Vietnamese waters some 19 years ago. By virtue of a “Production Sharing
Contract,” the IOGC would be conducting petroleum exploration as a
contractor of the Socialist Central Government. For its technological work
programs, advancement of costs, and investment in the country’s subsoil, the
IOGC would be compensated by way of a share in the production of the
resources found. In this “Production Sharing” scheme, PetroVietnam (as the
government’s agent) would be receiving the people’s share of the oil, and the
sales proceeds of such oil share would supposedly be used for the people’s
good. Yet, outside Vietnam, various Vietnamese American activists and the
handful of NGOs advocating liberal democracy in East and Southeast Asia52
had focused on Vietnam’s poor human rights records, although the country had
signed on to the majority of the human rights conventions.53 The indirect
implication of their allegations was that perhaps the billions of “Third World”
inhabitants were often disregarded in these commercial deals. While such
public outcries arguably may create a “shaming” or “moral stigmatization” effect
and, hence, may contribute to shareholder activism movements54 or scholarly

51

R. Thomas Collins, Jr., Blue Dragon: Reckoning in the South China Sea, at pp. 21-23 (RavensYard
Publishing Ltd. VA 2002).
52

For reports on political oppression in East Asian and Southeast Asian countries, see AMNESTY
INTERNTIONAL, ANNUAL REPORT 2003 found at http://web.amnesty.org/web/web.nsf/print/myssummary-eng (Malaysia);
http://web.amnesty.org/web/web.nsf/print/mmr-summary-eng (Myanmar);
(Vietnam);
http://web.amnesty.org/web/web.nsf/print/vnm-summary-eng
(Lao);
http://web.amnesty.org/web/web.nsf/print/lao-summary-eng
http://web.amnesty.org/web/web.nsf/print/chn-summary-eng (China).
See also NewsMax.com, “Stress Vietnam Rights, Clinton Told” (November 10, 2000) (quoting Human
Rights Watch on Vietnam’s arrests and imprisonment of political and religious dissidents), found at
http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2000/11/10/97827.shtml.; CNN, “Rights Group Says Vietnam
repressing Religious Freedom” (November 14, 2000).
53

Vietnam has become signatory to 8 U.N. human rights conventions. See Le Minh Thong, Nghien Cuu
Ly Luan: 50 Nam—Tuyen Ngon The Gioi Ve Quyen Con Nguoi [Editorial: Fifty Years After the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights] in NHA NUOC VA PHAP LUAT [The State and the Law]
(monthly publication) No. 4 (120) (The Institute of State and Law, National Center for Social Sciences and
Humanities 1998), at 33-43. Accord Wendy N. Duong, “Gender Equality and Women’s Issues in
Vientam: The Vietnamese Woman – Warrior and Poet,” 10 Pac. Rim. L. & Pol. J. No. 2, 191 (2001), at
222 n. 123.

54

As early as the 1970s, Georgetown law student shareholders of General Motors, aided by their corporate
law professor, submitted extensive shareholder proposals to the giant corporation. See, e.g., Douglas M.
Branson, “Corporate Social Responsibility Redux,” 76 Tulane L.Rev. 1207, 1215 (2001-2002) (discussing
Power-to-the-People initiatives and expanded use of shareholder proxy proposals and public interest
directors); Janis Sarra, “Convergence Versus Divergence, Global Corporate Governance at the Crossroads:
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literatures debating corporate social responsibility in the IOGC’s home base,55
such shaming or stigmatization hardly impacts the negotiation between “Third
World” governments and MNCs, which quite often take place in faraway lands,
conveniently tucked away from the American collective conscience.56 In those
faraway lands, freedom of speech, freedom of information, and freedom of
choice can be luxuries rather than a matter of right.57
On the other hand, those who believe in government-private sector
partnerships as free enterprise’s solution to global economic development may
take a different stance. In the Vietnam Deal, if petroleum was found, a longterm relationship between the IOGC and the “people” would commence,
creating jobs, stimulating the Vietnamese economy, and eventually raising
citizens’ standards of living via the creation of a healthy middle class. It is
hoped that this middle class will cry out for a taste of liberal democracy, which
ultimately results in campaigns for political freedom, forcing the single-party
state to change. If no petroleum in commercial quantity was found during the
term of the Production Sharing Contract, the IOGC could withdraw from the
country and write off its loss, and the question would become whether the
Governance Norms, Capital Markets & OECD Principles of Corporate Governance,” 33 Ottawa L. Rev.
177 (2002) (observing the emergence of shareholder activism in various developed jurisdictions beyond the
U.S. traditional “shareholder paradigm” of wealth maximization). See also Corporate Counsel Weekly,
“SEC Orders Review to Identify Changes to Shareholder Proposal Rules,” (BNA April 23, 2003);
Corporate Counsel Weekly, “SEC Proposes Groundbreaking Rules on Shareholder Nomination of
Directors,” (BNA Oct. 15, 2003); accord U.S. Law Week, ”SEC Proposes Groundbreaking Rules on
Shareholder Nomination of Directors,” found at http://pub.bna.com/ptcj/011357o.htm; Alan MacDougall,
“Shareholder Activism Needs Support of a Public Body” (The Financial Times May 6,2002); Martha
McNeil Hamilton, “Player in Proxy Wars; HP-Compaq Merger Has Brought a Shareholder-Services Firm
Out of Obscurity” (The Washington Post April 1, 2002). New York Times, “What Price Merger?” (March
21, 2002) (recognizing need for reawakened sense of shareholder activism in corporate America). See also
Eric Engle, “Corporate Social Responsibility: Market-Based Remedies for International Human Rights
Violations?” 40 Williamette L.Rev. 103 (Winter 2004) (recognizing shareholder proposals as the sole legal
procedure for shareholder-activists to influence management).
55

See, e.g., Andrew Van Alstyne, Book Review of Al Gedicks, Resource Rebels: Native Challenges to
Mining ad Oil Corporations (Boston: South End Press. 2001), 15 Society & Natural Resources 862 (2002);
Beth Stephens, “The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and Human Rights,” 20 Berk. J. Int’l
L. 45 (2002); Elisa Westfield, “Globalization, Governance, and Multinational Enterprise Responsibility,”
42 Va. J. Int’l L. 1075 (2002); Cynthia A. Williams, “Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of
Economic Globalization,” 35 Univ. Cal. L.Rev 705 (2002); Douglas M. Branson, “Corporate Social
Responsibility Redux,” 76 Tulane L.Rev. 1207 (2001-02). But see Morton Winston, “NGO Strategies for
Promoting Corporate Responsibility”, 16 Ethics and International Affairs 71 (Spring 2002)at p. XXX
(“NGOs cannot really force corporations to do anything and their attempts to influence corporate behavior
by means of any combination of strategies and tactics are unlikely to be successful in the long run unless
they are able to mobilize two other important constituencies: consumers and governments”).
56

Sylacuse, Making Global Deals (Houghton Mifflin Co.1991); Mark Baker, “Tightening the Toothless
Vise: Codes of Conduct and the American Multinational Enterprise,” 20 Wis. Int’l L.J. 89 (2001-02).

57

Vietnam’s 1992 Constitution guarantees freedom of speech, but only “in accordance with the provisions
of law.” It protects religious freedom, but also declares that no one “can misuse beliefs and religions to
contravene the law and State policies.” 1992 CONST, arts. 68, 69, 70, see also Note 49, supra.
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interests of the other group of “people” across the ocean, the IOGC’s
shareholders, would have been served by such an unprofitable business
endeavor.
From both a business and policy perspective, the poor people of the host
country may be sitting over possible petroleum reserves worth billions, while
having no technology or capital to develop them. They need the IOGC’s
technology, know-how, and capital, which, if properly used, will lead to a more
equitable distribution of energy resources, and hopefully a better life for “Third
World” inhabitants. Since IOGCs are in the business of looking for petroleum
reserves, their investor-shareholders bear the investment risks inherent in
share ownership, should IOGCs hit “dry holes”58 during exploration expeditions.
The standard of conduct, therefore, should be whether the IOGC duly complies
with Generally Accepted Accounting Standards and Practices (GAAS/GAAP) in
the proper disclosure of their material foreign direct investment. Sophisticated
disclosure legal regimes such as U.S. federal securities laws (as strengthened by
the post-Enron Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002) should adequately safeguard the
interest of the IOGC’s shareholder public.59
Parties to the Vietnam Deal considered it a phenomenal success. The
IOGC and PetroVietnam closed the deal worth almost hundreds of millions of
dollars in record time. The IOGC even successfully brought into the deal the
Russians and the Japanese to share investment risks,60 and to satisfy the
political agenda of the Vietnamese Communist Party’s Politburo. Since the
deep-water block was adjacent to the waters subject to sovereignty disputes
among China and the ASEAN nations, Vietnam naturally desired to position in
the contract area the most impressive cast of characters representing powerful
international interests. The deal was accomplished under the most extenuating
and difficult circumstances because of geographical, cultural, linguistic, and
political differences. Vietnam had a history of warfare and revolutions; its legal
system was either in disarray or at best primitive;61 the IOGC’s behind-the-
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“Dry holes” is a colloquial expression in the oil and gas industry, referring to unsuccessful exploration
endeavors. See Wendy Duong, The Long Saga of the Spratlys Island: An Overview of the Territorial
Disputes in the South China Sea Among Vietnam, China, and other ASEAN Nations, Texas Transnational
Law Quarterly (November 1997) and Currents -- International Trade Law Journal (South Texas College of
Law Summer 1997) (discussed “dry hole” as real politik solution to offshore territorial disputes spurred by
oil and gas exploration activities).
59

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act), Pub. L.
No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.): Accord 18 Corporate
Counsel Weekly, No. 36, pp. 281-288 (September 171, 2003) (reporting on SEC’s comments emphasizing
the needs for accurate Management Discussion and Analysis textual disclosure to accompany corporate
financial statements in post-Enron era).

60

The non-U.S. interests were represented and publicly announced at the closing ceremony for the
Vietnam Deal in Hanoi, 1994. Accord R. Thomas Collins, Jr., Blue Dragon: Reckoning in the South China
Sea, at pp. 21-23 (RavensYard Publishing Ltd. VA 2002).
61

Edward Neunnuebel, “Vietnam: An American Lawyer’s Perspective,” in VIETNAM LAW
YEARBOOK, 1995 (Stuart Allen ed. 1995); Mark Sidel, “Law Reform in Vietnam: The Complex
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scene counterparts from the host country were die-hard former revolutionary
leaders and Party members indoctrinated in the ABCs of Leninism. In the words
of a senior international lawyer representing an IOGC, his client might have
successfully negotiated with a new form of post-Cold War “monarchy.”62

•

Mapping the Scenery: The New Monarchs of the 20TH and 21st
Centuries

In the case of Vietnam, the new monarch is the Politburo, the real ruler
of the nation, viewed by Vietnamese American activists as a nucleus of highly
ranked party members not necessarily motivated by free enterprise or liberal
democracy as defined in Western political philosophy.63 In the words of another
IOGC executive, the people of Vietnam may “deserve a better government,”64 but
age-old sovereign power and the sanctity of “statehood” conceptually rooted in
customary international law65 preclude outsiders or other nations from
intervening in the country’s political processes.66 The country’s populace, on the

Transition from Socialist and Soviet Models in Legal Scholarship and Training,” 11 UCLA Pac. Basin L.J.
221 (1993).
62

See Note 20, supra. N.E. Maryan, Jr., Negotiating with the Monarch: Special Problems when the
Sovereign is your Partner, 745 PLI/Comm, 11, 130 (1996).
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Vietnamese activists in exile claim that communist indoctrination, together with pervasive misuse of
justice, corruption, and political oppression, poses obstacles to the development of a truly free enterprise
system responsive to market forces and, hence, impedes Vietnam’s growth. See, e.g,. Vietnam Dan Chu
(Democracy for Vietnam), No. 84 (Denver Edition) (September 2003). Compare Pham Van Thuyet,
“Legal Framework and Private Sector Development in Transitional Economies: The Case of Vietnam,” 27
Law & Policy Int’l Bus. 541 (1996) (Mr. Thuyet is the Vietnam specialist of the World Bank).
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Notes of author’s personal interview with former Vice President for Negotiation of Texaco International
(September 2000) (on file with author).
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Under international law, a nation-state is created upon the existence of three elements: 1) territory; 2)
people, and 3) government. See, e.g., Blond, Fenton, Johannesen, Johnson & Wertman, Blond’s
International Law (Marafino Edited Sulzburger & Graham Pub. Ltd. NY 1991); Restatement of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States Section 201 (Revised 1986); L’Institut de Droit International, http://
www.idi-iil.org. See also Interamerican Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933), 49 Stat
3097, T.S. No. 881, 165 L.N.T.S. 19, 3 Bevans 145; Charter of the Organization of American States
(1948), 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 117 U.N.T.S. 3, amended by Protocol to the Charter of the
Organization of American States 21 U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. No. 6487 (1967)..
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Modern international jurisprudence outlaws territorial conquest or the use of force to invade a nation for
economic gains or to control its political processes. The coming into force of the United Nations Charter
ended the legality of acquisition of territorial title by military conquest. See, e.g., U.S. Department of State,
Documents on International Affairs 2662 (John W. Wheeler-Bennett ed. 1932) (Statement by Secretary of
State Henry Stimson (the Stimson Doctrine), announcing that the U.S. would no longer recognize title to
territory seized by armed force); League of Nations’ Assembly Resolution (March 11, 1932), codifed in the
Chaco Declaration (August 3, 1932); the Saaverda Lamas Pact (October 10, 1933); the Montevideo
Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (December 26, 1933); Inter-American Conference on the
Maintenance of Peace (1936); Declaration on the Non-Recognition of the Acquisition of Territory by Force
(Eighth Pan-American Conference 1938). See aLso Ward Churchill, “Social Justice Movements and Latcrit
Community: The Law Stood Squarely on Its Head: U.S. Legal Doctrine, Indigenous Self-Determination
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other hand, has shown much yearning for America’s affluence and laissez-faire
spirit. Any anti-Americanism attributed to the people of Vietnam as the
aftermath of war was at best an unsubstantiated myth -- In 2000, the Clintons’
entourage to Vietnam was enthusiastically received as highlight of Vietnamese
modern life, especially among youths.67
Perhaps the “monarch” analogy is especially appropriate for Vietnam
because, notwithstanding the population’s earnest zeal and healthy appetite for
freedom and entrepreneurship,68 the Vietnamese Communist Party holds on to
its political supremacy, its exclusive state ownership over key industrial and
economic sectors, as well as the licensing authority of its bureaucracy,
generally criticized as corrupt and ineffective.69 According to Vietnamese
American activists, the fruits of foreign direct investment projects in Vietnam
serve the self-interest and political agenda of the government or governmentconnected elitists, unchecked by principles of liberal democracy or sound
macroeconomic management.70 The effect of foreign direct investments has not
and The Questions of World Order,” 81 OR. L.Rev. 663, 700 (2002); Robert Langer, Seizure of Territory:
the Stimson Doctrine and Related Principles in Legal Theory and Diplomatic Practice (1947); Gerhard Von
Glahn, Law Among Nations: An Introduction to Public International Law 367-76 (6th ed. 1992) (discussing
illegality of involuntary cession of territory by conquest); Allan Gerson, “War, Conquered Territory, and
Military Occupation in the Contemporary International Legal System,” 18 Harv. Int’l L. J. 525 (1977).
67

See, e.g., Chan Tran, “The Meaning of President Clinton’s Trip to Vietnam” (Harvard Asia Quarterly
winter 2001); Alejandro Reyes, “From Our Correspondent: After the Visit” (Asia Week November 21,
2000); CCN, “Clinton Makes Groundbreaking Vietnam Speech” (November 17, 2000); Jodi Enda, “In
Vietnam, Clinton Straddles Painful Past, Hopeful Future” (Kansas City Star, November 17, 2000); Rajiv
Chandrasekaran, “Analysis; Clinton Witnesses Two Sides of Vietnam; Leaders Indifferent, Youth
Enthusiastic” (Washington Post Foreign Service November 20, 2000); Ilene R. Pursher, “Good Morning
Vietnam” (The Christian Science Monitor November 17, 2000); CNN, “Tumultuous Crowd Welcomes
Clinton to Hanoi” (November 17, 2000).
During my business travels in Asia in the mid 1990s, I interviewed, at random, Vietnamese villagers in the
outskirts of Hanoi and peddlars in the inner-city neighborhoods of Ho Chi Minh City. All interviewees
could not tell the difference between France, America, Cuba, and Russia. All these countries were lumped
together in the generic label of “West” (local term: “Tay”). The opposite of “West” is not “East,” but “Us”
(local term: “Ta”). “West” or “Tay” also included Japan, Taiwan, and Singapore. When asked whether
they considered me a “West” (Tay) or an “Us” (Ta), the interviewees replied that I was probably a “West”
although I spoke the local language fluently. China was neither “West” nor “Us,” but was referred to as
“China” in the local language (literal translation: “Center of the Universe”). The North Vietnamese
villagers
had
a
vague
understanding
that
America,
rather
than
“West,”
once bombed North Vietnam. The South Vietnamese peddlars, however, had some intellectual distinction
between America and France, and enthusiastically claimed that they once were “friends,” worked for,
serviced, or knew someone in America (notes on file with author).
68

See, e.g., Pham Van Thuyet, supra, 27 Law & Policy Int’l Bus 541.

69

See Duong, 10 Pac. Rim L. & Pol. J. NO. 2 at 295-96, n. 529 and 532, and sources cited therein
(discussing corruption and the ineffectiveness of law in Vietnam, together with oppression in the form of
banning dissident fiction). See also Note 15, supra; http://www.transparency.org.; http://www.Hrw.org;

70

MNCs’ “entanglement” with represssive regimes for profit-making in infrastructure development,
security arrangements, labor utilization, or environmental-impact projects has become the basis for a
number of lawsuits brought by inhabitants of the “Third World” in U.S. courts, thereby testing the limit of
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sufficiently “trickled” down to the mass public despite economic reform, thereby
widening the gap between those elites and the poor public, occasioning even
more seeds for discontentment and disintegration of the social fabric. If this is
empirically true, the utility of free enterprise and government-MNC
partnerships as vehicles to prosperity and liberal democracy appears to be just
a notion of idealism. In this pessimistic view, even goals of the multilateral
General Agreement on Trade and Tariff (GATT) and its World Trade
Organization (WTO) framework can be a fallacy, although these multilateral
systems are symbols of free trade,71 a concept supported by David Ricardo’s
“comparative advantage” economic theory.72 Viewed this way, the governmentprivate sector partnership is simply a bridge to legitimize the return of
colonialism.73
applicable U.S. laws such as the Alien Tort Claims Act. See, e.g., Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,
226 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 2000); Doe v. UNOCAL Corp, 248 F.2d 915, 920 (9th Cir. 2001); Doe I v.
UNOCAL Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal 1997); Doe I v. UNOCAL Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1296
(C.D. Cal. 2000); Bowato v. Chevron, Docket No. C99-2506 (N.D. Cal. 1999); Jota v. Texaco, Inc. 157
F.3d 153, 163 (2d Cir. 1998); Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 1994 WL 142006 (S.D.N.Y. April 11, 1994);
Ashanga v. Texaco, Inc., 2000 W.L. 122143 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2000); Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 945 F.
Supp. 625, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Aguinda v. Texaco, 2000 W.L. 122143 (S.D. N.Y. Jan. 31, 2000). See
also Bennett Freeman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor,
“Remarks to the Third Warwick Corporate Citizenship Conference (July 10, 2000), found at
www.state.gov/wwww/policy_remarks/2000/00710_freeman_warwicku.html (visited as of August 10,
2000). See also Note 239, infra, with respect to the status of the Doe decision in the 9th Circuit.
71

See, e.g., Renato Ruggiero, Director General of the World Trade Organization, “Beyond Borders:
Managing a World of Free Trade and Deep Interdependence (WTO Press Release, September 10, 1996).

72

See, e.g., Gray & Jarosz, “Law and the Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment: The Experience from
Central and Eastern Europe,” 33 Columbia J. Trans. L. 1 (1995) (relating David Ricardo’s comparative
advantage theory to trade context, and contrasting it to investment context). See also David Ricardo, The
Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (London, Dent & Sons Ltd., printed in Great Britain by
Biddles Ltd., Guidlford, Surrey, first published in 1911).

73

See, e.g., Bhala, “Assessing the Modern Era of International Trade” (Book Review), 21 Fordham Int’l L.
J. 1647 (1998); Joshua Karlliner, The Corporate Plant: Ecology and Politics in the Age of Globalization at
221 (1997); Tony .McAdams, 19 J. Legal Studies Education at 249 (North-South division suggests to
critics the re-emergence of colonialism).

Even in the past era of colonialism where conquest was the accepted mode of territory annexation, nationstates still observed the display of sovereign powers and protocols, at least as lips’ services in diplomatic
relations. For example, territorial accession by the weaker countries was still the result of formal treaties.
Moreover, as in the case of Vietnam, colonialism was viewed by France as a “civilization mission”
(mission civilisatrice”) and the territorial occupation illustrated the well-intentioned extension of sovereign
power by France. See, e.g., Nguyen Van Trung, Chu Nghia Thuc Dan Phap o Viet-Nam: Thuc Chat va
Huyen Thoai (French Colonialism in Vietnam: Truths and Myths) (Saigon: Nam Son Publishing 1963);
Vinh Sinh & Nicholas Wickenden, Phan Boi Chau and His Autobiography, VIETNAM REV. (AutumnWinter 1996) at 206; Ho Tam Hue Tai, Radicalism and The Origin of the Vietnamese Revolution (1992);
accord Wendy Duong, Gender Equality and Women’s Issues in Vietnam: The Vietnamese Woman –
Warrior and Poet, 10 Pac. Rim L.& Pol. J. No. 2 191-326, at 313 (March 2001). During the years that
preceded the negotiation of the 1884 Patenotre Treaty, which solidified French colonialism in Vietnam, see
Nguyen Xuan Tho, Les Debuts de L:’Installation du Systeme Colonial Francais au Vietnam (1858-1897)
[Buoc Mo Dau Cua Su Thiet Lap He Thong Thuoc Dia Phap Tai Viet Nam (1858-1897)] at pp. 413-462
(Paris 2002), a Vietnamese envoy was dispatched by the King of Vietnam to Paris, during which
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The image of the new or renewed “monarchy,” however, does not just
apply to Vietnam. Whether the host country is a ravaged country in the
aftermath of war, a lesser developed country ruled by a dictatorship, or a
formerly Marxist society ready to embrace free enterprise, it is no surprise that
host countries overall have been reluctant to give up state control over natural
resources and in major industries such as the petroleum or energy sector. The
scarcity, potential, and impact of petroleum on a country affects the core of its
economic and political strength. Accordingly, government ownership or control
is typically the scenario facing an IOGC, regardless of differences in national
political or legal regimes.
At the onset, to make certain that the forthcoming analysis is not slanted
with preconceived notions of corporate conduct, I will premise my focus on the
petroleum and energy sector on the following two observations.
First, the political, economic, and business risks of petroleum and
energy projects abroad far exceed those associated with other ventures. This is
due to the following factors:
a) Petroleum resources worldwide as well as in the U.S. have declined,
leaving the explorationist with little choice but to reach out for
potential reservoirs in certain parts of the world plagued with both
geological difficulties as well as differences in legal and political
systems.74
b) An IOGC’s investment in the petroleum and energy sector is longterm, requiring decades of investment of cash, human capital, as well
as technology.
c) Petroleum exploration and development is heavily influenced by geopolitical factors. The existence of the Organization of PetroleumExporting Countries (OPEC) as an international oil-producing cartel

proceeding the Emperor of France was quoted as stating to the Vietnamese mandarins who led the envoy:
“La France est beinveillante pour toutes les nations et proteger des faibles, mais ceuz qui l’entravent dans
sa marche ont a craidre sa severite!” (Translation by Colonel Aubaret: “France is compassionate toward
all nations and toward the protection of the weak, but those who stand in the way of France’s marche will
know the severity of its action.”) See “The Literati of Vietnam,” Vol. 2, at p. 100 (Saigon 1969) (edition no
longer in print), and notes from the personal collection of certain descendants of the last royal family of
Vietnam, recording the November 5 1863 proceedings in Paris, reprinted in Vietnam Dan Chu (Democracy
for Vietnam), No. 84 (Denver Edition) (September 2003). See also Shawn Frederick McHale, Print and
Power: Confucianism, Communism, and Buddhism in the Making of Modern Vietnam (University of
Hawaii Press 2003).
74

Known petroleum reserves are typically located in the Middle-East, the North Sea, Africa, Latin
America, Australia, Southeast Asia, and Canada. International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook, at
pp. 44-148 (1998); Alan S. Miller, “Symposium on Clinton’s New Land Policies: Energy Policy From
Nixon to Clinton: From Grand Provider to Market Facilitator,” 25Envtl.L.715 (1995); see also Sara N.
Pasquinelli, “To Drill Or Not To Drill: The Arctic National Wildlife Refuge V. The "Need" For U.S.
Energy Independence,” 33 Golden Gate U.L. Rev. 503(2003).
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is an example of economic and political influences on the petroleum
market. International contractual mechanism has helped achieve
certain degree of stability to the market notwithstanding these
geopolitical dynamics. Thus, the partnership between an IOGC and
the host government is not just a reality, but also a global economic
necessity. The concept of injecting public interest consideration or a
global watchdog function into these partnerships (other than through
the host government as allegedly representative of the “people”)
presents the most challenging and perplexing task. Such a task
should take into account all interests and policy considerations, and
hence cannot be accomplished overnight.
Second, humans’ search for natural resources to better life is not a
phenomenon of modern technology. It is an age-old, ongoing endeavor rooted in
world history.75 This endeavor parallels technology progress, and transcends
national borders because of the natural geographical groupings of mankind.
The United States, because of its technological, economic, and political power,
has become the headquarters of several petroleum and energy multinationals.76
The lawyer and the executive who handle cross-border petroleum and energy
transactions encounter legal and business dynamics that are succinctly
different from the conduct of oil, gas, and mining activities in the United States.
In fact, in most petroleum-producing countries, a constitutional framework
based on the U.S. model of rights may completely be alien (the Vietnam Deal is
but one example).77 The dissimilarities in legal systems and constitutional rights
models are so varied that any attempt to classify countries for such a purpose
may be fraught with error.78 I will use this as the caveat to the following
simplified typology, developed only to map the scenery for discussion.

Simplied typology of today’s “monarchs”

75

James E. Horrigan, “Foreign Natural Resource Investment,” in Ved P. Nanda, ed., The Law of
Transnational Business Transactions Vol. 1 (Clark Boardman Company, Ltd. NY NY 1982).

76

Approximately 90 percent of all transnational corporations are headquartered in the northern
hemisphere. Joshua Karliner, The Corporate Planet: Ecology and Politics in the Age of Globalization 6
(1997); accord Tony McAdams, “Globalization: New Demands for the Legal Environment of Business
Course,” 19 J. Legal Studies Education 240, at p. 249 (2001). Recent business trends include successful
mergers between the top integrated oil and gas companies, thereby concentrating economic powers in a
handful of giant MNC-IOGCs. Examples are mergers that created Texaco-Chevron, Exxon-Mobil, and BpAmoco. See also Note 17, supra.
77

Under the Vietnamese Constitution, explicit in the provision of rights is the imposition of citizens’ duties
owed to the State. See VIETNAM’S 1992 CONSTITUTION, art. 51 (“The citizens’ rights are inseparable
from his duties. The State guarantees the rights of citizens; the citizen must fulfill his duties to the State and
society.”). The clear consequence of this constitutionally imposed “citizen’s duty” is the sacrifice of
individual liberty for state interests, as declared by the government.

78

Horrigan, “Foreign Natural Resources Investment,” supra (chapter 7, section 7.01).

32

The following typology categorizes today’s “monarchs,” based partly on
their political structure, but primarily on the extent of governmental power and
involvement in the national petroleum or energy sector. Since the degree and
type of government involvement is the principal factor to distinguish the
following eight classifications, there may be overlaps among the groups. For
example, a developing country that exercises all types of ownership or control
specified in this typology may fall under all of the eight groups.
(1) The single-party and “Marxist-remnant” dictatorships. (By
“dictatorship,” I am referring to the fact that the country has only one political
party, which is the ruling party. Opposition is prohibited.) This category
consists of the remaining “gang-of-four” nations that still adhere to Marxist
ideology (Vietnam, China, Cuba, and North Korea).79 In these countries, the
communist party is the gatekeeper of the national economy, notwithstanding
any “open door” policy, economic reform, or investment incentives. The degree
of civil liberty oppression or governmental economic domination varies,
depending on the country or a particular ruler in power.
(2) The “U.S. embargoed” and “economically sanctioned”
“monarchs.” This group may overlap with group 1 above, because Marxist
countries such as Cuba and North Korea are officially on the U.S.’s
“economically sanctioned” list.80 This group also include countries such as Iran
or Lybia, sanctioned by act of Congress,81 and countries such as Sudan and
Myanmar, sanctioned by Executive Orders.82 U.S.-based nationals and

79

Out of those four nations, only Cuba and North Korea remain on the U.S.’s embargo list under the
Trading with the Enemy Act. China has opened to the West since the 1970s after President Nixon’s visit to
Bejing, and Vietnam followed China’s example in 1985 with its “Renovation” national economic policy
and its 1987 Foreign Investment Law modeled after China’s original Foreign Investment Law. See, e.g.,
VIETNAM’S 1987 FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW (Luat Dau Tu Nuoc Ngoai), as amended (Office of
The State Committee for Cooperation and Investment) (December 29, 1987). Compare New Investment
Guidelines (New China News Agency June 29, 1995); The People’s Republic of China’s Foreign
Investment Regulations, FE/2342/S2 (June 29, 1996).

80

See ,e.g.,Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 15 CFR Part 515 (2003) (with respect to Cuba); Foreign
Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 500, 15 Fed. Reg. 9040 (December 19, 1950), currently at 31
C.F.R. Part 500 (2003) (with respect to North Korea).
81

Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §
1701 note (2000), as amended by ILSA Extension Act of 2001, Pub L No 107-24, 115 Stat 199 (2001). See
also Exec. Order No. 12543, 3 C.F.R. 181 (1986); Exec. Order No. 12544, 3 C.F.R. 183 (1986); Lybian
Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Parts 550 et seq. (2003); 61 Fed. Reg. 66,067 (1996).
82

See, e.g., Note. 452, supra. With respect to Sudan, see Exec. Order No. 13067, 3 C.F.R. 230 (1997);
implementing regulations at 31 C.F.R. Part 538 (2003). With respect to Myanmar, see Exec. Order No.
13047, 3 C.F.R. 202 (1997); implementing regulations are at 31 C.F.R. Part 537 (2003). For an example of
state ownership and control over the petroleum sector in a country economically sanctioned by the U.S., see
Article 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of Sudan entered into force 1 July 1998, found at
:http://www.sudan.net/government/constitution/english.html.
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businesses (and at times their owned or controlled foreign subsidiaries)83 are
banned from economic relations with these countries (including some countries
in group 1 and all of group 2). Some of the U.S. ‘s economic sanctions, such as
the Cuba boycott, raise unresolved questions challenging U.S. foreign policies.84
(3) Modified democracy: the single-party, so-called “laissez faire”
economies. This group of “monarchs” paradoxically combine economic laissez
faire philosophy with a single-party, non-Marxist political regime. One such
example is Singapore, which has long referred to its single-party political
philosophy as “modified or Asian-styled democracy.”85 In Singapore, although
private ownership of economic sectors is permitted, only state-owned
enterprises are allowed to engage in certain types of industry. The utility sector
in Singapore, for example, has traditionally been subject to such governmental
ownership and control.86

83

Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. §736.2 (b)(3) . See also Export Administration Act of
1979, 50 App. U.S.C. §2404 (a)(1); Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 515, Sections
515.204 and 515.559(a) and (b).
84

Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. 730 et. seq. See also Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity Act of 1996, Publ.L. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785, 22 U.S.C. §§6021-6091; Cuban Democracy Act of
1992, P.L. 102-484, 106 Stat. 2575. Cf, , John W.. Smagula, “Redirecting Focus: Justifying the U.S.
Embargo Against Cuba and Resolving the Stalemate, 21 N.C.J. Int’l L.& Com. Reg. 65 (1995); Agora
Andreas Lowenfeld, “The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act,” 90 Am.J.Int’l L. 419
(1996); Brice M. Clagett, “Title III of the Helms-Burton Act is Consistent with International Law,” 90 Am.
J. Int’l L. 434 (1996).

85

Senior Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew of Singapore is a proponent and advocate of Asian-styled
modified democracy. See Lee Kwan Yew, “Democracy, Human Rights and the Realities,” speech by the
Prime Minister to the “Create 21 Asahi Forum, Tokyo (November 10, 1992), printed in 16 SINGAPORE
MINISTERIAL SPEECHES (1993). See also, e..g, Frank Ching, “Eye on Asia: Is UN Declaration
Universal?” FAR.E.ECON.REV. August 28, 1997, available at 1997 WL-FEER 11441604. Lee Kuan
Yew's approach to Singapore’s political economy is economic determinism. The Cambridge-educated
Senior Prime Minister believes that a prospering economy and social order are the major components for
success, and he uses political authoritarianism to achieve this end result, trading off democracy or
individual liberty for economic prosperity. Han Fook Kwang, Warren Fernandez, Sumiko Tan, Lee Kuan
Yew: The Man and His Ideas (Singapore Times, 1998); Lee Kuan Yew, The Singapore Story: Memoirs of
Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore Times 1998). See also Rafael X. Zahralddin-Aravena, “Chile and Singapore:
The Individual And The Collective, A Comparison,” 12 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 739 (1998) (criticizing that
although Singapore’s economic success fulfilled Prime Minister Yew’s economic vision, the small nation
already reached its height so far as output quantitites were concerned, leaving the fostering of creativity to
be desired; author pointed out shortcomings of Yew’s economic determinism).

86

For example, Singapore Power, the state-owned utility company of Singapore, controls the utility sector
in this one-city country. Singapore, however, is in the process of restructuring and privatizing its electric
power sector, which will transform the monopoly into a competitive market. Two subsidiaries of stateowned Singapore Power, PowerSeraya and PowerSenoko, along with Tuas Power, are currently generating
electricity. PowerGrid, another subsidiary of Singapore Power, maintains and operates the country's
electricity transmission and distribution system. The Singaporean government currently owns majority
stakes in all of these firms through holding companies. The process of privatization has been repeatedly
delayed, and current plans call for the Singporean government to divest its stakes in the electric utility
sector in 2004. See http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/singapor.html#ELEC.

34

(4) Non-Marxist state ownership of natural resources. The analogy of
MNCs doing business with “monarchs” is also appropriate in most developing
economies that, at some point and to some degree, have declared state
ownership over natural resources, land, or surface use, regardless of political
regime.87 In the developing nations falling under this group #4, natural
resources are owned by the state, or by the “people” administered through the
state.88 (Despite the economic dominance of countries such as U.S., Canada,
France, and the U.K., which recognize private ownership of natural resources,
89state ownership of minerals is in fact the more common global regime.)90 State
ownership can be established by treaty or constitutional authorities, as in the
case of Russia, Mexico, Albania, and Yemen,91 and/or by specific petroleum
legislation, as in the case of Russia, Kazakhstan, Bolivia, Guatemala, Peru, and
Cambodia. 92 Governments may also mandate the type of contract or form of
87 Countries in Group #4 may overlap with group #1, because group #4’s political structure may either be
single-party or multiple-party-based, or they can be multiple party-based in name and on paper, but single
party-based in reality (meaning that no one else but the incumbent party can afford to run in a national
election). This group #4 is distinguishable from Group #2, because Group #2 are “off the limit” so far as
U.S.-based MNC-IOGC’s (and their foreign subsidiaries, as the case may be) are concerned, due to
economic sanctions imposed by the United States.

88

See, e.g., Darden, “Legal Research Checklist for International Petroleum Operations,” Monograph Series
No. 20, Section of Natural Resources, Energy, and Environmental Law (ABA 1994). Accord, Guillermo
M. Yeats, “Why Argentina Has Lagged as an Oil Nation,” The Wall Street Journal (Friday October 4,
1996), at A7 (discussing Argentina’s new hydocarbon law reaffirming state ownership of subsurface). See
also Mexico’s Oil and Gas Law - Ley Reglamentaria del Artículo 27 Constitucional en el Ramo del
Petróleo – [“Regulatory Law of Constitutional article 27 in the Petroleum Branch”] -found at:
http://www.energia.gob.mx/work/secciones/1257/imagenes/leypetroleo.pdf.

89

Although countries such as the U.S.and Canada give effect to private ownership of underlying minerals,
under specific factual circumstances, questions concerning sovereign or private rights over certain minerals
continue to arise in the country’s national jurisprudence. See, e.g., Amoco Production Co. v. Southern UTE
Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865 (1999).
90

More recently, countries such as Brazil and Venezuela have adopted new statutory or constitutional
provisions that open some limited upstream operations to private companies, although ownership of
hydrocarbons will remain exclusively with the state.
91

For Russia, see Federal Treaty (agreed and initialed in Moscow by the plenipotentiary representatives
of 19 of the 21 Republics within the Russian Federation, Art. II, 1992 WL 472427 (Rus. Legis.); for
Mexico, see Constitucion Politica De Los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Art. 27 (1917); for Albania, see
1994 Foreign Investment Law of Albania, No. 7764, “There is Freedom of Investment,” found at:
http://r0.unctad.org/en/subsites/dite/fdistats_files/pdfs/Albania_profile.pdf; see also Under Albanian
Constitution, found at: http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/al00000_.html#A010; for Yemen, see Yemen
adopted
on:
16
May
1991,
found
at:
Constitution,
article
7,
http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/ym00000_.html.
92

For Russia, see, e.g., Law of the Russian Federation Concerning Subsurface Resources, Russian
Federation Act No. 2395 -1; Russian Federation Supreme Sovert Decree No. 2396-1, as amended by
Russian Federation Federal Act No. 27-FZ,adopted by the State Duma on February 8,1995, 1995 WL
229344 (Rus. Legis.); see also Russia: Dmitry Slobodanuk, The State Determined to Own Oil and Gas,
Pravda, Sept. 23, 2003, at http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/tncs/mergers/2003/0923oillawrussia.htm.;
Ernest Chung, “Petroleum Investment in the Russian Federation – Russian Federation Federal Law No.
225-FZ on Production Sharing Agreements (Dec. 30, 1995),” 37 Harv. Int’l L.J. 551 (1996). For
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doing business in the petroleum or energy sector, as in the case of Brazil,
Mexico, and the Philippines.93 Countries may also by law designate specifically
(i) the agency, ministry, or state-owned oil and gas company that has the
authority to enter into contractual arrangements with foreign entities, as in the
case of Vietnam,94 Ghana,95 Mexico,96 or New Zealand,97 (ii) as in the case of
Cambodia, Australia, and Niger,98 the procedure by which such contractual
Kazakhstan, see Business Information Service for the Newly Independent States, Kazakhstan's New
Investment Law, Feb. 3, 2003, at http://www.bisnis.doc.gov/bisnis/country/030203KzInvestmentLaw.htm.
For Bolivia, see Ley de Hidrocarburos, Ley Nº 1689 de 30 de Abril de 1996, at
http://www.elaw.org/resources/text.asp?ID=1234; Peru: Ley Orgánica de Hidrocarburos, Ley No. 26221
(Aug. 20, 1993), at http://www.minem.gob.pe/ ; for Guatemala, see: Oil Law Decree # 109 – 83, at
http://www.mem.gob.gt/hidrocarburos/index.htm; for Peru, see Ley Orgánica de Hidrocarburos, Ley
No. 26221 (Aug. 20, 1993), at http://www.minem.gob.pe/; Hydrocarbons Law of Peru: Law No 26221,
since 08 – 20 – 1993 , regulates all the Hydrocarbons sector and establishes the types of contracts.
Available in Spanish at: http://www.minem.gob.pe/. For Cambodia,: see Cambodian Investment Law, at
http://www.mekongexpress.com/cambodia/general/caminvestlaw.htm;
93

For Brazil, see Leopoldo A. Taylhardat, Great Expectations for Brazilian Oil Aperture, 5 Alexander’s
Gas & Oil Connections, Jan. 25, 2000, at http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/ntl00477.htm; Gustavo G.
de Oliveira and Miriam Mazza Quadros, Main Issues Impacting Oil & Gas in Brazil—Upstream, at
http://www.bomchilgroup.org/brasep02.html; for Mexico, see Global Oil Giants Snub Exploration
Contracts,
El
Universal,
Jan.
17,
2004,
at
http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/pls/impreso/noticia.html?id_nota=2810&tabla=miami; see also PEMEX Contracts
Japan’s National Oil for Study of Oil Deposits, Jan. 23, 2002, Alexander’s Oil & Gas Connections, at
http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/company/cnl20410.htm; for the Philippines, see National Oil Exchange
Act of 2001, House Bill No. 300, at http://www.congress.gov.ph/download/billtext/hb00300.pdf.
94

For Vietnam, see Note 43, supra.

95

In Ghana, petroleum operations are governed by the Petroleum Law of 1984, which empowers GNPC
[Ghana National Petroleum Corporation] to operate in all open acreage of the country on its own or in
association with foreign partners. The basic contract between the state, the GNPC and the private
companies is the Production Sharing Agreement. See Mbendi Information for Africa, Ghana: Oil and Gas
Industry, at http://www.mbendi.co.za/indy/oilg/af/gh/p0005.htm.

96

Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) of Mexico and PetroVietnam of Vietnam are examples of how a
government may entrust mineral resource development entirely to state ministries or grant monopoly to
state-owned enterprises (SOE). See, e.g., “The Role of State Oil Companies,” Oil & Gas J. 37 (Aug. 16,
1993).

97

New Zealand: The New Zealand Government owns the in-ground petroleum resource and any company
wanting to prospect, explore or mine petroleum in New Zealand must obtain a permit from Crown Minerals
under the Crown Minerals Act. This includes petroleum on the New Zealand continental shelf. Crown
Minerals Act 1991 §§ 22-42, at http://www.med.govt.nz/crown_minerals/petroleum/legislation/index.html;
98

For
Cambodia,
see
Cambodian
Investment
Law
at:
http://www.mekongexpress.com/cambodia/general/caminvestlaw.htm; for Australia, see States Grants
(Petroleum Products) Act 1965, Act No.27 of 1965 as amended (compilation prepared on May 5 M, 2003,
taking into account amendments up to Act No.21 of 2003), found at http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgibin/download.cgi/download/au/legis/cth/consol_act/sgpa1965396.rtf. For Niger, see Mbundi News for
Africa, Oil & Gas Industry, at: http://www.mbendi.co.za/indy/oilg/af/ni/p0005.htm for Australia, see
States Grants (Petroleum Products) Act 1965, Act No.27 of 1965, as
amended, at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-in/download.cgi/download/au/legis/cth/consol_act/sgpa1965396.rtf;
for
Niger,
see:
Mbendi
Information
for
Africa,
Niger:
Oil
& Gas
Industry,
at
http://www.mbendi.co.za/indy/oilg/af/ni/p0005.htm
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arrangements can be entered – whether by international tender or bidding, or
by informal negotiation.
State ownership can also be exerted, not only over natural resources, but
also over land and surfaces, similar to such property concepts existing in U.S.
property law as rights-of-way or easements.99 Governments, via their sovereign
power, may charge a fee for land-use or surface right-use for any investment
project that requires a local site. Finally, even if surface rights can be privately
owned or used, the host country may proclaim governmental authority to
acquire such rights via the process of eminent domain or equivalent.100
(5) Various degrees of state control over natural resources,
particular types of industry, and related property rights. Other “monarchs”
who do not proclaim state ownership nonetheless may exercise various degrees
of state control over natural resources, land use, and/or particular major
industries such as telecommunications, media, transportation, mining, energy,
utility, and defense technology. Or, a country may proclaim both exclusive state
ownership over specific types of natural resources, and, at the same time, exert
blanket state control over certain sectors or industries, regardless of whether
those sectors or industries involve natural resources. Further, the government
may also declare certain protected areas as subject to state control due to
environmental, safety, or national security reasons.101 Finally, even if all
resources, land, and surface rights can be privately owned or acquired, the
government may still either own or control access routes for transportation or
use of seaports and other export or distribution outlets. All such title, access
and usage must be negotiated and specific government-private sector
partnerships formed as a result.
(6) “Monarchs” as gatekeepers: various degrees of state control over
foreign direct investments across the board, regardless of sector or
industry.102 A country may also impose minimum state equity ownership over
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FDI projects as a whole, regardless of the type of industry or sector to which the
FDI project pertains. This can be illustrated by the history of local equity
ownership requirements for FDI projects in Mexico.103 More importantly, at a
national level, state control and ownership can be part of a bigger political
agenda, perhaps not spelled out in the written law or in any publicly available
governmental policy statements. On an ad hoc basis, at any point in time and
in the absence of contrary national laws, under its sovereign “jurisdiction to
prescribe,”104 the government may rely on its national interest to justify its role
as gatekeeper of the economy or of a particular industry or project, regardless of
its political or economic philosophy.
(8) De facto or decentralized state control: unwritten custom, and
the discretionary power of town lords and village chiefs. Regardless of
political systems, it is always the government, or its various offices or
instrumentalities, who can deny visas, travel documents, permits, licenses, and
who can engage in the use of force and police power, including the issuance or
execution of search and arrest warrants. Ad hoc exercise of sovereignty105 will
determine, on a real-life basis, whether a foreign investor has right of entry to
the local market, or whether local entrepreneurs can master their own fate by
seeking direct partnership with foreign investors outside of the host
government’s control. Further, at the provincial, township, or village level, oral
traditions and cultural norms, including certain local governmental practice
and preferences not documented in the written laws, create enormous
discretionary power for various town lords, village chiefs, neighborhood police
commissars, or heads of governmental instrumentalities or political
subdivisions in the developing world. (Professor Michael Gordon calls this body
of unwritten law and custom a country’s real-life “Operation Code”).106 The role

L. & Policy 253 (1996). Compare Stephen M. Soble, “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea [North
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See Gordon, “Observations on the Nature of Joint Ventures in Mexico: Are they Involuntary and
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Institution for Mexican Development: A Legislative History,” 1978 Ariz. St. L.J. 173; Gordon, “The
Contemporary Mexican Approach to Growth with Foreign Investment: Controlled but Participatory
Independence,” 10 Cal. West. L. Rev. 1 (1973); Bryan, Gonzalez Vargas & Gonzalez Bar, NAFTA
Vademecum (1994) (word product of the law firm Bryan, Gonzalez Vargas & Gonzalez Bar, Mexico City);
Murphy, Access and Protection for Foreign Investment in Mexico Under Mexico’s New Foreign
Investment Law and the North American Free Trade Agreement (from the ICSID Review Foreign
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16 Texas Transn’l L. Quarterly No.2, 5-9 (April 2002) (current Articles 27 and 28 of the Mexican
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of governments ranges across a wide spectrum, and constitutes a major
influence in the pattern of “Third World” global economic development.
The term “monarchy” may not be just rhetoric, after all.
###

PART B
DISSECTING TWO TYPICAL PETROLEUM AND ENERGY FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT TRANSACTIONS
In this Part B, I will examine and dissect two types of major foreign direct
investment transactions:
1) The “upstream” petroleum transaction like the Vietnam Deal, in which
the host country grants the MNC-IOGC the right to explore for oil and
gas on national territory (hereinafter “the Upstream Transaction”); and
2) The
“mid-stream” independent
power-generation
project
(IPP)
transaction, in which natural gas discovered as a result of the Upstream
Transaction will be used to generate electricity to service the country
and/or the region, as part of the MNC-IOGC’s strategy to develop a longterm gas sales market (hereinafter the “Midstream Transaction”).107
Both transactions constitute the bread and butter of the integrated
IOGCs (entities such as ExxonMobil, Chevron-Texaco, Unocal, ConocoPhillips,
Royal Dutch/Shell Group, StatOil, TotalFinaElf, BP-Amoco, or Mitsubishi Oil).
The Midstream Transactions, in particular, are the core business of the power
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See, e.g., Michael Gordon, “Of Aspirations and Operations: The Governance of Multinational
Enterprises by “Third World” Nations, “16 Inter-American L. Rev. 301 (1984) (discussing the unwritten
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consider all “Midstream Transactions” to be part of the Downstream segment of the petroleum industry.)
Classic Downstream Transactions are diverse in nature and may not always involve high capital or high
risks. They can be end-user-oriented and do not always result in large-scaled partnerships between MNCs
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developers such as El Paso Energy, Pacific Energy, Dynergy, Duke, Coke
Industries, Tractebel USA (a subdivision of Lyonnais des Eaux of Europe), and
the now bankrupt Enron.108
Both types of transactions also generate subcontractor relationships
between the above MNCs and (i) the oilfield service industry (companies such as
Baker Hughes and Schlumberger); (ii) the international engineering and
construction industry (companies such as Halliburton, Raytheon, Fluor Daniel,
and Bechtel); as well as (iii) the heavy industry manufacturers (companies such
as General Electric, Westinghouse, or Carterpillar). The magnitude of these
projects is evident, both in terms of the amount of capital required, as well as
the brand-names of the corporate players involved.

I. Case #1: The Upstream Transaction109
In industry jargon, activities of the petroleum industry can be categorized
into three distinct segments: upstream (where the natural resources and raw
material are found); downstream (the refining, marketing, selling, distribution,
and trading of energy products or commodities – collectively the delivery of
those products to the ultimate consumers); and mid-stream (infrastructure
development, processing, transporting, or converting raw material into energy
products or commodities, and/or any other processes that connect the
upstream segment to the downstream segment). Although the upstreammidstream-downstream dichotomy may be unique to the petroleum sector or to
mining activities, the concept behind these segment classifications is actually
meaningful in any manufacturing business that involves the discovery and
utilization of raw materials to be uncovered from nature at the source,
especially when the business has developed a vertical expansion, whereupon
the same holding entity owns the entire chain of products and services: from
raw material discovery (upstream), manufacturing or production activities using
the raw material uncovered (midstream), and ultimate consumer distribution
(downstream).
Because the industry’s technical and business issues typically drive legal
considerations, terms such as upstream, midstream, and downstream have
been built into the vocabulary of the international business lawyer servicing the
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petroleum and energy sector, and hence take on legal meanings. For example,
an “upstream” exploration contract (such as the Vietnam Deal) typically
involves high capital, and contains unique legal issues inapplicable to a
downstream transaction (such as a franchise contract enabling a gas station
franchisee to sell gasoline to the ultimate consumers).110
In U.S. modern petroleum terminology, the upstream segment is typically
divided into three major functions or phases: the Exploration for petroleum,
the Development of such petroleum at the wellhead, and the Production of
such petroleum prior to transport to a refinery or ultimately for end-user
distribution. Between Exploration and Development, there may be a sub-phase
called Appraisal, during which the reserve discovered is appraised for
technical development. These four phases constitute Petroleum Operation or
Petroleum Activities. From the U.S. oilman/woman’s perspective, these
phases of upstream activities have replaced the formerly popular word, the
exploitation of petroleum resources, which has taken on a negative
connotation associated with the era of colonialism, especially in international
operation involving the “Third World.”111
A. History, Development, and Semantics: It has been said that
petroleum exploration is a unique activity, whereupon the party with capital,
technology and know-how agrees to pay an owner of natural resources for the
right to do work free of charge.112 This is not an overstatement or ironic
expression, and will make perfect sense if the capital and technological
commitment made by an IOGC is viewed as a fee for access to the natural
resources that may be found in some landowner’s backyard. Simply stated, the
landowner needs a contractual mechanism under which the expert operator will
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be given access to “farm the field”
benefit of both parties.

113

and uncover the natural resources for the

To achieve this goal, historically, governments and IOGCs have
negotiated their interests in one of two systems: Concessionary or
Contractual. As will be explained below, the differences between the two
systems are rooted in the development of Anglo-American versus the French
legal concept of mineral resource ownership.
1. The Concessionary Model. In the Concessionary system, private
ownership of mineral resources is allowed.114 The term mineral is handily used
here to refer to all natural resources underground, although in geological terms,
petroleum may not qualify as a mineral. In most commercial contracts and
legal regimes, petroleum is defined as including both oil and gas.
Like the term “Exploitation,” the term “Concession” can be dated back to
colonial time and, hence, equally tainted due to political correctness. 115 Today,
it can be used synonymously with a country’s petroleum fiscal regime called the
“royalty/tax” system. Where the government (and not private landowners)
owns minerals (as in the case of offshore reserves), under the Concessionary
system, the government will transfer title of minerals to the IOGC that extracts
and produces the resources, since private ownership is allowed. The
government will then charge (i) royalty, in its capacity as owner, 116 and (ii)
income or profit taxes upon the IOGC’s corporate income, in the government’s
capacity as taxing authority. A Concessionary System may also be described as
a licensing system, in which the IOGC-contractor is required to obtain a
license for each phase of operation (Exploration, Appraisal, Development, and
Production] The IOGC-licensee can receive and claim title to net proceeds of
petroleum sales after it has paid tax and royalty to the government. Despite the
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availability of petroleum private ownership, the license in the Concessionary
System denotes that Petroleum Activities may heavily be regulated by the
state.117
In contrast, under various Contractual Systems, the government owns
the minerals. An IOGC-contractor only has the right to receive a share of
production or revenues from petroleum sales in accordance with contractual
terms. Generically, there are two types of contracts: a Service Contract and a
Production Sharing Contract (PSC). A Service Contract can be further divided
into two categories: a Classic or Pure Service Contract, and a Risk Service
Contract.
2. The Service Contract model. In a Service Contract arrangement,
ownership by, or title transfer to, the contractor is removed all together. 118 The
IOGC-contractor gets compensated for the performance of its technical services.
It can get a straight fee regardless of success or failure of the exploration
endeavor (a Classic or Pure Service arrangement). Where such fee is not paid
unless and until petroleum is discovered and produced, the contract is a Risk
Service arrangement, because the contractor is taking the risk of exploration
failure. If there is no petroleum discovery, the contractor loses its investment
and does not get paid by the government.119 Thus the real difference between a
Pure Service Contract and a Risk Service Contract depends on whether the
contractor’s fee is contingent upon profit. Today, a Classic or Pure Service
Contract (where the contractor gets paid regardless of exploration failure)120 is
very rare. It may still be found in the Middle East, where governments already
have substantial capital and seek only certain expertise or technology from a
contractor for hire.121
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3. The Production Sharing Contractual (PSC) Model. In the following
discussion, the term “Production Sharing” and the acronym PSC are used
interchangeably.
“Production Sharing” concepts dated back to French Napoleonic
traditions – that mineral wealth was not owned by individuals, but rather by
the state for the benefit of all citizens.122 (In contrast, private ownership of
minerals has its root in Anglo-American legal traditions, as typified by the
United States). The earliest use of the Production Sharing system occurred in
agriculture. Farmers, as tenant-sharecroppers, farmed the field, the title to
which was held by the government or landlords. Sharecroppers were then
compensated by a share of production.123 With the passage of time, the
“Production Sharing” philosophy did not remain a French Napoleonic product.
(Ironically, the current French petroleum fiscal system is not PSC-based, but,
rather, is a royalty-tax regime in which private ownership of minerals is
recognized).124
The first PSC was executed in Indonesia -- a former Dutch colony -- in
the early 1960s, under the authority of the Indonesian 1945 Constitution,125
when the country began to take on its status as an oil-producing nation in the
“Third World.”126 The Production Sharing scheme came about as the gradual
result of changes in the pattern of international petroleum exploration since the
end of World War I. The enhanced bargaining positions of petroleum-producing
Walde in Smith, Dzienkowski, Anderson, Conine, Lowe, & Kramer, International Petroleum Transactions
(2d Ed. Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation 2000) at pp. 513-14
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countries throughout the years, as well as adverse actions taken by new
regimes in places such as Lybia and Iran,127 motivated U.S. oilmen (and women)
to devise a new system more appealing to governments than the earlier
Concessionary system. Hence, the earlier Concessionary System modeled after
the U.S. oil and gas leases was replaced with negotiated share of production, as
high as a 50-50 profit split between the IOGC and the host government, as in
the case of Venezuela in 1948.128 Overall, the IOGC-contractor is compensated
for its working interest via a grant of a negotiated percentage of petroleum
production, which typically consists of 1) production representing its recovery of
costs (called “Cost-Recovery Oil,” if oil is discovered); and 2) production
representing the contractor’s profit (called “Profit Oil” if oil is discovered). In a
PSC System, the IOGC-contractor may still be required to pay tax and royalty to
the host government, depending on the local law.
B.

Comparison of the three systems (Concessionary, PSC, and Service
Contract).

The PSC is much akin to the Risk Service Contract, because under both
arrangements, the contractor is not compensated unless and until it finds and
produces petroleum. There is no “Production Sharing,” nor fee for service, if the
exploration venture fails.129 Principally, the differences between the PSC system
and a Service Contract system depend on whether the contractor is
compensated in cash or in kind (for example, payment made in Crude Oil130 is
payment in kind). In a Service Contract, the contractor may earn only a fixed
fee, whereas in a PSC, the contractor can participate in the upside potential of
production. If compensated in kind, the PSC contractor receives a share of
production and hence can take title to the Crude. In such a case, the PSC
contractor enjoys rights of private ownership just like in a Concessionary
system. So, essentially, the main difference between the PSC system and the
Concessionary system can be stated as follows: The point of title transfer (from
the owner to the IOGC-contractor) may shift from the wellhead (as in a
Concessionary system), to the point of petroleum export (as in a PSC system).131
The PSC is simply an innovative deviation of the Risk Service Contract,
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engineered by U.S. independent oilmen/women to meet the demands of the oilproducing countries.
It follows, therefore, that in a PSC system, the government, via its
instrumentality, will also receive a share of production by splitting profit with
the IOGC-contractor, in addition to receiving tax and royalty as sovereignty.
This “share” formula is called the Profit Split. (In contrast, in a Pure or
Classic Service Contract, the government bears the risk of exploration failure,
or it may pass the risk on to the contractor as in a Risk Service Contract).
Unlike the Service Contract model, where the IOGC is simply a contractor and
the host government is a principal, the Production Sharing scheme enables the
government to become the IOGC’s equity partner, earning both a profit and
sharing in costs, in addition to collecting tax and royalties.
A PSC typically covers all upstream activities (Exploration, Appraisal,
Development, Production). The Exploration Phase alone may cover a term of
five years. Examples of the PSC System include Egypt, Guyana, Indonesia, and
Malaysia.132 As of the mid-1990s, the number of PSCs outnumbered Service
Contract agreements by a ratio of 5 to 1.133 It is fair to conclude that in various
modified forms compared to the original Indonesian PSC, Production Sharing
has become a standardized model for petroleum exploration around the world,
and has dominated start-up petroleum foreign direct investment for the past
three decades.
Today, Indonesia’s PSC model sets the standards for PSC terms, at least
for the developing nations or for Asia-Pacific.134 The PSC may take thousands of
hours of lawyers’ and executives’ time, culminating into hundreds of pages of
documentation carefully drafted, reviewed, and negotiated. Or, the PSC may
involve certain standard terms already incorporated into the country’s
petroleum legislation, not subject to negotiation. The National Association of
International Petroleum Negotiators (AIPN), the networking group for IOGC
“upstream” executives and lawyers, has published its own recommended model
PSC, widely respected and observed in the industry.”135
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Thus, the degree of negotiation in a PSC transaction depends on whether
the host country has a model contract, whether that model contract is
specifically part of the country’s legislation, and whether it is feasible for the
IOGC to propose modifications, exemptions or deviations from the model
contract or the law. Even if the local law allows modifications, the host
government may, or may not be willing to negotiate different terms, depending
on the leverages of the parties under the circumstances. Further, where the
model contract is part of the country’s legislation, or where the model contract
does not exist, norms of practice or contractual precedents from prior deals
may provide the IOGC with the framework for negotiating its proposed
relationship with the government. In reality, a very poor country with a
primitive legal and fiscal regime would typically “negotiate” from an agreement
drafted by the IOGC’s lawyer, with not much leverage for demanding any other
specificity or supremacy, and would grant as many of the IOGC’s requests as
needed to keep the IOGC interested.
Naturally, the IOGC’s share of production must be sufficient not only for
it to recoup all costs, but also for it to make adequate profit. The Profit Split,
therefore, is among the key economic factors that drive negotiation. Other
essential features of the Production Sharing system include:
--title to the hydrocarbons remains with the state, and no private
ownership is permitted, except for the share of production granted to the
contractor as its compensation.
--the state maintains overall control and the contractor is responsible for
conducting Petroleum Activities.
--The IOGC-contractor submits Annual Exploration Work Programs
and Budgets for scrutiny and approval by the state.
--The IOGC-contractor provides all financing and technology and bears
all risks.
--The IOGC-contractor will be entitled to certain amounts of petroleum
discovered to recover its costs (Cost-Recovery). After Cost Recovery, the
remaining production will be shared according to the Profit Split.
--All equipment purchased or imported into the host country will become
the property of the state, except for leased equipment or equipment provided by
service subcontractors.136 This is the direct result of state ownership over
natural resources and assets connected to Petroleum Activities.
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C.

The Dynamics of Negotiation in the PSC Regime And The Role of
Lawyers.

The capital-intensive and high-risk nature of upstream transactions, as
well as their complexity, necessitates substantial lawyer’s involvement.
Preceding the actual contract negotiation is the process of international tender
and bidding, based on the government’s terms or requests for proposals,
whereupon a contractor or consortium of contractors is chosen to conduct
Petroleum Activities. Typically, the government enters into a PSC with an Oil
and Gas Contractor for a given Contract Area. A Contract Area that is the
subject of an IOGC’s PSC with a host country may cover more than one
exploration Block. A Block is simply an area designated by the government as
the subject of a call for tender or bidding in order to generate foreign investment
interests. (An IOGC-contractor may have an interest in a block in the United
Kingdom, which has a Concessionary system, and another block in Indonesia,
which has a PSC system).
Even before the tender or bidding process, much time and effort may be
spent for the examination and exchange of geological data, the performance of
various field trips and technical studies, and various informal exploratory
sessions and meetings between government officials and representatives of the
IOGC to explore mutual interests and evaluate the potential of the project.
During these preliminary meetings, the IOGC may test the level of competition,
and solicit or lobby for government support. In each step preceding the contract
award and the actual negotiation of the PSC, lawyer involvement may be
desired or required.
For the actual contract negotiation, the give-and-take depends on the
overall objectives of both sides. In an ideal situation, host governments desire
capital investment and technology transfer from IOGCs. IOGCs, on the other
hand, require ready access to the Contract Area, government approvals and
support for Petroleum Activities, and ultimately a share of production sufficient
for the companies to recoup all costs and achieve desired profit goals. In
principle, these two sets of interests are mutually complementary to each other,
leading to bargained-for positions. In an ideal world, both sides do their job
with the best intention and conscience – governments duly safeguard the
people’s resources and are inspired to use the proceeds of petroleum sales for
the betterment of their societies; IOGCs are respectful of the host country’s
environment, labor, natural sources, and cultural heritage, and are willing to
curtail excessive profit goals in the interest of the host environment and local
community, in order to be competitive and to fulfill corporate social
responsibility. Conflicts, nonetheless, occur when either party is motivated to
alter the equilibrium of the risk allocation dynamics to secure the maximum
advantage for itself, at the cost of the other side. In the worst case scenario,
both sides neglect the public interest at heart.
Specifically, potential conflicts over the dynamics of give-and-take may
occur in connection with the following seven legal and business concepts
essential to the PSC regime. I will explain these concepts as the context to
examine the current pattern of global economic development, and to raise
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certain arguments regarding its windfall or pitfall. The seven PSC legal and
business issues are listed below.
(1) Operatorship;
(2) Participating Interest (or Joint Venture Interest, as the case may
be), and related issues of transferability;
(3) the “Carry” of costs and expenses;
(4) Contractor’s Work Program or Minimum Work Commitment;
(5) Commerciality standards, the IOGC-contractor’s Withdrawal
Rights, and other relevant economic judgments made by the IOGC;
(6) the government’s Fiscal Regime (consisting of elements such as the
Profit Split, Government Participation, and various requirements for
the payment of Bonuses, in addition to Tax and Royalty);
(7) the IOGC’s contractual devices to buffer itself against Political Risks
associated with the investment environment, including the use of the
Stabilization Clause.

1. Operatorship. By virtue of an Operating Agreement or Joint
Operating Agreement (JOA) executed separately from the PSC, the IOGCcontractor will assume the status of an Oil and Gas Operator, who will
conduct Petroleum Activities in the Contract Area. The Operator is the entity
that controls or monitors all technical and management issues (subject to
voting control by equity interest owners), and hence drives the progress and
success or failure of the Petroleum Operation. An upstream Production Sharing
deal is often a twin-contract deal -- the PSC and the JOA together constitute the
legal documents describing the deal and the legal relationships created
thereby.137 While the PSC defines the rights and obligations of the IOGC as a
contractor and/or business partner of the host country (and hence is
sometimes referred to as the “host government contract”), the JOA, on the
other hand, defines the rights and obligations of all project participants,
including those non-government entities who may share investment risks with
the IOGC, as well as the commercial arm of the host country serving as the
IOGC’s local partner. The JOA establishes internal procedures, and addresses
management, control, and operational issues. The PSC is prone to
standardization by operation of local law, because the state authority that
exercises sovereign power over the project is a contractual party. The JOA, on
the other hand, is generally not standardized by operation of law, although it
may still be subject to legal requirements of the local jurisdiction. Obviously,
the PSC and JOA for a particular project must be coordinated and, quite often,
are negotiated concurrently.
2.
Participating
Interest,
Joint
Venture
Interest,
and
Transferability. The JOA Operator and PSC Contractor can either be a single
company, or a Consortium of companies and interests, or a Joint Venture
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consisting of, at a minimum, two Joint Venture partners. A Consortium or
equivalent can be defined as an alliance of companies, whose rights,
obligations, and extent of cooperation are determined solely by contract.
Generally, the Consortium has no independent juridical status because it is not
formed under any system of national law, although the consortium formation
agreement may contain choice-of-law and choice-of-forum provisions reflecting
the consensus of the parties thereto in the event of a contractual dispute. A
Joint Venture, on the other hand, may be incorporated or unincorporated,
depending on the law of the place where the joint venture is formed (lex situs).
Thus, under either a Concessionary system or a PSC system, the Joint
Venture form may be used to formalize the partnership between the IOGC and
the government, or a State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) of the host jurisdiction.
(In the Vietnam Deal, PetroVietnam served dual purpose, as representative of
the nation-state, and as an SOE acting as the nation-state’s commercial arm).
The business partnership formed by the Joint Venture Contract creates joint
venturers’ obligations to share risk, equity, costs and expenditures, and enables
joint participation in management and operatorship. The host government
typically will prefer the Joint Venture form, because it allows state-owned
companies and governmental instrumentalities to receive technology transfers
and training more directly and continuously, and even to participate in project
management and operatorship side by side with the technologically abled
foreign investor. Where the local law requires such Joint Venture to be
incorporated, the result is the formation of a local company or juridical entity
established to conduct Petroleum Operation and Petroleum Activities, of which
both the IOGC and the SOE are functionally shareholders.
If unincorporated, the Joint Venture is in essence a partnership as that
term is understood in U.S. law,138 but the unincorporated international Joint
Venture will be governed by the law stipulated in the Joint Venture Contract’s
“choice-of-law” or “governing law” provision. U.S. courts have defined an
Unincorporated Joint Venture as a partnership having a specific purpose, for
a specific duration, and designed for a specific project, although the Joint
Venture Contract may still contain disclaimer language alleviating joint and
several liability among joint venturers (except to the extent provided by the
Joint Venture Contract).139
Where equity, risks, and costs are shared in an Unincorporated
Petroleum Joint Venture arrangement, the result is typically the creation of
“Participating Interests.”140 A Participating Interest obligates its holder to
share in costs and expenses, and entitles him or her to take a percentage in
equity and profit. An Unincorporated Joint Venture structure where the host
138

International Raw Materials, Ltd. v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 978 F.2d 1318 (3d. Cir. 1992); In re Groff,
898 F.2d 1475 (10th Cir. 1990).
139

Id.

140

If the Joint Venture is incorporated, the Joint Venturers’ ownership interest will be given the legal term
accorded by the law of the place of incorporation (lex situs).

50

government or its SOE holds a Participating Interest in the project may also be
described as a “Government Participation” system.141 Where there is
Government Participation, the Joint Operating Agreement (JOA) establishes the
rights and obligations of the government and the IOGC both as interest owners
and business partners, even though the IOGC may alone assume operatorship
of the field due to its technical capabilities.
The Participating Interest held by the IOGC may be reduced after the
PSC has been signed. This is because even though the IOGC alone executes the
PSC with the host government, it may later decide to seek additional foreign
investors to share risks and costs by selling part of its Participating Interest to
third parties. In such a case, the “assignment,” “transfer,” or “assignability”
clause in the PSC becomes extremely important. The clause also provides the
legal mechanism for the IOGC to remove itself from the project or escape further
contractual obligations by transferring all of its Participating Interest to a thirdparty assignee, who will take over the IOGC’s work commitments vis-a-vis the
host government by assuming the IOGC’s Participating Interest. The PSC’s
“transfer” clause will lead to the execution of a separate “farm-in/farm-out
agreement” to effectuate the terms of the transfer (the transfer is a farm-in for
the assignee-farmee, and a farm-out for the assignor-farmor).
If the transfer is completely made “offshore” away from the jurisdiction of
the host country, the government will look solely to the initial IOGC-contractor
for all work commitments and obligations under the PSC. In most cases, the
host government will not want such secretive “offshore” transfer that manages
to escape the host country’s jurisdiction or power to regulate. It will prefer to
preserve its right to approve or veto the IOGC’s transfer or choice of an
assignee, or otherwise impose certain conditions upon such a transfer. For
example, the assignee may be required, as a matter of standardized procedure,
to establish its economic viability as an enterprise, and/or its technical ability
to perform under the PSC to the satisfaction of the host government.
Whether or not the choice of an assignee remains the exclusive domain of
the IOGC, or is subject to the host government’s approval (either pro forma or
via ad hoc review), as a matter of practical economics, farm-in candidates
cannot just fall out of “nowhere.” Farm-in companies are usually other IOGCs
or state-owned companies fully supported by neighboring countries having an
economic interest and political foothold in the region. These farm-in candidates
must visibly and demonstrably measure up to the capabilities, resources, and
stature of the original IOGC who executed the PSC, and to whom the host
government looks for the completion of exploration Work Programs. These
farmees can either be well-established independent oil producers, or consortia
thereof, or, more typically, those MNCs with brand-name recognition in the
petroleum sector – only the giants who dominate the industry can afford to take
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the risks and costs of international Petroleum Operation. Naturally, the original
IOGC will be looking for farm-in partners who share its business philosophy,
who can provide cost sharing and capital contribution, and who can form
substantial allies with the original IOGC-contractor long-term. The smaller
entrepreneurs have little chance to gain an equity position in such an
environment of networks and alliances fortified by the kind of financial backing
and grouping that naturally defeat competition from the lesser equipped.
Farm-in/farm-out arrangements are routinely done in the industry,
amounting to an effective risk-spreading and business-alliance framework.142
In most cases, the host government gives pro forma approval, requiring
screening for, and proof of, financial and technical capability. But in reality,
the host government will likely be making these approval decisions based on
geo-political factors. A farmee not favored by the government due to its
activities elsewhere in the country or in the region will be unlikely to receive the
host government’s support. For example, in the Vietnam Deal, the Vietnamese
government would probably not approve a farmee who held a Participating
Interest in another contract area granted by the Chinese government, over
which contract area Vietnam and other ASEAN nations each had asserted a
competing territorial claim.143 Naturally, Vietnam would not favor such a farmee
due to its national interest and resulting hostility toward China. As another
example, both the IOGC-contractor and the host government may favor a
farmee who is already developing an adjacent contract area, or who has already
obtained rights of exploration in several contract areas in the country or the
region. Such a farmee may have greater economic incentives to acquire
additional interests in adjacent areas in order to achieve economy of scale in its
overall development strategies. In summary, the choice of a farmee can be both
geo-political and economic.
If, however, the original IOGC manages to effectuate a farm-out
completely “offshore” purely for purposes of cost and risk sharing, while
maintaining as the primary contractor in the host country, the IOGC may be
able to avoid any geopolitical factors triggered by the governmental approval
process and, hence, will have more flexibility in choosing a partner based solely
on its internal economic needs. The choice, however, will still be bound by the
monopoly nature of the industry as a whole -- only a handful of players can
afford to assume the risks and costs associated with petroleum ventures in the
developing economies. The result is that only a few dominant MNC players,
locked together in farm-in/farm-out positions and in original contractual
arrangements with governments, will “reign” over the economy of the entire
country or the region, if and when petroleum is found. Overall, risk-sharing
alliances among IOGCs are often made subject to strict confidentiality
understakings.144
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While such confidential international farm-in/farm-out arrangements
may bear all characteristics of large-scaled acquisitions, they may not be
governed by any national law’s anti-competitive regulatory regime, let alone any
regional oversight. First, these farm-in/farm-out arrangement does not
implicate the IGOC’s home jurisdiction’s anti-trust concerns or interest.
Second, the transitional economies may not have developed effective and
sophisticated anti-competitive laws. Third, the speculative nature of upstream
endeavors – that prospective profit is rendered uncertain by various geological
appraisal risks – can make the gauging and assessment of anti-competitive
effect either premature, speculative, impossible, or inappropriate. Farmors and
farmees are obligated to spend money before they can make money, if they
make money at all! In other words, due to the “hit and miss” nature of
exploration programs, all players, no matter how dominant or monopolistic,
may go home with losses rather than gains, and this is the reality of the
business. Accordingly, how can there be any anti-competitive effect on a market
when, at the end of the day, there may be no commodity and no market at all?
It is evident, however, that the inter-corporate farm-in/farm-out arrangements,
as well as the MNC-government partnerships, are all tightly negotiated
partnerships, generally well-sealed from the public light, motivated by the highrisk, high-cost transactional dynamics between parties who control technology,
capital, and access to the uncovered “crown jewels,” all in a less than ideally
stable economy. The screening and approval of the host government of farmin/farm-out arrangements, which may amount to acquisition of enormous
ownership interests of natural resources, often falls short of any systematic
anti-competitive regulatory framework, and justifiably so.
The result,
nonetheless, is still the creation of de facto cartels – a group of IOGCs joined
together in consortia or farm-in/farm-out arrangements, supported by
governments.145 The cartel dominates and shapes a transitional country’s
petroleum industry and hence its national economy. The domination has
impact beyond the border and can reach regional or global dimension. The
reality is: foreign direct investment in petroleum projects will continue, but
only if the losses suffered by IOGCs in exploration endeavors on balance are
outweighed by their gains in an environment with rapidly declining petroleum
resources. More so than ever, the capacity of small- or medium- sized
independent producers is diminishing in an increasingly competitive globe.
An example of a business environment consisting of de facto petroleum
cartels. is the current oil development picture in poverty-stricken Chad: all four
IOGC giants -- Exxon-Mobil, Chevron, Conoco, and Shell -- have joined forces
to develop the industry there. Three out of the four are U.S.-based corporate
giants, and although Shell is a Dutch company, it has substantial producing
subsidiaries or affiliates in the U.S. 146 Critics of MNCs may opine that a U.S.-
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based de facto cartel has situated itself for the control of Chad’s national
economy, and potentially of petroleum-producing Africa. On the other hand, the
rational economist may legitimately pose the following question: Where will
Chad be, some 20 years from now, without the involvement, cooperation,
alliances, and resources of these “cartel” members who are both financiers and
technology specialists?
the hope brought to Chad by the monopolistic
petroleum industry, no matter how thin or how flawed, is still better than no
hope at all.
The picture is clear: modern “monarchs” participate, cooperate with, and
support private de facto cartels, either as a matter of choice or simply lack of
choice. Due to the high risk, capital-intensive, and technically complex nature
of upstream Petroleum Activities (especially when the host country is in an
economically embryonic stage), these monopolistic partnerships effectively
preclude the development of a native or local entrepreneurial class capable of
investing in, and benefiting directly from, the natural and energy resources of
their own homeland. When the modern monarchs shake hands with the MNC
rainmakers, the door to true capitalism is forever closed to the inhabitants of
the transitional economies, or the hopefully emerging entrepreneurial middle
class. The true owners of natural resources stand anonymously, unobtrusively,
and passively at the mercy of those in power and control, who finalize the
handshakes based on confidential negotiations. There can never be, for the oilproducing countries that remain poor, the jovial scene of the “Beverly Hillbillies”
moving their horse-carts merrily into their Beverly Hills mansion because oil
has been found on their land in Texas! The only hope for true ownership of
petroleum by the people is when the SOEs that are commercial arms of the host
government (such as PetroVietnam in the Vietnam Deal) are eventually
privatized, and shares are offered to the public for direct purchase. In such a
case, all traumatic problems of the past chaotic experience with privatization of
the state-owned economy will be apt to re-occur, as has been experienced with
China, Germany, the former Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe.147 But even if
this “privatization” scenario can successfully materialize one day, the public at
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that time might still be too poor and too sick to afford ownership of shares in a
petroleum publicly traded company! (Countries stricken with poverty such as
Nigeria and Chad suffer from high infant mortality and short life expectancy,
which together belie the hope for true prosperity or improved standards of
living).148
3. The “Carry” of Costs and Expenses. Although holders of
Participating Interests are required to contribute equity and to bear their
proportionate shares of costs, this may not always mean that the Participating
Interest holder will have to contribute cash flow to support expensive
exploration activities. Where the host government or its SOE insists on holding
a Participating Interest in the project, such a Participating Interest may be
“carried” by other investors or participants all through the various stages of
Petroleum Activities. The “Carry” means that all financial burdens and the risk
of exploration failure are borne by foreign investors, even though the host
government is entitled to hold a Participating Interest. If exploration fails, the
host government will not have to pay back the Carry.
Understandably “Carry” is the norm in the developing nations. Typically,
the IOGC-contractor will only “carry” the Participating Interest held by the host
government or its SOE. (The IOGC-contractor will not be looking to “carry” the
interest of any of its other partners, especially if the IOGC is counting on these
partners to share investment risks! In fact, most likely the IOGC-contractor will
be looking to other foreign partners to share its “carry” of the government.) The
host government’s economic dependency upon the IOGC who “carries” the
government’s costs is inescapably evident, yet the party who is economically
dependent is also the party who plays the role of the sovereign regulator
overseeing the IOGC’s conduct in the country.
Quite often the IOGC’s “Carry” obligation will be effective through the
exploration phase, where risks of failure are the greatest. Accordingly, during
PSC negotiation, the IOGC’s goal will be to minimize its “Carry” obligations as
much as possible, not to extend the “Carry” beyond the exploration period. After
a commercial discovery, the government or its SOE should be able to obtain
financing for its obligations via a pledge against its forthcoming share of
production. In other words, the government’s “carried” interest is typically a
non-cost-bearing interest, which may be converted into a cost-bearing interest
upon production startup. The IOGC will want to assure that all “carried” costs
and expenses be ultimately reimbursed out of production. The contractual
framework under which “carried” costs and expenses are reimbursed is part of
the “Cost Recovery” terms.
4. The Work Program. The exploration program typically consists of
kilometers of seismic data, a definite number of wells to be drilled (Obligatory
Wells), and, in some cases, an additional number of optional wells to be drilled
(Non-obligatory Wells). These work commitments constitute the IOGC-
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contractor’s Work Program – a contractual undertaking made to the host
country in exchange for access to the country’s natural resources. This is why
the IOGC-contractor finds itself peculiarly in the position of someone who
promises to perform work for free. The right to install and work a drilling rig on
sovereign ground is literally the consideration in exchange for the IOGC’s Work
Program!
The Work Program may even impose penalties for contractor’s nonperformance, and can be secured by a Standby Letter of Credit issued for the
benefit of the host government, in order to safeguard against the IOGCcontractor’s default.149 If the IOGC-Contractor fails to finish the Work Program,
the host government can draw upon the Letter of Credit to make good its
damages, and, in addition, sue the IOGC-Contractor for breach of contract in
the underlying PSC transaction. The role of the Standby Letter of Credit can
also be fulfilled by similar instruments such as a bank’s financial guarantee, a
surety performance bond, and/or a “parent” or corporate” financial or
performance guarantee provided by the IOGC’s parent holding company,150 In
summary, not only does an IOGC-contractor do “work for free,” but it may also
be penalized or made subject to further financial loss if it fails to perform or
complete the work.
One way for the IOGC to control financial risks is to put a maximum
limit or ceiling on the Work Program. This limit can either be “money-driven,”
or “work-driven.” If the Work Program limit is “work-driven,” the PSC may
specify that the IOGC is required to drill a specific number of wells, and that
the wells meet certain criteria or purpose. In a “money-driven” Work Program,
the contractual commitment is typically to conduct exploration up to a
maximum budgetary limit – a financial cap. When the ceiling is reached, the
IOGC-contractor has no obligation to perform additional exploration activities or
spend more money. It may then withdraw from the host country or otherwise
validly abandon the project.
Where there is a discovery of a reserve in the Contract Area, two major
issues will immediately arise. First, under most contractual arrangements,
discovery of petroleum will entitle the contractor to the exclusive rights of
exploitation. However, this may not be a universal rule. Accordingly, a specific
“exclusivity” provision may become necessary in the underlying PSC. Without
a express “exclusivity” provision, the host government, due to geopolitical
factors, may require the IOGC to take on an equity partner after the reserve has
been found, thereby interfering with project management and limiting the
IOGC’s chance for maximizing profit. To the extent the country’s law requires
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certain procedural prerequisites, the IOGC-contractor must make sure it
complies with and performs all such requirements in order to secure
exclusivity.
Second, the IOGC-contractor will have to determine whether the reserve
is substantial enough for the IOGC to proceed to the subsequent phases of
Development and Production. If the reserve is substantial enough to justify the
costs, it may be found to be “commercial.” This determination may necessitate
certain governmental action, because the government, either by law or contract,
may have reserved a licensing or approval authority for itself with respect to
each and every step of Petroleum Activities. This approval authority is even
more crucial with respect to a declaration of “commercial discovery,” as will
be explained below.
5. Standards of Commerciality and Contractor’s Withdrawal Rights.
The nature of exploration work is such that the more exploratory activities are
conducted in the Contract Area, the more likely the investor may discover
petroleum if the Contract Area indeed has reserves. The logic is simple: The
contractor will need to drill as much as possible, as long-term as possible, in
order to “hit that stream.” The more wells are drilled, the more chance there is
for the IOGC-contractor to make a commercial discovery.
The limit set on the Work Program forces the IOGC to perform “educated
guesswork” by estimating into the future the costs or work involved to secure
the maximum chance for a commercial discovery. This guesswork has to be
done in an environment full of uncertainty and variants, even with the most
sophisticated geological sampling and technical analysis. To deal with these
appraisal risks, the IOGC-contractor may have to secure for itself a
“withdrawal right,” or the right to disengage from future obligations, in order
to bring the investment or project to the conclusion when it determines that
further work and expenditures contradict sound economic judgment. The host
government, on the other hand, may insist on the opposite course of action – it
wants to reserve for itself the right to call for a higher commitment than
originally contemplated, either in terms of monetary spending or the drilling of
additional wells. A balance of these competing demands and interests must be
obtained by negotiation in order to achieve the compromised mixture of “giveand-take.”
It follows, therefore, that a decision by the IOGC to withdraw from the
project does not necessarily mean that the Contract Area is devoid of deposits.
Instead, it is the IOGC’s economic judgment whether the finds are “commercial”
enough to be worth the costs of developing them. Accordingly, critical to an
exploration contract is the “commerciality” clause, which sets the standards
for determining whether a petroleum discovery is economically feasible and
appropriate for development (as opposed to being abandoned).
Commerciality is the legal concept that, if triggered, will allow the IOGC
the right to exit the project based on its economic judgment, in order to “cut its
losses and go home” without further obligations to the host government. The
concept thus conditions contractual obligations upon the viability and
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profitability of a project.151 In the ideal negotiating situation, the IOGCcontractor will want total final discretion over the legal definition of
commerciality. It wants to control its right to proceed and invest more money,
or simply withdraw in order to prevent an economically losing proposition. The
determination may even depend on external factors such as high production
costs in an environment of declining oil price, or whether a marginal reserve
can be jointly developed with another substantial reserve in order to achieve
economy of scale. At times, the IOGC may procure a “claw-back” right to
return to the project after it has withdrawn for lack of commerciality, as
economic viability may be a fluid judgment depending on both external and
internal factors or changed circumstances.
In contrast, the host country will also want to have the discretion to
declare whether a discovery is commercial, as such declaration will mark the
end of the Exploration phase and the beginning of the Development phase,
which may ultimately lead to petroleum production that can change the future
of a country. Here, conflicts may arise and intense negotiation may result. At
best, the government will want to put the burden of proving non-commerciality
upon the IOGC-contractor, and will want to scrutinize and have approval or
veto authority over the IOGC-contractor’s determination of commerciality.
Realistically, for national interest reasons, no government will want to yield
such absolute discretion to the foreign investor. Quite often, commerciality
determination becomes a joint decision by the IOGC and the host government.
Where the scale tips will depend on leverage and bargaining power under the
circumstances.
Likewise, as an extension of the “commerciality” concept, the IOGCcontractor may want to protect its power of control by contractually dividing the
exploration work commitment into sub-phases. It may want to retain the right
to evaluate and withdraw at the end of each sub-phase, thereby maintaining its
discretionary flexibility whether to renew or extend the time duration for
exploration. It may also want the discretion to reduce or expand the Contract
Area. (This flexibility is even more critical in case of a gas discovery (rather
than oil discovery), because the development of a gas discovery will depend on
possibilities of long-term gas sales contracts in the region, or other acceptable
marketing schemes.) At the other end of the spectrum, the host government
will also want to maintain its power to approve or disapprove each of the
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contractor’s decisions and, in general, will want the contractor to prolong or
expand exploration work in hopes of future finds for development.
6. The Host Country’s Fiscal Regime and Bonus Requirements.
Despite the differences in legal systems, an economist may be able to chart
precisely the economic consequences for either party by scrutinizing the terms
of the PSC. In other words, in any legal system, it is possible to calculate and
figure the percentage of the Government Take versus the Contractor Take
out of the production of petroleum found in a Contract Area. The Government
Take consists of the taxes, royalties, production share or Government
Participation claimed by the host country or its SOE, plus any payment of
bonuses asked of the IOGC-contractor at various points during the contract’s
life. All these elements together constitute the host government’s petroleum
Fiscal Regime. The Contractor Take, on the other hand, refers to the after-tax,
after-cost share of petroleum (or fees paid, depending on the legal system) to
which the contractor is entitled.152
From a macro-economic standpoint, a petroleum-exporting country’s
Fiscal Regime is the legal and economic mechanism by which “Economic Rent”
is captured via the Government Take, in order for the country to maximize its
wealth. Various “Economic Rent” theories explain the government’s Fiscal
Regime, and may provide insight into the conflict, as well as may justify the
balance, between the economic interests of host governments versus those of
IOGC-contractors. Under these theories, “Economic Rent” is the difference
between the value of petroleum and the costs to extract it.153 “Costs” consist of
not only the expenses of Petroleum Activities, but also the profit claimed by the
contractor. Accordingly, Economic Rent is the same as excess profit available
for grab by either party, after IOGCs have recouped all of their expenditures
and captured their desired profit:
Value of Petroleum – (Expenses + Profit) = Economic Rent = Excess Profit

Governments, in the role of resource owners analogous to landlords, will
attempt to capture as much Economic Rent as possible through taxation,
royalties, its share of production, and required bonuses. IOGCs, on the other
hand, will want to maximize profit to the farthest-reaching limit, whenever
possible. In other words, IOGCs want to claim excess profit, if the fiscal and
legal regimes so allow. The Government Take, therefore, serves to curtail IOGCs’
excess profit.
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Among the elements constituting the Government Take, tax and royalties
may be set by national legislation and, hence, can rarely be negotiated. The
IOGC, however, can negotiate within the range of royalty rates provided by law,
and/or it can negotiate or apply for tax holidays or exemptions, or a ceiling limit
upon business income tax (at times called profit tax). Typically, royalty rates
have not exceeded 15% of the value of production.154 As to income tax, quite
often, governments or their contracting SOEs have been willing to pay for the
IOGC-contractor’s tax out of the government’s share of production, and then
provide the IOGC a receipt to enable it to seek income tax credit back home,
especially when, as in the case of the U.S., the home jurisdiction taxes
worldwide income and then provides the taxpayer with a credit for the amount
of income taxes paid to foreign governments in order to avoid double
taxation.155
Where the host government or its SOE absorbs the IOGC’s income tax
obligations (as described above), naturally the IOGC-contractor will have to
accede to a higher production share for the government, since such production
share must encompass the payment of the IOGC’s income tax to the host
jurisdiction. For the IOGC-contractor, the benefit of having the governmental
entity assume the IOGC’s local tax burden is merely the streamlining of
paperwork created by the enforcement of the host government’s taxation
scheme – the foreign investor does not have to worry about it, since the SOE, a
governmental instrumentality, will then be paying taxes on the IOGC’s behalf.
Government Participation can be another bite of production added to the
Government Take. (There are jurisdictions that opt not to charge a royalty and,
instead, focus on Government Participation or production sharing). Government
Participation can also guarantee certain rights of control for the host
government or its SOE with respect to the management and operation of
Petroleum Activities. Excessive Government Participation, therefore, can be a
disincentive to the IOGC’s decision to invest.
Negotiation thus centers around balancing the Contractor Take against
the Government Take – both sides want the biggest bite of Economic Rent.
Ideally, the government’s goals are to design a Fiscal Regime that:
• provides a fair return to the nation-state as well as to private
industry (otherwise, no foreign investor would invest);
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•
•
•
•

avoids undue speculation or unpredictability (which will dissuade
foreign investment);
limits undue administrative burden upon the government as well
as foreign participants (which will also dissuade investment);
provides sufficient flexibility to cope with the country’s changing
needs; and
creates healthy competition and market efficiency.156

In reality, due to unequal bargaining powers, their desperate need for
technology and foreign capital, and their inexperience, the lesser-developed
transitional economies stand to give up more than gaining in the negotiation
process. Accordingly, the goals set forth above can be purely aspirational. For
example, the exclusivity of the “MNCs and Friends Club” may negate the goal of
fostering healthy competition or stimulating entrepreneurship in the host
country (The only group of “entrepreneurs” that may benefit from training and
technology transfer is the contracting SOE, controlled and selected by the
government). Accordingly, various measures by which a government captures
Economic Rent become the sovereignty’s tools to correct the imbalanced
pendulum. Yet, as explained below, these measures themselves may also
become the seeds of vice.
Specifically, since tax and royalties are typically set by law, and
production shares or Government Participation are carefully negotiated via
contracts, the payment of bonuses to governments as resource owners becomes
the only flexible mechanism for the host government to capture Economic Rent.
In other words, where appropriately administered, required bonuses paid by an
IOGC-contractor to the host government are proper ways for the government to
minimize or eliminate the IOGC-contractor’s excess profit.
Accordingly,
contractual terms such as Signature Bonus (payable to the host government
upon contract execution) and Production Bonus (payable to the host
government upon production startup) have become acceptable norms of the
international petroleum industry. The host government may decide to award
the PSC to the IOGC-contractor who can voluntarily minimize its profit margin
by offering to pay the highest bonuses to the host country. The company does
not have to do this unless it voluntarily offers to do so, or unless the host
government mandates bonuses as a bidding requirement. Hence, not all PSCs
have bonus provisions, although bonuses have provided the competitive edge
and increasingly become the norms for PSCs around the world.
Bonuses thus increase the Government Take, and can be payable in
cash, or as equipment, supplies, social programs, or technology transfer. From
the perspective of the investor, Production Bonuses are better deals than
Signature Bonuses -- at the time of production startup, appraisal risks
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regarding exploration failure have practically been eliminated, as a commercial
reserve has been found. If there is no commercial reserve discovered, Signature
Bonuses already paid are considered part of the IOGC’s investment losses.
In reality, the Government Take (achieved through the developing
nation’s petroleum Fiscal Regime) does not always result in wealth and wellbeing for the nation-state or its populace. This is particularly true in countries
with a bad reputation for corruption and dictatorship, but this fact can also be
the result of governments’ incompetence, mismanagement, and other
macroeconomic errors. The bonuses thus become the vulnerable places where
abuse of governmental power can occur. The inverse movement and disparity
between a hefty Government Take in petroleum Fiscal Regimes and the
progress or sustained development for the nation-state and its populace can
best be illustrated in an analysis of the bonus system, as detailed below.
Bonuses, when payable in cash, can be a direct source of hard
currencies to the host government. The import of hard currencies – meaning
currencies of the economically strong industrialized nations such as the U.S.
dollar, the Euro, or the Yen, to which the weaker currencies may be pegged -can help solve a developing country’s “balance of trade” or “balance of
payment” problems, which can jeopardize the country’s good standing in the
international monetary system administered by the IMF.157 A good supply or
surge of hard currency imports may restore a country’s economy and its place
in the international monetary system. Yet, in a pervasively corrupt country
where bribery is received at the very top, hard currencies poured into the
country can also become illicit contributions to the “bloated Swiss bank
accounts” of corrupt government officials.158 The most recent scandal and
federal anti-bribery investigation initiated by the U.S. Department of Justice
involved finder’s fee and acquisition payments made by defunct Mobil
Corporation (now Exxon-Mobil by virtue of corporate merger).159 The payments
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were made to a U.S. citizen and owner of a merchant bank, who allegedly acted
as agent for the government of Kazakhstan. These payments (in the millions)
were allegedly made in connection with Mobil’s acquisition of, and development
activities in, the Tengiz field in Kazakhstan. According to U.S. prosecutors,
these payments were eventually channeled into private bank accounts allegedly
owned or controlled by the President of the Republic.160 Similar bribery
allegations have been made against the giant international construction
company, Halliburton, with respect to its work in Nigeria.161
A Press Release issued by Transparency International (TI) (an NGO
specializing in international anti-corruption campaigns), which accompanied
TI’s 1997 Corruption Perception Index (CPI), alerted the public that there was a
direct link between levels of corruption in the developing economies and foreign
direct investment. The CPI compilers concluded that a large share of corruption
was the explicit product of MNCs, headquartered in leading industrialized
nations, using massive bribery and kick-backs to obtain contracts in the
developing world and countries in transition.162 Other anti-corruption activists
outside of the TI’s network have also argued that “a country becomes or
remains poor under a familiar formula: its corrupt government, which
represents the “elites” in terms of power concentration, maximizes the Swissbank accounts of its leaders by selling the national economy to a group of
companies who pay rich bribes for the guaranteed right to monopolize their
respective sectors in the local and regional market.”163 If this view and
allegation can empirically and consistently be proven, the “development” model
of global economics is an abject failure.164 With the web of corruption in place
as a way of life, there is no way for the “rich” democracies to help the
approximately 3 billion people who are citizens of some 100 impoverished
nations, unless the flow of capital and resources can get to the people who need
159
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them. But is this web of corruption perpetuated by MNCs, and which one
comes first, the chicken or the egg? Serious attention, therefore, must be given
to the empirical patterns of relationships between FDI capital, the current
status of anti-corruption law, trends of international legal cooperation, and the
poverty statistics of the developing world.165
Following the release of the 1997 CPI, in December, 1997, after much
debate and controversy, an anti-bribery international convention was signed,
joining together all members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), and three other non-member-states in a global combat
against corruption.166 The OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Transactions of 1998 (“OECD Convention”)
entered into force within a year of signature, and as of April 2003 had been
ratified by 34 nation-states.167 In the U.S., on November 10, 1998, President
Clinton signed into law the International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act,
implementing the OECD Convention.168
The OECD Convention obligates its signatories to enact national
legislation prohibiting international briberies. Most developing nations
(commonly lumped together as the “bribe-receiving” nations) are not members
of the OECD and, hence, are not bound by the Convention’s mandates. It is
ironic, however, that several “bribe-receiving” nations have always had either
policy statements or written laws condemning and sanctioning briberies by
their officials, long before the OECD Convention came into being. For example,
in Vietnam, Party leaders officially stressed the fact that corruption offended the
nation’s cultural value, as well as the Communist model of rigid party
disciplines,169 yet the principles stated by national leadership contradicts the
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realty of life on the street. The question in “Third World” real-life is whether
those anti-corruption laws and policies exist on paper only, in a country such
as Vietnam, where government bureaucrats typically earn approximately
US$30-50 a month, and where the colloquial expressions of “jungle’s law” made
by “sleeping state representatives” are used by commoners to refer to the
nation’s legal system. 170
One can argue that in practice, the OECD Convention was not designed
to improve the morals, ethics, or reality of the developing world for the benefit of
its inhabitants. The Convention was viewed as the direct result of the U.S.’s
international lobbying efforts to persuade the Western industrialized nations to
adopt anti-corruption law analogous to the U.S. anti-bribery legislation, the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).171 The U.S. objective was to put its
business executives on par with their counterparts from other OECD nations. If
the signatories to the OECD Convention, bound by its mandates, enact antibribery national laws, U.S. businesses will no longer be disadvantaged in
“bribe-receiving” countries, simply because U.S. businessmen are governed by
the FCPA while their competitors from other “bribe-giving” countries are not.
For years, U.S. businesses have cried out loud for this level playing field.172 The
Convention thus represents a victory for U.S. companies, especially when other
industrialized nations have quickly taken action to comply with the mandates of
the OECD Convention.173
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In addition to the OECD Convention, regional efforts also evidenced the
ongoing international campaign against bribery. The Organization of American
States (OAS) was instrumental in bringing about the Inter-American
Convention Against Corruption of 1996 (the “Inter-American Convention”).174
The Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Global Coalition for Africa
(GCA) have spearheaded efforts toward ultimately a similar convention for
African countries, which has not come into being.175 Similarly, the Paris-based
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) has also initiated efforts to invite
companies worldwide to adopt rules of conduct designed to combat extortion
and bribery in international trade.176
In the world of scholarly idealism, the OECD Convention can be viewed
as a representative and inspiring statement of universal business ethics. As
such, the Convention is an example of how “international legalization,” rather
than interest-based bargaining, can advance normative values.177 Historically,
the philosophical debates concerning international law and international
relations fluctuate on a spectrum between the “value” model and the “interest”
model.178 Normative and constructivist scholars see international law as an
expression of morally driven norms (the “value” model); rational choice scholars
understand law to be a creature of interest-based bargaining or other incentives
based on the “logic of consequences” (the “interest model).179 Commentators
have referred to the formulation of international law to effectuate both the
“value” and “interest” models as the “legalization” movement.180 In its best
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defense, the OECD Convention is an example that both models can co-exist,
serving as the showcase for the “legalization” movement.181
However, a careful look at the current norm of bonus payment in the
petroleum sector may pose some legitimate doubt as to whether systematic
efforts of legalization at the international level may effectively cure the root
cause of poverty or its cousin – the vice of governmental corruption -- in the
developing world. A misused bonus payment in the millions of dollars paid
under a negotiated PSC scheme may constitute a “legitimate” bribe considered
legal under the FCPA, which has tactfully been used as a model anti-bribery
legislation for nation-states acting under the mandates of the OECD
Convention.182 Enacted in response to the Lockheed scandal in Saudi Arabia in
the 1970s,183 the FCPA does not prohibit bribes qua bribes, because what is
considered a bribe in one culture may not constitute a bribe in another culture.
The FCPA only prohibits payments that qualify as ‘corrupt payments” under
statutory elements specified in the Act.184 One such element is the requirement
that in order for the payment to be illegal, it must be made to a recipient who is
a “foreign official.”185 Payment made to the treasury allegedly for the “people,”
as in the case of bargained-for Signature or Production Bonuses, does not meet
this criterion and hence falls outside the prohibition of the FCPA.186 Further, to
be liable under the Act, the company making the bribe must act with a
“knowing” state of mind.187 “Knowing” is defined to include “awareness of a high
probability of the existence of [certain] circumstances [required for the
offense].188 The legislative history indicated that a deliberate “burial of one’s
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head under the sand”189 to refute knowledge will not serve to escape liability
under the Act, so long as knowledge of the predicate circumstances can be
proven or established.190 Thus, concepts such as “conscious disregard,”
“deliberate ignorance,” or “willful blindness,” are meant by the legislature to be
part of the statutory definition of “knowing.”191 While such “knowing” standard
should be the widest net to catch all sins, in the case of petroleum bonuses, the
difficulty of proof becomes the obstacle against effective enforcement of the law.
How does the prosecutor prove deliberate blindness as to where a cash bonus
payment goes after it reaches the nation’s Treasury, especially when such
bonus payment is formally required by bidding or tender, or otherwise
negotiated as payment allegedly for the benefit of the “people”?
In principle, the country’s leaders should be able to prefer or require
cash payments in order to accumulate hard currencies for the Treasury, for use
in various legitimate macro-economic-or nation-building purposes. In reality,
in a pervasively corrupt country, such huge cash amounts may enrich some
high officials’ Swiss accounts, yet the IOGC may now legitimately “bury its head
in the sand,” and decline to inquire or investigate further. In fact, it will make
sure that documents exist to prove the company does not need to, and cannot
inquire further. The PSC itself negates the MNC’s specific intent or knowledge
of corrupt usage or purpose by the host government’s individual leaders. How
cash bonuses or payments are used may be disingenuously legitimized as part
of the host government’s exercise of its “sovereign power,” at least on paper or
at the surface. Leaning upon the legitimacy of such “sovereign power,” the IOGC
thus can rightfully disregard any concern it may have about how bonus money
is going to be used, or where it is going. The IOGC may lawfully label such
mysterious use as exclusive sovereign domain, and not of any concern to the
payor. Consequently, the very nature of, and mechanism established for, the
payment of cash bonuses or payments in PSC schemes becomes the very
defense companies will rely on to negate FCPA implications FCPA
accountability, therefore, stops at the border, where money changes hands.
The only safeguard left lies in the home jurisdiction’s corporate or
securities law governing mandatory public disclosures -- how cash payments
are documented and classified on the books and records of the IOGC according
to applicable accounting and auditing standards governing publicly traded
corporations. Under the FCPA, violation of accounting and auditing
requirements with respect to the documentation and explanation of payments
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made in connection with international business activities may become separate
violations of the FCPA.192 (The FCPA consists of two statutory components: the
anti-bribery provisions and the accounting/reporting provisions.) The
accounting and auditing requirements of the FCPA are part of the 1934
Securities Exchange Act governing, in general, public companies that are
issuer-registrants within the framework of U.S. federal securities law.193 Under
these legal standards, “reasonableness” rather than “materiality” constitutes
the threshold that triggers the company’s responsibility to keep books, records
and accounts, which “must accurately and fairly reflect” the transaction and
disposition of the issuer’s assets.194 “Reasonableness” and “accurate and fair “
reflection can easily be met with respect to the bonus payments,195 since all the
issuer-company needs to do is to document, in reasonable detail, that the
payment was a bonus payment payable to the Treasury of a foreign country,
using the executed PSC as evidence and support. The FCPA does not require
the IOGC to investigate the actual use and disbursements of bonus payments.
Nor does the Act require the IOGC to trace the final recipients of these bonuses,
unless the IOGC has reason to believe that (i) there exists a corrupt intent on
the part of the recipient to misappropriate and transfer the bonuses to the
pocket of a foreign official, or (ii) there exists a reasonable likelihood that bonus
payments are funneled to private accounts. Even when the IOGC may have
reasons to know such unique circumstances, it is difficult for the prosecution to
ascertain statutorily what the law requires the IOGC to do to prevent bonus
money from turning into a bribe under the law. The IOGC can effectively clean
its hands and legitimately walk away, leaving what occurs behind doors in
governmental offices of the host country as within the exclusive province of
sovereignty. 196
If indeed bonuses or any type of cash payments are meant for the benefit
of the people, anti-bribery law enforcement with respect to the use and
disbursement of multi-million-dollar cash payments to foreign governments
should not stop at the border where money changes hands. Nor should it stop
with the home jurisdiction’s internal audit or accounting requirements, whose
focus is on the shareholder public and not on citizens of the “Third World.”
Here is a perfect example where the interest of the shareholder public and
“Third World” inhabitants can coincide – shareholders do not want exorbitant
foreign bribes to cut into the maximum return on their investment, and “Third
World” inhabitants do not want the money to end up in the unclean hands of
their corrupt leaders.
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Imposition of stricter due diligence duties upon the IOGCs, which are in
the best position to conduct such due diligence, should be considered as part of
the spirit and objective of international anti-bribery campaigns and of the
“legalization” doctrine that has led to bodies of international law such as the
OECD Convention and the Inter-American Convention. Obviously, serious
policy arguments may be raised as to whether or not IOGCs should be required
to conduct due diligence and obtain assurances from the host jurisdiction with
respect to the use and disbursement of cash bonus payments allegedly for the
“people’s” interest. Similar policy arguments can also be made as to (i) the
realistic effectiveness of such due diligence requirements, and (ii) the extent to
which the due diligence should be conducted before their additional costs pose
economic concern for the shareholder public back home.
In any event, the necessity of requiring further due diligence for each and
every cash bonus made can be rendered moot if the IOGC community will use
its leverage to replace cash bonus offers or requirements with bonuses in kind,
aimed specifically at serving the local community and directly contributing to
the people’s interest. For example, instead of complying with cash bonus
requirements or offering to pay them, during negotiation IOGCs may suggest
bonuses strictly in the form of IOGC-sponsored social or training programs for
the local community; the construction, training and staffing of educational,
medical, or community facilities and research centers; the construction of
various industrial or technological infrastructures; the sponsoring of starving
local artists and writers; the funding of university scholarships and grants;
and/or other social programs similar to efforts normally undertaken by
corporate citizens of the developed nations.197 As a condition precedent to
payment, cash bonuses, if any, should be earmarked for the funding of
independent local or international NGOs, local or international educational or
medical institutions, and similar non-profit organizations operating in the host
jurisdiction.198 If administered via an NGO, the use and disbursement of
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bonuses can be monitored via NGOs’ programmatic reports to safeguard against
funding abuse or mismanagement. Short of a better alternative, if all members
of the “MNC-IOGC cartel” will, by consensus, raise this suggestion to the host
countries, governments will eventually be forced to minimize or alleviate cash
bonus requirements (other than those exemplified above), or otherwise replace
them with social programs, and any concern regarding the potential misuse of
cash bonuses will practically be rendered moot. The tremendous leverage and
bargaining power that the MNC-IOGC community has over host governments
should be exercised in a systematic “public interest” and “social responsibility”
approach. This approach can only be accomplished if the MNC-IOGC
community engages in self-enforced regulation as a voluntary response to
constant public scrutiny.199
The substitution of cash bonuses with social programs funded by
MNC/IOGCs is also consistent with the IMF’s austerity measures imposed upon
nation-loan recipients to steer them away from conducting themselves as the
“welfare states.” Commentators have observed that the Bretton Woods
institutions often advocate shrinking governments, social programs restrictions,
higher interest rates, reduction of subsidies for basic goods, and elimination of
tariffs as some of the free-market direction required of loan recipients.200 World
Bank and IMF officials have reportedly claimed that resistance to open markets
such as the antagonism exhibited by Latin America and Africa accounted for
economic inequality and stagnation in those regions.201 In addition to deterring
greed and preventing potential abuse of power within the nation’s bureaucracy,
shifting the funding of social programs to the private sector and the MNC/IOGC
community, with the involvement of locally formed or locally operating NGOs,
may help the developing nations conform their national policies to IMF or World
Bank fiscal philosophies.
(7) The Management of Risks and its Impact upon Legal Issues
in MNC-Government Partnerships. The discussion so far reinforces one
conclusion that requires no empirical validation: where the “Third World”
government is not acting in the best interest of its people and is itself
to constitutional protection with respect to both commercial speech and political speech. Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1976); see also Adam Winkler, “The Corporation in Election Law,” 32 Loy. L.A.L.
Rev. 1243, 1246 (1999). The curtailing of political contributions made to foreign candidates and political
parties abroad does raise perplexing constitutional and social policy issues, and will be topics of discussion
for another day.
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committing “bad acts,” naturally the government’s alliance with an MNC and
the monopolistic, close-knit nature of their partnership can cause another layer
of havoc to the country and its inhabitants. While this point may first seem
obviously common sense, its full implication can best be illustrated by
scrutinizing how an MNC-IOGC seeks to allocate and manage various types of
investment risks.
Principally, an IOGC must face two types of investment risks. The risks
of not finding a commercial reserve in a Contract Area are part of “Appraisal
Risks,” dependent upon geological factors. These Appraisal Risks are
distinguishable from “Political Risks,” which, despite their volatile and
undeterminable nature, can relatively be assessed and controlled. Acts of
government constituting Force Majeure202 are typically lumped together under
the rubric of Political Risks. Legal risks – the risks of changing laws, new
legislation, or adverse judicial or governmental agency rulings -- are part of
Political Risks.
From the perspective of the foreign investor, Political Risks are part of
project risks, encompassing all material hostile acts by governments, the
assessment of which more an art than an exact science.203 In an investment
contract, hostile acts by governments may be included in the legal definition of
force majeure, or may occasion other force majeure events beyond a party’s
control, such as transportation interruption, shortage of supplies or failure of
delivery. The worst Political Risk that has been experienced with foreign
investment in countries such as Cuba, Iran, Lybia, and Vietnam was the
nationalization or expropriation of foreign investors’ assets due to regime
changes and revolutions. Today’s global economy and the interlocking financial
markets make individual governmental act of nationalization and expropriation
less likely, unless it is part of a drastic regime change or military coup.
The least obvious and least drastic Political Risk, but equally significant,
is an across-the-board policy shift, or gradual material adverse governmental
action (MAGA) that may occur per project, under the same regime that has
approved the investment. Over time, MAGA can amount to “creeping
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nationalization or expropriation,”204 which refers to the gradual process of a
state’s acquisition of control over foreign businesses within its borders, such
that the foreign investor’s economic interest is materially impaired and
jeopardized.205 While creeping governmental action may be characteristic of
Political Risks in the developing nations, policy shifts are not unique to any part
of the world. In the U.S., policy shifts may occur with every election.
An IOGC’s “Appraisal Risk” assessment and “Political Risk” assessment
may be inter-dependent. Petroleum Activities are long-term endeavors – the
production period can be of 20 or 30 years’ duration.206 Exploration (quite often
an initial five years’ commitment) may involve very high risks of failure – for
years, the conventional explorationist often commented that out of 10 ventures,
at least nine were unsuccessful, although recent technological advent -particularly 3D seismic technology -- may have increased the probability of
exploration success to a percentage much higher than the dismal 10% in
traditionalist thinking. Within the corporate culture of IOGCs, only “upstream”
professionals and explorationists are able to expend huge budgets without the
kind of profit-making accountability usually expected of other incomeproducing units. All of this speculation, educated guesswork, and scientific
geological evaluation lead to one conclusion: when the venture is successful,
the IOGC must capture sufficient profit to accommodate failures elsewhere.
Further, since the industry is so capital-intensive, typically, the toptiered IOGCs will not invest in a potential reserve unless the areas are capable
of a significant volume of oil or natural gas.207 In other words, the commercial
discovery must be of a substantial quantity for profit to be realized in such a
high-cost investment. Likewise, in order to achieve high profit, IOGCs would
naturally favor acquisition of very substantial Participating Interests, and will
not welcome governmental Fiscal Regimes that keep the IOGC-contractor’s
Participating Interest to a minimal percentage.
It follows, therefore, that Appraisal Risks and Political Risks may move
inversely against each other. The IOGC’s decision to invest in a country means
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that, in its judgment, Appraisal Risks must have been outweighed by the
projection of huge profit in a success case. The higher the Appraisal Risks are,
the higher the level of capital investment is going to be, leading naturally to a
much higher expectation of profit. The higher the profit margin is, the more
motivated the IOGC will be in lowering Political Risks with a corporate strategy
that helps maintain the political power base of the incumbent government with
which the IOGC has signed a contract. It is in the interest of the IOGC if the
incumbent government continues its strong political footing in the country and
the region, thereby providing a stable environment for the IOGC to achieve its
steadily high returns on its huge, long-term investment.
Nothwithstanding the “social responsibility” doctrine,208 the current
Anglo-American corporate law regime does not compel corporate entities to
concern themselves with human rights.
Rather, the emphasis is on
shareholder primacy, financial accountability to investors, or at best the
provision of a “voice” forum for other stakeholders such as employees or
creditors.209 (Even in the U.S. “shareholder primacy” corporate model, the voice
of non-controlling minority shareholders in public companies has typically been
limited to a window-dressing opportunity to submit proposals or raise
objections to management’s policy and direction, under stringent procedural
limitations.210) Thus, the human rights agenda has basically been left to the
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voluntary models of “inspired” corporate conduct in response to public opinion.
The “home” jurisdiction’s oversight over corporate “offshore” conduct, or the
extraterritorial reach of the home jurisdiction’s mandatory law, becomes the
most concrete tool with the sharpest teeth to police MNCs’ conduct. But the
rigor of this policing and oversight depends on the geo-political dynamics of the
home jurisdiction and the political agenda of its lawmakers. The fact that the
geo-political dynamics drives the effectiveness of enforcement, or lack thereof, is
a reality of the global community. It is precisely because of this reason that
public international and humanitarian law has often been criticized as
inspirational law or “soft” law, without enforcing teeth.211
Accordingly, the due diligence that IOGCs usually perform as part of
their Political Risk management does not have to include a moral due diligence
with respect to democratic or human rights values.212 Once the investment
contract has been signed with the incumbent government, issues of politics
within the country and relations between the incumbent government and its
people become irrelevant to the IOGC’s corporate strategy. Part of the IOGC’s
overall and long-term business goal is to gain the support of, and split profit
with, the incumbent government, no matter how unpopular or tyrannic the
regime may seem. Once fully invested in the country, IOGCs are naturally longterm supporters of the incumbent government, and are most likely to help
minimize any political instability associated with the region or locale. Likewise,
the incumbent government will have all the incentives in the world to keep its
business partners in active business and in prosperity. Both sides are now fully
imbedded in the self-interest structure. In the words of the cynical critic, the
two partners are “married” for a long time.
What’s more, in planning its partnership with the government, the IOGC
can also turn to other risk management alternatives. For example, it may seek
Political Risk insurance protection, and in such a case, the international
community and the full faith and credit of the United States may come to its
assistance. For the right project, the MNC-government partnership will have
full multilateral or bilateral support from governments of the developed nations
available to it. Among the agencies providing Political Risk insurance and
investment guarantees are the Multilateral Investment Guaranty Agency
(MIGA), a World Bank affiliate; the U.S. Export-Import Bank (ExIm); and the
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U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC).213 So long as the U.S. has
not embargoed a country, or otherwise set limit on trade or investment, U.S.-
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Political Risk insurance and investment guarantees are provided by the following institutions, two of
which (OPIC and ExIm) are bilateral Export Credit Agencies (ECA) formed by the U.S.:

1) The Multilateral Investment Guaranty Agency (MIGA): Partly funded by the World Bank,
MIGA insurance is available to all World Bank members that have ratified the Convention Establishing
MIGA– the insured must be a national of a member country. In most cases, guarantees by MIGA must also
be approved by the host country. MIGA also partners with private insurers through coinsurance and
reinsurance programs. Non-commercial risks covered by MIGA include currency transfer restrictions,
expropriation, breach of contract, and war and civil disturbance. Should it pay a claim, MIGA would
succeed, by way of subrogation, to the right of the investor against the host country. See Multilateral
Investment
Guarantee
Agency,
World
Bank
Group,
About
Miga
at
http://www.miga.org/screens/about/about.htm (as of May 1, 2002). See also MIGA Annual Report (1996)
(discussing growth in foreign direct investment).
2) The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC): Political risk insurance and investment
guarantees can also be obtained by US nationals from OPIC. As a U.S. government agency, OPIC has as its
goal the promotion of America’s best economic and global strategic interests. A product of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1969, OPIC is limited by statute to insure projects only in the developing economies.
With an annual reserve of approximately $4 billion, OPIC provides both insurance and, to a more limited
extent, financing, so long as there is a government-to-government (bilateral) agreement that sets out
OPIC’s rights of subrogation. OPIC operates at no costs to U.S. taxpayers due to user fees charged by the
agency. With 29 years of claim history, OPIC insurance programs have been extended to some 140
developing markets, and are backed by the full faith and credit of the United States. http://www.opic.gov/.
See also Randi Cohen, “OPIC Insures Investment in Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic States,” 1
New Euro L.Rev. 95, 121 (1992).
3) The Export-Import Bank (ExIm): First created in 1934 but not formally established until 1945,
ExIm also absorbs, in the interest of U.S. producers and importers, credit risks that are typically beyond the
reach of the private sector by providing both financing and investment guarantees. Initially, ExIm’s goals
were to foster trade between the U.S. and the Soviet and Eastern blocs. Later, ExIm extended its scope to
service the reconstruction of both Europe and Asia. Its objective is to supplement, but not to compete
against sources of private capital. ExIm’s history shows a deliberate effort not to engage in turf battle with
the World Bank or the IMF. Principally, ExIm guarantees working capital loans to U.S. exporters, and
provides export credit insurance to protect U.S. exporters against foreign buyers’s failure to pay their credit
obligations. It also lends money to foreign purchasers of U.S. exports, and provides guarantees to
commercial lenders for repayment protection of their private loans. U.S. providers of the petroleum
industry’s goods and services may benefit from ExIm assistance, provided that ExIm has assessed and
approved the project, based on conditions such as reasonable assurance of repayment, and whether a
transaction would have adverse economic impact on U.S. production and employment.
http://www.exim.gov/.
In addition to export financing and bilateral credit support provided by the U.S., other industrialized nations
may set up bilateral agencies of their own. For example, member states within the OECD have their own
bilateral export agencies and programs. One such country is Japan, which provides assistance through the
Export-Import Bank of Japan (JExIm). http://www.mof.go.jp/. All such bilateral agencies have their
own criteria for Project Financing to facilitate “Third World” economic development.
These financing arms should be distinguished from grants, which may be construed as public aid, such as
those provided by the U.S. Trade & Development Agency (TDA
) http://www.tda.gov/, or long-term
interest-free loans provided by the International Development Association (IDA), a World-Bank affiliate.
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based IOGCs are free to partner with “Third World” governments regardless of
their reputation or practices, subject only to the IOGCs’ risk assessment and
evaluation of potential profit.
Even modern trends in international economic law can serve as a doubleedged sword. Among the various widely accepted Political Risk management
techniques are (i) the “internationalization” doctrine, and (ii) the Stabilization
Clause, both of which render stability and standardization to an otherwise
unstable investment environment in the transitional economies.214 However, if
the host government is a dictatorship, or otherwise grossly corrupt and
incompetent, these very same risk-management techniques can help keep such
incumbent government in power by fortifying the business partnerships it has
formed with powerful and economically abled MNCs. These techniques lock the
incumbent government into commitments that curtail the sovereign power of
the country for the benefit of the foreign investor, thereby functioning as the
type of “back-scratching” arrangements that serve the parties’ mutual selfinterest.
•The “internationalization” doctrine. Conflicts of law (or “private
international law,” as that term is used in Europe)215 can present the most
haunting and perplexing issues for lawyers and academics,216 yet they
constitute the least significant issues for business executives. There is
justification for the executive’s indifference to the “governing law” provision in
an investment contract, because disputes are routinely resolved and
compromises reached based on relationships and bottom-line economic
considerations, rather than as a result of intense legal interpretation. In most
“upstream” petroleum contracts, since drilling takes place on the host country’s
territory, it is almost impossible to avoid the application of the local law (lex loci;
lex situs). Savvy negotiators will not spend much time demanding the
application of a neutral law other than lex loci or lex situs in contracts with the

http://www.usaid.gov/. Accord, David Blumental, “Sources of Funds and Risk Management for
International Energy Projects,” 16 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 267 (1998).
214

See, e.g,, Margarita T.B. Coale, “Stabilization Clauses in International Petroleum Transactions,” 30
Denver Journal Int’l Law and Policy, No. 2, 217, 224 (2002); accord Dickstein, “Revitalizing the
International Law Governing Concession Agreements,” 6 Int’l Tax & Bus. Law 54 n. 48 (1988); see also,
e.g., Texaco v. Libyan Arab Republic (TOPCO), 53 I.L.R. 389 (1977).
215

See, e.g., Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (EEC) Art. 15 (1980) (using
the phrase “private international law” in what U.S. lawyers know as “conflicts of law” context).
216

See, e.g., P. North, Contract Conflicts at 9, 17, 297 (1982); Symeonides, “Choice of Law in American
Courts in 1995: A Year in Review,” 44 Am. J. Compare. L. 181 (1996); Stephen B. Burbank,
“Jurisdictional Conflict and Jurisdictional Equilibration: Paths to a Via Media?” (2003); (papers presented
at the Conference on Transatlantic Business Transactions: Choice of Law, Jurisdiction and Judgments
(Barcelona June 1-3, 2003). See also Croff, “The Applicable Law in an International Commercial
Arbitration: Is It Still a Conflict of Laws Problem?” 16 Int’l Lawyer 613 (1982) (discussing whether an
arbitrator should choose the applicable law to a contract through a private international law rule, and which
one). See also Detlev Vagts, Transnational Business Problems 466-472 (1986).
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host government, although lawyers often explore, where possible, exemption or
waiver from particular local legal requirements where needed.
The real efforts, however, are spent on the “internationalization” of the
contract as a doctrinal approach to international business transactions.217 In
its ultimate objective, the doctrine calls for the universal incorporation into the
local law all those industry norms or practices that are so well-established they
become part of modern lex mercatoria, or, more broadly speaking, international
economic law.218 The doctrine establishes that a cross-border investment
contract cannot be dictated solely by varying local norms and rules.
Consistency can only be achieved through the application of universally
accepted international rules and standards. The doctrine thus creates a
superior layer of “legalization” that limits or minimizes the adverse effect of local
law for the sake of fostering international commerce. The doctrine transforms
the contract from a local law contract to an international contract, bringing the
project to international and industry standards, notwithstanding its local
situs.219
From a broader perspective, the ‘internationalization” doctrine evolves as
part of the international legal community’s efforts to eliminate or minimize the
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See Note 217, infra See also Hononold, The Influence of the Law of International Trade on the
Development and Character of English and American Commercial Law, The Sources of International
Trade 70-71 (Schmitthoff ed. 1964); F. De Ly, International Business Law and Lex Mercatoria 15-20
(1992). Accord Janis, An Introduction to International Law (Aspen 3d ed. 1999) at pp. 282-283. See also
Herbert V. Morais, “The Quest for International Standards: Global Governance vs. Sovereignty,” 50
Kansas L.Rev. 779, 790-805 (2002) (discussing ongoing efforts by global work groups to achieve
internationalization of legal standards applicable to global governance, as well as to the evolution of, and
balancing between, “soft law” and “hard law”).
218

See, e.g., Notes 24 and 25, supra (explanation of lex mercatoria).. The phrase “international economic
law” has broader implication than “international commercial law,” which refers to the bodies of law
governing international sales, international shipments of goods, and export-import transactions.
219

Ironically, although the international legal community pushes for, and has been successful in the
internationalization of legal standards, living conditions have never been standardized. Global distribution
of technology and consumer products are likewise non-standardized. Activists charge that manufacturers
often transfer obsolete technology and a lesser grade of consumer products to the “Third World” as a
dumping ground of consumerism. In the era of free trade, the “Third World” often exports the best of its
products in order to compete globally and to generate hard foreign currencies revenues. When this trend is
observed in agricultural products, it means that the poor of the “Third World” “starve” in order to feed the
best products for the “First” and “Second World,” and to enable their country to accumulate hard currencies
via export and satisfy international debt obligations. The result is a “Third World” standard of living that
can shock conscience and quite often remain unknown to inhabitants of the developed nations. The byproduct of these substandard living conditions is a “Third World” localized standard of morality, ethics,
and behaviors incomprehensible to the developed nations,. who ironically are often the driving force in the
standardization of normative legal behaviors essential to the development of the international rule of law.
The issue of moral decisions made in poverty perhaps is not a consideration in law-making, but has long
been a topic of exposition for creative artists. See Victor Hugo’s Les Miserables (popularized in American
pop culture by way of a Broadway production almost a hundred years after Hugo’s death.) Globalization,
in its most efficient and noblest form, should serve to equalize these inequities and differences.
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Political Risks often associated with doing business in the developing
economies. Internationalization gives the investment environment predictability
through the standardization of legal behaviors. But the doctrine is not anything
new; rather, it is simply an effort at “codifying” what has taken place in real-life
deal negotiation. For decades, lawyer’s efforts have been spent on securing
specific sovereign actions incorporating international norms into the local law.
The lobbying for such sovereign action may be part of the due diligence
necessary for Political Risk assessment before the IOGC invests in the country.
The desired sovereign actions may include specific constitutional proclamation
or ratification of international treaties and conventions, specific legislative or
administrative measures, or contractually designed sovereign guarantees
executed by the government on an ad hoc basis.220 If any such specific
sovereign action cannot be obtained, principles constituting lex mercatoria for
the international petroleum or energy sector must be provided in specific
contract provisions, or otherwise expressly incorporated into the contract’s
“governing law” or “choice-of-law” clause.221
•The Stablization Clause as Protection Against Political Risks. The
“internationalization” doctrine has precedential support from a long line of
confidential arbitration decisions.222 These decisions support the arbitrators’
view that certain contracts are by their very nature internationalized and thus
subject to international law and standards, especially if the parties by
negotiation have consensually waived restrictions of local law.223 One such
evidence of mutual consent and waiver is the Stabilization Clause (at times
referred to as the “Stability Clause” or “Equilibrium Clause). In various
forms, the Clause restricts the host jurisdiction’s exercise of “permanent
sovereignty” by contractually preventing the nation-state from subsequently
modifying the governing law of the investment contract. 224
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See, e.g., Trans Commodities v. Kazahkstan Trading House, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23906 (1997)
(foreign sovereign guarantee sufficed as evidence for “Commercial Activities Exception” undermining
protection of the U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act). See also Jonathan Inman, “Government
Guarantees for Infrastructure Projects,” 68 Project Fin. Int’l 36 (March 16, 1995) (discussing various types
of government guarantees).
221

See, e.g., Bonny v. Society of Lloyd’s, 3 F.3d 156 (7th Cir. 1993) (affirming choice-of-forum and
choice-of-law provisions in international agreements). Accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE
LAW OF CONFLICTS OF LAW Article 187 (ALI 1971) (enforceability of choice-of-law provision).
222

See Texaco Overseas Oil Petroleum Co./California Asiatic Oil Co. v. Government of the Libyan Arab
Republic (TOPCO), 53 I.L.R. 389 (1979).. See also Lena Goldfields, Ltd. v. U.S.S.R., Lena Goldfields
Arbitration, ANNUAL DIGEST OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES (H. LAUTERPACHT
ED. 1929-1930); Sapphire International Petroleum Ltd. v. National Iranian Oil Co. (NIOC), 35 I.L.R. 136
(1967); Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Co. (ARAMCO), 27 I.L.R. 117 (1963); BP Exploration
Company (Libya) Ltd. v. Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, 53 I.L.R. 297 (1971); Libyan
American Oil Co. (LIAMCO) v. Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, 62 I.L.R. 140 (1977), 20 I.L.M.
1 (1977); AGIP v. Popular Republic of Congo, 21 I.L.M. 726 (1982).
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Id.
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Margarita T.B. Coale, “Stabilization Clauses in International Petroleum Transactions,” 30 Denver J.
Int’l Law and Policy No. 2, at pp. 217-243 (2002). See also Legal Framework for the Treatment of Foreign
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“Permanent sovereignty” signifies the “permanent” nature of the
territorial state’s power to protect its territory and to maximize its resources,225
including the power to exclude unwanted foreign investment via the licensing
process.226 The notion, however, should receive a broader connotation than
just in the context of territory or property rights. Permanent sovereignty also
empowers the government of a country to make law and proscribe conduct
within its territory, and thus should be co-extensive or synonymous with the
government’s “jurisdiction to prescribe” (as opposed to “jurisdiction to
adjudicate,” which is traditionally a judiciary function within a government).227
Private international law (commonly known in the U.S. as principles of conflicts
of law), has long provided the complex framework for deciphering this
“jurisdiction to prescribe” by establishing legal boundaries for the exercise of
national jurisdiction.228

Investment, Volume 1: Survey of Existing Instruments: Progress and Background Studies (World Bank
Group, 1992) (discussing “stability of contract” clauses).
225

Banco Nacional De Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875 (1981); Schwebel, “The Story of the
U.N.’s Declaration on Permanent Sovereinty over Natural Resources, 49 A.B.A.J. 463, 465-66 (1963);
U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) (1962), reprinted in 2 I.L.M. 223 (1963); U.N. General
Assembly Resolution 3201 (S-VII) (1974); Subrata Roy Chowdhury, “Permanent Sovereignty over Natural
Resources: Substratum of the Seoul Declaration,” in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DEVELOPMENT
59 (Paul de Waart et al. eds. 1988).
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James Nolan, “A Comparative Analysis of the Laotian Law on Foreign Investment, the World Bank
Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, and Normative Rules of International Law on
Foreign Investment,” 15 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. Law 659 (Spring 1998) (discussing aspects of state
licensing as expression of sovereign power in case study on Laotian law).
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Vagts, Transnational Business Problems (2d Ed. Foundation Press 1998). Burgenthal & Maier, Public
International Law in a Nutshell (2d Ed. 1990); Encyclopedia of Public International Law (R. Bernhardt ed.
1981). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES, sections 402-404 (1987) (codifying jurisdiction to prescribe); see also Note 104, supra.
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A nation’s “jurisdiction to prescribe” does not necessarily stop at the physical borders, although its
extra-territorial reach must be supported by a valid exercise of sovereign power rooted in customary
international law. This means that certain nexus must exist to support the extraterritorial extension of
national jurisdiction. The nexus can either be:
1)
2)
3)

4)

Territory (a sovereignty can proscribe conduct occurring within its borders);
Nationality (a sovereignty can proscribe conduct of its nationals);
Comity, reasonableness, or sovereign consent (two states can agree to allow each other
prescriptive authority within each other’s borders or upon each other’s nationals, or one
state may refrain from exercising its prescriptive authority beyond its borders in order to
show respect or deference, or otherwise avoid relational conflicts with, another state);
Effects of conduct (the “effect” test): a sovereignty can proscribe conduct that produces
an effect within its territory. The “effect” principle is best illustrated in the expansive
reach of the U.S. antitrust law to even conduct of foreigners in other countries. See
Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 244 (1991) (expanding U.S. antitrust
jurisdiction; reducing likelihood of U.S. courts invoking comity to decline jurisdiction
over foreign acts causing substantial effect in the U.S. despite conflicts with foreign law).
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In order to preserve the sanctity of “statehood” – that a sovereign nation
consists of (i) people; (ii) a government; and (iii) territory229 -- the notion of
permanent sovereignty must be unassailable, inviolate, and incapable of being
contracted away to a foreign interest; otherwise, a government can just “sell” or
“pawn” a nation-state, its people and natural resources to a private party and
waive sovereign power all together.230 In this line of logic, the nation-state
should not lose its sovereign capacity to change the status or method of
regulating the extractive or exploitive industry (with respect to natural
resources), regardless of any previous contractual arrangement that the nationstate may have made in its commercial capacity. Likewise, a sovereignty can
never waive its jurisdiction to proscribe conduct of private actors, unless it has
undertaken an international obligation to restrain itself by way of treaty or
reciprocity among nation-states in order to maintain international comity.
Yet, the “internationalization” doctrine practically serves to curtail the
effect of a nation-state’s “jurisdiction to prescribe,” in the broader interest of
international commerce. The Stabilization Clause can be looked at, in part, as
a direct application of the “internationalization” doctrine. The Clause thus
becomes the proper context for examining conflicts between the
“internationalization” doctrine and notions of “permanent sovereignty” or
“national jurisdiction to prescribe,” because enforcement of the Clause amounts
to an erosion of the territorial state’s “permanent” power to legislate.
In one of its most popular forms, the Stabilization Clause creates a
contractual commitment by the host government to “freeze” the local law
applicable to the petroleum investment contract. For example, the Clause may
provide that the PSC will be construed in accordance with the governing local
law as it is in force on the date of contract execution. (The Clause may
further impose a good-faith duty upon the host government to take all steps
necessary to ensure the contractor’s rights are not altered by subsequent
governmental action without the mutual consent of the parties.) The key
Vagt, Transnational Business Problems, at pp. 3-29; David Gerber, Prescriptive Authority: Global Markets
as a Challenge to National Regulatory Systems” (Paper presented at the Conference on Transnational
Business Transactions sponsored by the Association of American Law Schools and the European Law
Faculties Association, Barcelona, Spain, June 1-3, 2003).
Commentators have noted that the size and attractiveness of the U.S. market, as well the U.S.’s political
and economic power, account for the geopolitical expansion of the U.S. prescriptive authority
notwithstanding objections from other countries. See, e.g., Gerber, Prescriptive Authority: Global Markets
as a Challenge to National Regulatory Systems, paper delivered at the Conference on Transnational
Business Transactions sponsored by the Association of American Law Schools and the European Law
Faculties Association, Barcelona, Spain (June 1-3, 2003).
229

Ian Brownie, Principles of Public International Law, 107 (4th ed. 1990) (discussing concepts of territory
and sovereignty); Mark W. Janis, An Introduction to International Law 176-77 (2d. ed. 1993); see also
Note 457, infra.
230

“Third World” culturalists have used the term “culture brokers” in native literatures (originated during
eras of colonialism) to refer to the collaborating natives who facilitated the extraction of natural resources
and the solidification of the colonial bureaucracy, in exchange for personal financial benefits.
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element of the Clause, therefore, is the removal of the government's right to
unilaterally alter the investor's rights by changing its municipal law or
promulgating new implementing regulations subsequent to contract
execution.231
International arbitrators have construed the Stabilization Clause more
narrowly: the clause is the nation state’s specific and express promise not to
unilaterally change the contract.232 As such, the Clause safeguards the IOGC’s
investment in the politically unstable developing economies, especially in
nation-states that do not follow Western legal traditions.233 At the same time,
the Clause has been considered in the larger context: it is viewed as evidence of
a sovereign nation’s right to waive its sovereign law-making authority. 234 For
example, the arbitration tribunal in Texaco v. Libyan Arab Republic235 stated
that "[n]othing can prevent a State, in the exercise of its sovereignty, from
binding itself irrevocably by the provisions of a concession and from granting to
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Lybian American Oil Cojpany (LIAMCO) v. Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, Award of 12
April 1977, 62 I.L.R. 140, 170 (1980); 20 I.L.M. 1 (1981).
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See Notes 214, 222-224, supra.
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Id. The Vietnam Deal offers an opportunity to illustrate discordance between Western legal traditions
and other legal traditions premised upon a different cultural heritage. An Eastern culture such as Vietnam
views contractual execution as the beginning of a business and legal relationship, rather than the conclusion
of a finite set of legal obligations. The tendency of Eastern parties and their legal regulators, therefore, is to
favor more amendments than their Western counterparts, because of the Eastern cultural view that the
business relationship should amply be adjusted as it progresses. See, e.g., VIETNAM’S ORDINANCE ON
ECONOMIC CONTRACTS, Art. 21 (allowing for right to amend after contract execution to “give details”
and “make concrete” provisions of an economic contract); VIETNAM’S ORDINANCE ON CIVIL
CONTRACTS, Art. 26 (acknowledging right to amend, open to negotiation). Accord, Wendy Duong,
“Overview of the Institutional and Legal Framework, The Petroleum Law, and Relevant Legal Matters in
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam,” unpublished manuscript prepared for Mobil Eastern Exploration and
Development, INc. (November 1994) (cited with client’s permission). Compare Dennis Unkovic, “Doing
Business in China and the Pacific Rim,” Int’l Quarterly Vol. 15-2, 189-219, 205 (2003) (commenting on
flexibility of China’s Economic Contract Law: contract may be changed or cancelled if impossible to
fulfill, or if breached by a party; contrasting this flexibility against rigidity in specific performance and
strong emphasis on penalty for economic discipline, rather than respecting parties’ freedom of contract).
Further, in a culture with a hybrid legal history such as Vietnam, frequent legislative changes to meet the
need of the transitional economy are viewed with more tolerance by (and, in fact, are expected of) country
leaders. Custom has higher societal precedential value than the written law in the “relational” cultures of
Asia, Africa, and Latin America (as opposed to the “individualistic” cultures of the West).
234

Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company and California Asiatic Oil Company v. The Government of the
Libyan Arab Republic, 53 I.L.R. at 474.
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53 I.I.R. at 474. Dispute resolution in international business transactions has traditionally been handled
via final and binding arbitration, as may be recognized by state-signatories to the 1958 U.N. Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “New York Convention”), Convention
on Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, Art. V, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S.
3 [hereinafter NY Convention]. Accordingly, there has been no court case addressing the validity of the
Stabilization Clause in the international context.
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the concessionaire irretractable rights."236
According to the tribunal, in
granting concessions to IOGCs, the Libyan State did not alienate but, instead,
“fully exercised its sovereign power to contract."237 To the extent international
arbitral decisions constitute modern lex mercatoria, it can be said that
stabilization clauses are valid under international law.238 In various forms, the
Clause has increasingly become a standard practice in most PSCs executed
with “Third World” countries.239
When carefully drafted and broadly applied, the Stabilization Clause can
shield the investment from new taxes, new legislation, new regulation, decrees
of nationalization or expropriation, or any other form of a “materially adverse
governmental action” (MAGA) that may make the investment less economically
whole. For example, if a country’s petroleum law (which may include
environmental and safety standards) effective at the time of contract execution
later needs to be changed, the Stabilization Clause can estop the host
government from applying the new law and new standards to the IOGC’s longterm project, in the absence of the IOGC’s consent or some other renegotiated,
mutually acceptable conditions. In other words, while the rest of the country
may be governed by a newer version of the law, the IOGC’s investment, secured
by the Stabilization Clause, will be governed by an outdated version. This is in
practice a much more pervasive application and interpretation of the
Stabilization Clause than mere prevention of the retroactive application of a
new legislation.
The Stabilization Clause’s validity and effectiveness may be questioned
based on six conceptual premises, as explained below.
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53 I.I.R. at 482.
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Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company and California Asiatic Oil Company v. The Government of the
Libyan Arab Republic, 53 I.L.R. at 474. See also Kimmo Mettala, Governing Law Clauses of Loan
Agreements in International Project Financing, 20 Int’l Law, 219 (1986).
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James L. McCulloch & Christina Maria Abascal Deboben, Tulane Latin American Law Institute
Symposium: “The Foreign Corrup Practices Act and Other Legal Considerations Relevant to the Oil and
Gas Industry in Latin America,” 77 Tul. L. Rev. 1075 (March 2003) (recognizing the popularity and
necessity of stabiIization clauses in Latin America’s foreign investment contracts, noting that in
“traditional stabilization clauses, a government is contractually prohibited from enacting legislation that is
inconsistent with the original contract”).
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If sovereignty rights over natural resources and territory can be waived in private transactions with
“outsiders” and, hence, are not “permanent,” then a government’s sovereign power to proscribe conduct of
its citizens by way of inhumane regulatory measures affecting the people’s liberty interests should likewise
be less than “permanent” and, hence, can similarly be circumvented by acts of outsiders premised upon
international humanitarian laws. These sources of law should suffice to curtail a government’s power to
proscribe conduct of its own citizens, if such power is exercised in a way that offends universal liberty
interests. Yet, in Doe v. Unocal Corp,, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 (9th Cir. 2002), the court barred
Burmese villagers’ claims against the military government of Myanmar (and an U.S. oil company) under
the “Sovereign Immunity Doctrine” codified in U.S. statutory law. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28
U.S.C. § § 1602-1607 (2000). See also the analysis under The Fifth Premise discussed in this Part. The
Doe case has been set for an en banc rehearing before the Ninth Circuit. 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 2716
(February 14, 2003).
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Challenging and Reexamining the Popular Stabilization
Clause – the Six Premises
The First Premise
The rationale of Texaco v. Libyan Arab Republic and similar decisions
upholding the Stabilization Clause can be challenged. The sovereignty may have
entered into a contract via its commercial arm or in its commercial capacity,
but not in its capacity as the law-making body charged with the responsibility
to safeguard the country’s public interest.240 This is the gist of permanent
sovereignty. In fact, this sovereign power constitutes the type of macro- and
micro-economic oversight critical to nation-building as well as to the building of
an effective world economy. U.S. courts have recognized permanent sovereignty
as an “inalienable right” uniquely applicable to a nation-state’s control power
over its natural resources and economic activities, and, hence, cannot be
waived.241 If the reverse scenario had been presented to the American public
and its court system – that a non-U.S. investor wants a political subdivision or
branch of the U.S. government to waive the U.S.’s rights to enact new
legislation or promulgate new regulations affecting the investor’s project, the
public outcry in response to such request (from the steps of Capitol Hill to the
average American household’s television set) would have killed the Stabilization
Clause much quicker than the time it takes the investor to table it for
discussion.
The Second Premise
Popularized as a risk-management device, the Stabilization Clause,
nonetheless, is not an effective tool for the management of Political Risks. As a
practical matter, the Stabilization Clause does not protect the investment
contract against a change in regime. If a government is toppled or denounced as
illegitimate, one of the three elements of statehood (territory; people;
government)242 becomes missing. Therefore, a contract executed by a defunct or
illegitimate government, which never has the recognition of the “people,” is not
binding upon a nation.243 If this notion falls short of the dignity of an
international legal theory, it at least reflects the undeniable reality of the global
political economy – what keeps governmental contractual obligations intact
after a change of regime is the new regime’s voluntary compliance, instigated by
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See, e.g., Settebello Ltd v. Banco Totta Acores, (1985) WLR 2050 (Portuguese government intervened
through legislation and altered penalty provision of oil tanker construction contract executed with stateowned shipyard).
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Banco Nacional De Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875 (1981).
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See Notes 55 and 229, supra (discussing elements of statehood).

243

“If a depostic power incurs a debt not for the needs or in the interest of the State, but to strengthen its
despotic regime, to repress the population that fights against it, this debt is odious for the population of the
State…” Alexander Sack, Russian law professor, 1927.
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the military and international pressure from the community of nations at large,
rather than by any aspirational goals of the international rule of law.
Accordingly, a commercial transaction negotiated and executed with a foreign
government always carries a risk of being dishonored or renegotiated after a
coup d’etat or revolution uprooting the current political or legal foundation.244
But even if the new regime is amenable to establish itself as part of the
international investment community, and hence is willing to honor existing
contracts, the state authority once in charge of the investment project may have
been restructured or repealed entirely, presenting practical problems in
contract enforcement and performance. This point, again, demonstrates the
intimate correlation between (i) the IOGC’s commercial relationship with an
incumbent regime, and (ii) the IGOC’s incentive to support the incumbent
regime long-term, in an effort to control and minimize Political Risks.
The Third Premise
The host government or their successors may view the Stabilization
Clause as an expression of the foreign investor's skepticism toward the country
or the regime’s legitimacy and reliability. Here lies the paradox: if the foreign
investor is already haunted by such skepticism, such that it has to insist on a
Stablization Clause, why is it entering into a binding contract recognizing the
legitimacy or stability of such a political regime in the first place? What, then,
has happened to the foreign investor’s sound business judgment and careful
assessment of Political Risks – an element that should, at all times, be part of
its accountability to the home country’s shareholder public?
By its very nature, the Stabilization Clause acknowledges that a
sovereignty may wear two hats: (i) as contracting party to a commercial
transaction, and, (ii) as sovereign regulator of economic behaviors, exercising
its “jurisdiction to prescribe.” By conducting itself in the second capacity, the
sovereignty in effect breaches the contract it enters into in the first capacity.
The Stabilization Clause thus becomes a tool of anticipating, minimizing, or
eliminating risks of investment loss due to foreseeable breach. The irony
remains: If the sanctity and freedom of contract is the principle governing the
parties’ transaction (as both parties will want to argue), one party – the more
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See, e.g., American Bell Int’l Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 474 F. Supp. 420 (S.D. N.Y. 1979);
Harris Corp. v. National Iranian Radio & Television, 691 F.2d 1344 (11th Cir. 1982) (new Iranian
government dishonoring contracts with U.S. companies in the 1970s following the Iranian revolution).. See
also M. Sorharajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (1994). An example of this situation is
the contract for the construction of nuclear electricity-generating plants in the Philippines, to be operated
on islands with active volcanoes. The contract was allegedly obtained through improper means under the
Marcos government and subsequently was rescinded by the incoming government. See Patricia Adams,
“Philippine Government to Dismantle Marcos Nuclear Plant” (Probe International February 28, 000),
.found at http://www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/index.cfm?DSP=content&ContentID=9; Maristella
Cardenas, “ECAs in the Philippine Power Sector and the Continuing Debt Problem,” (Freedom from Debt
Coalition Dec. 12, 2003), found at http://www.jubileesouth.org/news/EpZyVyuAVlSMRrFluL.shtml.
Likewise, the validity of contracts made in Namiba under regimes controlled by South Africa has also been
questioned.
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economically powerful -- is also anticipating and trying to render predictable
the possibility of breach by the economically weaker party. If the Stabilization
Clause is an enforceable promise (as the MNC will try to argue), it is also a
signal of lack of trust, demonstrating the need for additional safeguards against
potential breach or default.245 It in itself is proof of the high Political Risks
inherent in the investment environment. Investor skepticism may have negative
impact on negotiations, or may even be found offensive to the host culture. Yet,
perhaps due to lack of leverage, or otherwise prompted by the need to please its
wealthy business ally, the host government must live with the Clause. Aware of
this subtle erosion of trust or cultural clash, if the IOGC decides to forego the
Clause in exchange for goodwill, from a corporate policy standpoint, this
omission in itself may indicate that the negotiation team has not buffered the
contract effectively against Political Risks. For an IOGC’s lawyer, such an
omission may arguably raise a claim of professional malpractice.
The Fourth Premise
Principles respecting the sanctity of contract are part of international
law, starting with the law of treaties.246 Likewise, among those principles of
contract law that should constitute the “general principles common to the
major legal systems”247 (as a source of customary international law) is another
legal concept called voluntary assumption of risk.248 Where the legal and
political environment of the host country is extremely volatile, the IOGC
245

Compare Menachem Mautner, “Contract, Culture, Compulsion, or: What is so Problematic in the
Application of Objective Standards in Contract Law?” 3 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 545 (2002)
(questioning objective approach such as “the economic man” to contract interpretation; analyzing role of
culture in contract formation; arguing that contract-making is functional equivalent of “trust” – actual
knowledge of whether a promissor can keep his word will render either contract-making or trust
unnecessary; viewing contract as either “professional” script or “lay” script, and lawyers as translators of
such script).
246

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v.
Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982) (interpretation of bilateral Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaty
based the sovereign parties’ intent). See also Hans Blix, “Developing International Law and Inducing
Compliance,” 41 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 1(2002), Ayelet Ben-Ezer and Ariel L. Bendor, “The Constitution
and Conflict-of-Laws Treaties: Upgrading the International Comity,” 29 N.C.J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg.
1(2003).
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Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States Section 102 (Sources of
International Law) (ALI 1987). Accord Statute of the International Court of Justice, STAT. OF THE INT'L
CT. OF J., June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031 (entered into force Oct. 24, 1945).
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See, e.g, See, e.g, Restatement 2d of Torts, § 496C (1965) ((1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), a
plaintiff who fully understands a risk of harm to himself or his things caused by the defendant's conduct or
by the condition of the defendant's land or chattels, and who nevertheless voluntarily chooses to enter or
remain, or to permit his things to enter or remain within the area of that risk, under circumstances that
manifest his willingness to accept it, is not entitled to recover for harm within that risk; (2) The rule stated
in Subsection (1) does not apply in any situation in which an express agreement to accept the risk would be
invalid as contrary to public policy); See also Deena B. Bothello , “An Unequal Balance: Repudiation and
Restitution in Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Southeast Inc., v. United States,” 80 Oregon L.R. 1469
(2001)..
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willingly assumes such risk when it makes a decision to invest there.
Apparently, its profit incentive to do business in such a volatile environment
outweighs its pre-investment Political Risk assessment. If that is the case, why
should the IOGC benefit from a negotiated Stabilization Clause that in effect
erodes the host country’s sovereignty, due clearly to the IOGC’s enormous
leverage power exercised during the contracting process?
The next logical inquiry is whether the Stabilization Clause will apply if
and when the host nation’s new legislative or policy measures improve, rather
than jeopardizes, the investor’s bargained-for position under the contract. As a
practical solution, the clever IOGC’s lawyer will then carefully draft the Clause
such that it will shield her client only from the negative effect – and not the
positive effect -- of future legislation or sovereign action. Again, this selective
enforcement is clear evidence of the IOGC’s exercise of its powerful negotiation
leverage.
The sliding scale reflecting this leverage varies from deal to deal,
depending on the country, the government, and the project. Within this sliding
scale, three scenarios may arise when a host government must consider a
proposed Stabilization Clause:
1) Other investors will insist upon a similar Stabilization Clause for each
and every foreign investment project in the country. The more
economically powerful and better-known investors will get their way; the
smaller or medium-sized entrepreneurs will have a lesser chance of
getting their way, or no chance at all. The MNCs who join forces to
propose the broadest Stabilization Clause as a group effort, vis a vis the
host government, will get the broadest protection from such standardized
Stabilization Clause as jointly negotiated and coordinated. The smaller
investor who is not part of any “joined forces” or “de facto cartels” will not
get such broadest protection;
2) If the government is desperate for foreign investments, it may just
allow a commercial instrumentality to waive the essence of governmental
existence – the ability of a sovereignty to legislate. This may occur for
only one project, for many projects, for only a particular kind of investor
or certain tier of investors, or only for a particular kind of industry; or
3) Where the disparity of bargaining power is not too severe, a
compromised Stabilization Clause may (i) require the host government to
make its best efforts to maintain or restore the foreign investor’s
economic position in the event of a subsequent legislative change, no
more no less; or, (ii) impose only a mutual obligation upon the parties to
renegotiate the contract, in good faith, in the event of new legislation or
regulations. 249
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The “Renegotiation Clause” may be considered a species of the Stabilization Clause, or it can be a
broader clause that serves purposes other than just stabilizing the contractual environment. For example, a
“Gas Clause” in a petroleum contract is usually a Renegotiation Clause, whereupon the parties agree to
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The Fifth Premise
The Fifth Premise is the natural result of the first four Premises. As a
legal concept, the Stabilization Clause is inherently problematic. The incoherent
and self-conflicting nature of the Stabilization Clause can further be illustrated
by examining
(i) the contracting capacity of the host government or its agent in the
deal-making process; and
(ii) the negotiation objective of a U.S.-based IOGC in structuring the
host government’s warranty or representation of its legal capacity to
contract with the IOGC.
(i) Host Government’s Capacity to Contract. Of critical importance in
the contracting process is the issue of who can bind the nation-state.250 The
dual-hat nature of the government’s role as a contracting party – either as
statehood or in its commercial capacity or both – can be very delicate and
complex. Under the “statehood” analysis, several issues arise as to which entity
or agency can legitimately represent and bind the government. (Very seldom will
a private investment contract be entered into in the name of the nation itself, as
in the case of a treaty, although such practice may perhaps be the ultimate goal
of the foreign investor, seeking to eliminate all kinds of ambiguous legal issues
regarding capacity to contract, as explained below.)
Since international cooperation and foreign investments often are among
the most lucrative areas of the national economy (and a substantial, if not the
only, source of foreign currency revenues), various state instrumentalities will
compete against one another to occupy some role in these “glamorous” areas.
(Of course, the more economically powerful the MNC is, the more chance it will
further negotiate fiscal terms in the event of a commercial gas discovery. Since gas development projects
are full of uncertainty, the parties cannot define contractual obligations unless and until the gas discovery is
evaluated, and economic benefits ascertained based on the characteristics of the gas found. A “Review
Clause,” on the other hand, imposes an obligation upon the parties to review contractual terms in the event
of change in circumstances., or to meet and formulate a new fiscal system to return the IOGC to its original
economic position. See, generally, Andrew B. Derman, International Oil and Gas Joint Ventures: A
Discussion with Associated Form Agreements, Monograph Series No. 16 at p. 70 (Section of Natural
Resources, Energy,and Environmental Law Section, American Bar Association and the National Energy
Law & Policy Institute, the University of Tulsa College of Law) (1992). See also James L. McCulloch &
Christina Maria Abascal Deboben, Tulane Latin American Law Institute Symposium: “The Foreign
Corrup Practices Act and Other Legal Considerations Relevant to the Oil and Gas Industry in Latin
America,” 77 Tul. L. Rev. 1075 (March 2003) (recognizing the renegotiation clause as a hybrid
stabilization clause); Gaetan Verhoosel, “Foreign Direct Investment and Legal Constraints on Domestic
Environmental Policies: Striking A “Reasonable” Balance between Stability and Change,” 29 L.& Policy
Int’l Bus, 451 (Summer 1998) (noting modern contractual practice to move from traditional stabilization
clauses to preferred renegotiation clauses).
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In the Vietnam Deal, PetroVietnam wore two hats: first as representative of the sovereignty, and,
second, as an SOE/commercial entity doing business for the government and of which the government is
the sole owner.
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have in getting to negotiate with the very top echelon of the government,
thereby avoiding the headache of being caught in the lower echelon’s
competition.)
In addition, if the host country is a federation, a number of additional
complications may arise under lex loci, whether or not notions of federalism are
clear or well-developed in the country’s laws. The division of authority between
the federation and constituent units may be ambiguous. The constituency may,
within its authority, introduce specific regulations affecting the project, and
provincial authorities may insist on enforcing local regulations that are
inconsistent with federal regulations. Accordingly, it is not unusual in a
developing nation for various government instrumentalities or constituencies to
claim the same authority over an investment project, resulting in internal
political fights that can discourage or even immobilize the foreign investor, at
least during the period of political in-fighting. Likewise, it is not unheard of if
the actual practice may differ from the written rules.251
Within its commercial capacity, the nation-state may also have many
faces. It may exercise choices in selecting an instrumentality through which the
state can do business -- either through one of its agencies, ministries,
provinces, or through an SOE (which is akin to a corporation in which the
government is the sole or controlling shareholder). The crucial difference
attached to any of these choices is the degree of the host government’s liability
for the obligations assumed by its instrumentality or SOE under the country’s
law or prevailing custom. (Again, lex loci or lex situs may be ambiguous or nonexistent on these critical legal issues.)
Where the host government has designated an SOE to serve as
contracting party (as with the role of PetroVietnam in the Vietnam Deal), both
the SOE’s capacity to represent the state and the SOE’s own commercial
capacity must be ascertained. For example, under the local law, an SOE may
or may not have a “corporate veil.”252 It may, or may not have corporate assets,
or if it does, its rights to corporate assets may be limited, and asset disposition
may require higher state approval.253 In any event, the IOGC-contractor will
want to establish the SOE as an instrumentality or agency of the state, with the
capacity both to bind the government and to execute business transactions for
itself, as well as on behalf of the state, all at the same time. In summary, the
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See, e.g., Note 106, supra (discussing the unwritten “Operation Code” of the transitional economies).
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Such is the case in the Russian Federation. If a "corporate veil” is granted, the state is not liable for the
obligations of the SOE. If, however, the SOE has no "corporate veil," the state is fully liable for the
obligations of the enterprise it owns, especially when the assets operated by such enterprise are not
sufficient to satisfy all claims. See Civil Code of the Russian Federation, Arts. 114, 115. On the other
hand, SOEs in the Federation may have limited rights to corporate assets. Quasi-ownership rights such as
economic and operational management rights may, or may not allow SOEs to encumber or dispose of
corporate assets without the prior consent of the state. Failure to obtain such consent may render the
transaction invalid. See Civil Code of the Russian Federation, Arts. 294, 296.
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IOGC wants the best of all worlds. If applicable lex loci or lex situs is neither
clear nor in existence, the clever IOGC lawyer will use her client’s enormous
economic power to write these advantageous “legal capacity representation and
warranty” provisions into the investment contract, at least as a starter point.
But that is not all. As the ultimate risk control measure, MNCs may
attempt to get parliament approval of the contract, including the Stabilization
Clause aided by all those “legal capacity” provisions discussed above. In some
legal systems, an agreement of the executive branch or its agency to "freeze" the
applicable law may not be effective without legislative approval of such
agreement. In such a case, legislative approval of the investment contract is
mandatory. Where parliament approval is not mandatory, it still provides
additional assurance at the highest level, and bolsters the validity of all those
contractual mechanisms. This is often done when the developing country’s law
governing a sector or an industry has not been enacted or is in an embryonic
state.
In reality, this measure may carry its own drawbacks. The process can
delay the project and increase bureaucratic hurdles, subjecting the investment
to more local political pressure. Or, for the following reasons, the process may
serve only psychological and goodwill purposes, rather than creating legal
precedents. First, a right granted by the legislature can be taken away by the
legislature. Second, legislative approval of the contract only serves to
demonstrate the commitment of the current legislature, not any future regime
or a newly elected body. Third, legislative approval of a contract does not
necessarily change such contract into law, since an agreement is not a statute.
Fourth, if the contract becomes law, then implicitly any amendment of the
contract may have the effect of law as well, thereby changing private
contractual negotiations into a legislative process. Fifth, even where the contract
becomes or has the effect of law, conflicts may arise between the contract and
any other existing or subsequent laws that have effect beyond the specific
industry to which the investment project belongs. Finally, a question may
equally arise as to whether provisions of the contract may be binding on
regulatory authorities other than the authority represented by the governmental
instrumentality or SOE (for example, whether PetroVietnam in the Vietnam
Deal had the authority to bind the Ministry of Finance or the Central Bank).
The PSC often addresses other matters such as customs, export-import of
goods and services, labor, taxes, environmental and workforce safety, many of
which are beyond the regulatory power of the petroleum authorities. Legislative
approval of the PSC may affirm the petroleum authorities’ power, but not
necessarily other divisions of the government.
In practical terms, legislative approval of an investment contract that
contains a Stabilization Clause may reinforce the contract’s validity as a
binding obligation of the nation-state. As such, the Clause can deterrently
make it more difficult for the host government to breach, repudiate, or
otherwise disregard contractual obligations. However, under traditional notions
of sovereignty, it is inconceivable that the nation-state’s Parliament or
Congress, its taxing,Treasury, or Central Bank authorities will turn their lawmaking and rule-making authority over to an SOE or any other governmental
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instrumentality, allowing such agency or instrumentality, in the conduct of
commerce, to waive the legislative or regulatory power of the nation. Yet,
practically, that may be the most far-reaching effect of the Stabilization Clause.
When upheld as binding upon the nation-state, the Clause amounts to tacit
admission that the SOE who enters into the contract has more authority than
the country’s legislators, or at least has the authority to speak for them.
Consequently, the enforcement of the Stabilization Clause may have great
political implication upon a nation well past the four corners of the investment
contract.
In the past decades, MNCs have tried, and have succeeded, in obtaining
parliament approval of their investment contracts executed by a host country’s
executive branch. This success demonstrates once more the vast clout,
powerful leverage, and superior bargaining power of the MNC-investor in a
developing economy.254 Either the country is so poorly situated that it has to
waive its sovereign power for the sake of attracting investment, or, because of
the tight glove-fitting nature of the MNC’s partnership with the government, the
government is willing to forego its supreme power to proscribe conduct and
abandon its responsibility to act in the national interest, simply to support a
long-term business partner. In such a case, the MNC’s interests can dilute or
replace the national interests. The Stabilization Clause illustrates not only the
host government’s willingness to bend and accommodate, but also the
enormous political power and negotiation leverage that cloaks a particular
IOGC, or a consortium of IOGCs, as the desired partner of the host government.
(ii) The paradoxical negotiating objective of the IOGC investor. It
follows from the discussion above that the MNC-IOGC’s objective is two-fold: to
bind the host government both in its sovereign capacity and in its commercial
capacity in the same contract. Such a posture may be viewed by legal
scholars as inherently paradoxical; yet it has been done (i) as a practical matter
to facilitate “Third World” economic development, and (ii) with respect to U.S.based MNC-IOGCs, as a necessary strategic measure to accommodate the
current status of U.S. law, to be explained below. Again, the success of MNCIOGCs in accomplishing such a paradoxical negotiating objective illustrates,
once more, the willingness to accommodate, as well as the inferior bargaining
power of today’s poor or lesser-developed “monarchs.” 255
To serve its purpose, the Stabilization Clause must be interpreted as a
sovereign promise not to alter the legal environment governing the investment
contract. At the same time and in the same contract, the IOGC must establish
the host government’s commercial capacity, since the “monarch” is also acting
as a private party contracting for profit in the deal. If the “monarch” fails to
abide by these commercial obligations, it may be committing, and, hence, may
be sued for, breach of contract, the same way a private party can be held liable
for breach. One capacity may undermine or undercut the other, and this
254

See, e.g., Assessing Investment Opportunities in Economies in Transition, OECD, Paris 1994, at 11.
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At least one commentator has noted that in these partnerships, governments are often fearful of
angering MNCs, lest they leave and take their capital investments away. Baker, 20 Wis Int’l L.J. at 103.
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becomes the challenge of the international business lawyer representing MNCIOGCs.
This paradoxical negotiating objective is necessitated by the current state
of U.S. laws or similar legal theories recognized in other developed jurisdictions.
In a dispute resolution proceeding arising out of the investment contract
(whether arbitral or judicial, or both, as when an arbitral award must be
enforced in the U.S.), the host government or the SOE acting on the
government’s behalf may attempt to assert two defenses:
1) the jurisdictional defense of Sovereign Immunity, now codified in the
U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA),256 (the “Sovereign
Immunity Doctrine”); and/or
2) an affirmative defense that the government’s act challenged by the
IOGC is an “Act of State” not subject to review by the U.S. judiciary (the
“Act-of-State Doctrine”).257
Both the Sovereign Immunity and Act-of-State doctrines have firm roots
in U.S. laws. The Sovereign Immunity doctrine compels the federal court to
relinquish subject matter jurisdiction over an action against a foreign state, in
due respect for principles of comity rooted in customary international law,258
unless certain statutory exceptions under U.S. law are met.259 The Act-of-State
doctrine, on the other hand, is he exercise of judicial restraint or abstention
based on principles of “separation of power” or the “political question” doctrine
in U.S. constitutional law.260 Under the Act-of-State doctrine, a U.S. court
would not “sit in judgment” of another country’s sovereign act “within its own
territory,”261 because the substitution of judgment would infringe upon an
executive function, causing sovereign embarrassment or discordance to
international relations, and undermining the “separation-of-power” bedrock of
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Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § § 1602-1607 (2000).

257

See, e.g., Allied Bank Int’l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 566 F. Supp. 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1983),
aff’d, 733 F.2d 23, (2d Cir. 1985, reh’g granted, July 3, 1984, 757 F.2d 516, 520 (2d Cir. 1985); Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba,
425 U.S. 682 (1976); W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. v. Environmental Tecotonics Corp., Int’l, 493 U.S. 400
(199);. accord Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, Section 443 (1987).
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Schooner v. McFaddon, 11 U.S.116, 3 L.Ed. 287 (1812).
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independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the
acts of the government of another done within its own territory.”).
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the U.S. governmental structure. The Act-of-State doctrine has been applied by
U.S. courts to accord validity to the expropriation of U.S. investors’ property,
even though the doctrine caused detriment to an aggrieved U.S.-investor.262
The doctrine has developed slowly, partly due to the scarcity of caselaw on such
a complex and antiquated doctrine rooted in, according to the U.S. Supreme
Court, “constitutional underpinnings.”263 These “constitutional underpinnings”
conceptually distinguish the Act-of-State doctrine from Sovereign Immunity,
rendering “Act of State” a domestic rule part of lex fori, rather than a rule of
international law. Similar doctrines have been recognized and applied in many
countries besides the U.S. 264 Commentators, however, have noted the decline
in the use and invocation of the doctrine in past decades.265
In practical terms, the Act-of-State doctrine functions as a conflict-of-law
principle and, in this regard, does not advance the interest of the MNC-IOGC.
The doctrine establishes that the law of the forum (lex fori), as in the case of the
United States, creates a presumption of validity accorded a sovereign act,
thereby shielding it from scrutiny by the courts of the forum applying the
conflict-of-law rule of lex fori. The doctrine’s practical impact lies in the
consequence of its application: only lex loci or lex situs provides the source of
law under which the validity of a sovereign action can be assessed. This is
precisely the kind of localized anomaly that the “internationalization” doctrine
purports to eradicate.
Under U.S. laws, two exceptions to the Sovereign Immunity and Act-ofState defenses have been carved out by either statute or caselaw, or both. In
general, either doctrine can be defeated and the host government, or parties
acting on its behalf, can still be sued if (i) the sovereign act constitutes a
262
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In Sabbatino, the Court rejected the notion that the Act of State doctrine may have its roots in principles
of sovereign immunity. Instead, the Court held that, although it is not constitutionally required, the doctrine
has “constitutional underpinnings” rooted in the “basic relationships among branches of government in a
system of separation of powers.” 376 U.S. at 428.
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See, e.g., A.M. Luther v James Sagor & Co. 3 K.B. 532, 548 (1921) (England); Sociedad Minera El
Teniente S.A. v. A.G. Norddeutsche Affinerie, 12 I.L.M. 251 (Super Ct. Hamburg 1973); Donald T.
Kramer, Annotation, Modern Status of the Act of State Doctrine, 12 A.L.R. 707, 715 (1972). But see F.A.
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“taking” of investor’s property “in violation of international law” (the
“International Law Exception”);266 and/or if (ii) the sovereign act in question
constitutes a “commercial activity” (the “Commercial Activity Exception”)267
The International Law Exception. To qualify for this exception, the
IOGC will have to establish that in breaching the Stabilization Clause, the host
government has committed an illegal taking of the IOGC’s property in violation
of international law. Such an action by the government must be a sovereign act.
This explains why, inter alia, it is crucially important that the investment
contract binds the host government in its sovereign capacity. It is predicted that
the International Law Exception will gradually gain more vitality and popularity,
as U.S. courts will increasingly come to face international law principles as a
result of globalization. This prospect, however, is not without challenge. The
preliminary inquiry of whether the sovereign “taking” violates international law
already raises complex and unresolved legal issues, because the standards of
what constitutes an “illegal taking” under international law are unresolved,
representing a serious split of viewpoints in the ongoing North-South dialogue
since the day of the Cuba Revolution and throughout the 1970s and 1980s.268
Further, with respect to the Sovereign Immunity defense, assuming that the
IOGC could successfully persuade a court that an illegal taking of its property
had taken place in violation of international law, the petroleum investment and
assets – all located in the host country – or the activities of the SOE or
governmental instrumentality that served as the contracting party must
somehow be traceable to U.S. territory to order to justify federal court subject
matter jurisdiction.269 Under the FSIA, without such territorial nexus to the
U.S., the International Law Exception does not apply.270
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Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 28 U.S.C. § § 1602(a)(3) (2000). Compare Hickenlooper
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The International Law Exception remains an ineffective safeguard against
host governments’ bad acts, unless and until the divergence of viewpoints in the
North-South dialogue is resolved, if ever, at all. So long as the divergence of
opinion persists, any proposed rule of law falls short of the status of customary
international law because the disagreement defeats the notion of consensus
accorded to universally accepted custom.271 If a court cannot determine
whether the foreign sovereign act in question constitutes a violation of
international law because it is unsure as to what the standards under
international law are, it cannot apply the exception with certainty and
intellectual comfort.
The Commercial Activity Exception. In contrast, no such territorial
nexus to the U.S. is needed for the Commercial Activity Exception to apply in
order to defeat the host government’s claim of Sovereign Immunity. Thus,
compared to the statutory International Law Exception, for U.S. investors, the
Commercial Activity Exception is an easier test to meet under the FSIA, one
that involves less legal uncertainty and requires a lesser degree of exposure to

of the foreign state AND that agency or instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in the united
states”) (emphasis added).
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international law on the part of the U.S. domestic forum that must interpret
and apply the FSIA.
The Commercial Activity Exception illustrates the “defensive” application
of the U.S.’s “extraterritorial jurisdiction to prescribe.” Instead of reaching out
extraterritorially to regulate foreign conduct beyond its border, the U.S. is
“fencing off” the sanctity of a foreign sovereign act when it is made applicable to
U.S. nationals appearing in an U.S. court, based on their conduct outside the
U.S. To support this “fencing off” posture, the FSIA resorts to the “effect” test to
justify jurisdiction for the federal court. Under this “effect” principle, the IOGC
can sue the host government in the U.S. if the cause of action is based on “an
act outside the territory of the U.S. in connection with a commercial activity of
the foreign state elsewhere (including its own territory), and such act causes a
direct effect in the U.S.272 (emphasis added).
“Commercial activity” is statutorily defined as “either a regular course of
commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act.”273 The FSIA
clarifies that the commercial character of an activity shall be determined by
reference to the “nature” of the transaction or act, rather than by its
“purpose.”274 If the host government’s violation of the Stabilization Clause is its
breach of the investment contract, the “nature” of such breach may make the
sovereign act “commercial,” even though the breach was occasioned by
enactment of a legislation whose “purpose” is to regulate an industry across the
board. Thus, by carefully drafting and phrasing the Stabilization Clause as well
as various “legal capacity” provisions, the IOGC stands a good chance of
making a strong case for the application of the Commercial Activity Exception,
using the contractual language and the investment contract itself to
characterize the government’s breach as a commercial act. Where a host
government breaches an investment contract that generates a Profit Split and a
Participating Interest held by the sovereignty in addition to tax and royalty, the
sovereign act begins to take on the nature of a commercial dealing, rather than
a legislative act of a sovereignty. By statutory definition, it is the nature of the
act (the displacement of a business partner’s economic rights), and not its
purpose (the enactment of law regulating the industry) that determines the act’s
“commercial” character.
In summary, the Commercial Activity exception to Sovereign Immunity is
statutorily pronounced and defined in the FSIA. This Exception exists to the
advantage of the MNC-IOGC. In contrast, the existence, extent or elements of a
Commercial Activity exception is not yet clear under U.S. caselaw interpreting
the
judge-made
Act-of-State
doctrine,
including
Supreme
Court
jurisprudence.275 The ambiguity haunting over the availability and vitality of
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this exception under the Act-of-State doctrine makes it more difficult for the
IOGC’s lawyer to draft and negotiate express contractual language establishing
the host government’s commercial capacity in the investment. Further,
compared to Sovereign Immunity, which must be applied based on the FSIA’s
statutory elements, the judge-made Act-of-State doctrine is not a rule of
decision, but rather the result of judicial balancing of factors that may warrant
abstention.276 Accordingly, from a risk-management standpoint, the probability
of success or positive outcome of an “Act-of-State doctrine” litigation is much
harder to assess. The doctrine carries more risk and less certainty, and hence,
poses graver concern to the IOGC and its lawyers.
In any event, both the Sovereign Immunity and Act-of-State doctrines
confirm the privilege of monarchy -- the queen will judge herself! Her sovereign
neighbors should stay at bay and play “hands off” in all due respect to her! If
permanent sovereignty attaches to the queen’s “Act of State,” as it should, the
queen will change her law as she sees fit at any point in time into the indefinite
future, even though she might have transacted business with traveling
merchants in the past, and has made all kinds of commercial promises to them!
All these principles are well and good if the queen watches out for her subjects,
but not if the queen is “pawning” her subjects for the benefit of the throne!
When served as a permanent shield for the “bad acts” of a corrupt,
incompetent, and recalcitrant government, both Sovereign Immunity and the
Act-of-State doctrine can become an accomplice to a pattern that obstructs,
instead of furthering, the social goals underlying “Third World” economic
development.
From a policy perspective, Sovereign Immunity and Act-of-State are legal
theories that restrict economic globalization. At least one commentator has
opined that traditional concepts of “sovereignty” central to international
relations and international law are outdated and should be reassessed and
modernized to accommodate today’s reality of economic interdependence.277
Nonetheless, these doctrines have evolved and have sustained their viability in
a common-law system such as the U.S., as certain aspects of sovereign powers
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essential to nationalism and internationalism must remain intact in order for
concepts of statehood to endure. In international “breach of contract” disputes,
these doctrines create unnecessary hurdles that undermine the sanctity of
international contracts and render tools such as the Stabilization Clause or
other risk-allocation mechanism less effective and less predictable. If the
Stabilization Clause is here to stay, it should be allowed to function as a true
risk management technique, free from obstacles arising out of antiquated legal
theories.278 Further, in commercial deals, governments should be held
ultimately liable to their peoples, and in the appropriate case should be made to
bear an accountable share of the global market based on their contractual
obligations. This accountability should serve as a deterrent against
governmental “bad acts.” Even if governmental actors may care little about the
“people,” they should worry about going bankrupt because of monetary
judgments rendered against them. Private judgments, therefore, carry their own
weight in facilitating policy choices.
In summary, from the perspective of the IOGC, not only does the
Stabilization Clause achieve relative predictability for an environment of
political instability, but it also boosts a case for the Commercial Activity
Exception under the FSIA, if and when the IOGC must bring the host
government or its SOE to a U.S. forum applying lex fori to (i) the resolution of
the IOGC’s breach of contract claim, or (ii) the IGOC’s request for the
enforcement of a favorable arbitral award.279 The Stabilization Clause, bolstered
by various “sovereign capacity” vis a vis paradoxical “commercial capacity”
warranty and representation provisions in the investment contract, can become
a pivotal part of the MNC-IOGC’s risk management and anticipatory litigation
management strategies.
The Sixth Premise
Finally, under my last premise, I pose the question of remedy for a
breach of the Stabilization Clause. If the host government violates the Clause,
and such violation falls under a Commercial Activity Exception to any national
law doctrine protecting the sovereign action, what is the foreign investor’s
damage or remedy? This issue strikes at the core of the Stabilization Clause
and reveals its pitfall when it is enforced as part of a petroleum exploration
contract.
As already discussed, the IOGC typically assumes all Appraisal Risks
associated with exploration. If no petroleum is found, the IOGC will have done
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work free. Consequently, if, during the exploration program, subsequent
legislation substantially changes the terms of the contract or renders them
uneconomic, a remedy such as restitution will give a virtual windfall to the
IOGC-contractor. Restitution will make the company whole notwithstanding the
potential losses it may have to endure due entirely to Appraisal Risks.
Restitution will also rescue the company from financial losses resulting from
entering into an imprudent commercial deal in which the IOGC has apparently
misevaluated Political Risks. Restitution operates as a punishment to the host
country (as the repudiating party) and its people for having enacted new
legislation and implementing it. When used to claim restitution, the
Stabilization Clause not only redistributes wealth among contractual parties
who already do not have equal bargaining power, but it also alters the nature of
sovereignty. “Third World” governments can exercise and enforce their sovereign
power against the entire “Third World” population, but if it wants to enforce the
same law against a particular foreign investor, the nation-state must pay for the
enforcement, at a price that assumes the investment has no Appraisal Risks. If
upheld as a method of seeking restitution for the benefit of the IOGC, the
Stabilization Clause will become more and more a “pro-corporate/pro MNC”
device, and not simply a means of Political Risk balancing aimed to facilitate
and foster global economic development.
Unfortunately, illustrative of this “pro-corporate” tendency, U.S. domestic
caselaw has shown an increasingly pronounced preference for the protection of
large-scaled corporate financial interests. In Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing
Southeast Inc. v. United States, 530 U.S. 604 (2000), the U.S. Supreme Court
granted the equitable remedy of restitution to the oil company and restored its
status quo prior to the execution of a domestic petroleum exploration contract.
In order to secure a mineral lease to explore for oil in North Carolina, Mobil had
paid a front cash bonus of $158 million in addition to annual rentals.
Analogous to a Signature Bonus in an international petroleum deal, the $158
million bonus was part of the company’s investment in the Contract Area,
whereupon the company spent front money in order to secure the right to
explore for oil. The chance for success would depend on Mobil’s evaluation of
geological Appraisal Risks. If, during the term of the contract, the company did
not find any commercial reserve, it would have to abandon drilling, and the
cash bonus would be a lost investment. Likewise, if new legislation rendered the
project futile, the company would also lose the investment.
When the Department of Interior refused to approve the project based on
new regulation,280 the lower court ordered restitution, allowing the company to
recoup its investment. The Supreme Court held that because the government
repudiated the contract and impaired its economic value, the refund of the cash
bonus to the company to make it whole was appropriate, whether or not the
contract would have ultimately proved to be profitable to the company. Where
the government was a contracting party, the enactment of new legislation
impairing the project constituted a “statement” from the promissor to the
promissee unequivocally repudiating the promissor’s obligations to uphold the
economic value of the contract. Such a statement is the government’s
280
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“individualized speech” in the commercial context, and not just an exercise of
sovereign power. The court analogized the refund of the cash bonus to a refund
given to the purchaser of a lottery ticket not received, even if the ticket might
have been a losing one.
At least one commentator has severely criticized the Mobil decision as
overbroadly redefining contractual relationships and expanding contract law for
the benefit of big businesses simply because the United States is a contracting
party.281 The decision increases the risk the government must bear in an
otherwise arms-length, fully informed business transaction, allowing the costs
of Political Risks to be shifted from the contractor to the government, since the
government was in the best position to control or eliminate Political Risks. The
commentator also criticized the court’s “lottery ticket” analogy as inappropriate,
because the purchase of a lottery ticket for a chance to win was strikingly
different from the right for access to mineral resources. A Stabilization Clause,
in the commentator’s view, penalizes the government for exercising its
legitimate sovereign power and hence creates disconcerting implications
regarding the role of the government.282 When legislation is regarded as
“individualized speech,” the nature of law changes from that of a function of
order and justice to a means of facilitating transactions and commercial ends.
Public governance as a governmental function thus becomes a financially
motivated bargaining tool, with the balance of power shifting to the cash-rich
party.283
It is saddening to realize that these policy concerns, vigorously expressed
by the commentator in the context of a domestic deal, have long been the tenor
of international petroleum transactions and “Third World” economic
development for decades preceding the Mobil decision. It is obvious, then, that
issues surrounding the Stabilization Clause in the international arena prove
once more the following disconcerting fact: For the MNC-IOGC, much of project
or investment risks can be lessened or avoided by contractual planning and
negotiation, taking full advantage of (i) the developing economies’ needs for
foreign investment and technologies; and (ii) the host government’s desire to
form and nurture a self-interest structure that encompasses the two sources of
power: the ruling power of poverty-stricken societies, and the deep-pocket
power of the affluent world. In such a system, the strong bargaining chip is in
the hand of the economically and politically advantaged.
My purpose of presenting the above six premises is neither to condemn
nor defend the Stabilization Clause. I neither wish to advocate for its utility, nor
its abolition. In fact, I believe that the Clause supplies the psychological comfort
needed for the closure of high-risk international deals.284 Without it, corporate
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actors and their employees will be incapacitated by the fear and anxiety often
associated with risk assessment and profit/loss projection in dealing with the
indeterminate future in an alien investment environment. In multi-milliondollar MNC/IOGC-“Third World” government partnerships, the Stabilization
Clause has constituted a legal norm and standard business practice, such that,
in the absence of extraordinary and peculiar circumstances, a lawyer’s failure
to propose or include the Clause in a large-scaled investment contract may
arguably subject him or her to professional malpractice exposure, or at a
minimum, severe criticism by management, due to the foreseeable political
instability of the “Third World.” For the cautious IOGC lawyer, the Stabilization
Clause is like the American Express card – don’t leave home without it!
My six premises serve only to call to the legal community at large the
inherent imperfection of the Clause as a legal tool.285 Yet, such an imperfect
legal tool has gained the type of popularity and widespread use that constitutes
the force behind the formation of modern lex mercatoria for such an important
industry and sector of the global economy. As such, the Clause’s popularity
should cause the prudent legal scholar a frown or, at a minimum, a sense of
ambivalence. The six premises I analyzed above are intended to expose the
dynamics, intricacy, intensity, and at times disturbing nature of MNCgovernment confidential partnership negotiation. Considering the imbalance of
economic powers, as well as the pattern of feeding self-interests, these
partnerships can turn into fruits laden with a juice that potentially can be
poisonous to the “people” invisible at the negotiation table. Invisible as they
are, they will be tasting those fruits because, from a policy-making standpoint,
those fruits are supposedly planted for them! Yet, one should not make the
overbroad generalization that all such fruits are poisonous, in the absence of
concrete evidence or empirical data specifically relevant to a decipherable trend
within an industry, a government, a country, or a region. In fact, I do believe
that any such unproven generalization may constitute the type of corporate and
government “bashing” that will undermine the critic’s credibility. But this is not
to say that we should ignore the chance that the poison may exist.
All I am pointing out is that the potential for the poisonous juice is
latently there in those partnerships by virtue of “Third World” realities and the
negotiation process itself. The chance for the poison to cumulate may exist in
the roots of the fruit-tree and, hence, it may taint the tree’s newly grown buds,
especially when the process of pruning the fruit is completely outside the
check-and-balance arm of a public interest watchdog representing a concerned
international humanitarian community. As the trend for the globalization and
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internationalization of law is calling various transnational work groups to sit
down together and look at the foundation for modern lex mercatoria, new
procedures and method to install this check-and-balance watchdog function
should be a priority for modern international jurists. No mutually acceptable
solution can emerge overnight, let alone a perfect one, but the deliberative
efforts and the thinking process must commence now. Some imperfect solution,
no matter how drastic it may seem, is better than no solution at all.

II.

CASE NO. 2: THE “MID-STREAM” TRANSACTION.

Suppose that in the Vietnam Deal, the IOGC had discovered Natural
Gas (rather than Crude Oil) in the Contract Area.286 The IOGC would then have
to evaluate the discovery and renegotiate the PSC for more specific gas terms,
because typically, a Producing Sharing Contract leaves contractual terms
governing natural gas for future negotiation.287 This is as much a necessity as
a norm, since gas terms cannot be projected or particularized ahead of time
without a technical evaluation of the type of gas discovered and the availability
of a long-term gas sale market in the region. (Crude Oil, on the other hand, can
be shipped all over the world. Natural gas transportation by ship is only
economically feasible if the natural gas is liquified – the process of cooling and
compression needed to “shrink” the gas from its original volume).288
Gas discoveries are often non-commercial unless they are very large in
quantity, are quite rich in liquids (this description refers to the density or
percentage of liquid in gas), and there exists a market for gas sale or use.289
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Quite often, gas development in the developing nations is a large-scaled and
long-term proposition, involving complex planning and technical gas
processing. Accordingly, many gas fields discovered in the “Third World” are
still “waiting on pipe,” sitting idle for years awaiting development, due primarily
to two reasons. First, many exploration acreages are located a long distance
from the kind of gas markets that would make gas sales profitable. Second, if
the gas is rich enough, liquid extraction is a development option, but
liquefaction facilities are extremely expensive and take a long time to build (as
long as two years or more). For example, the Arun liquefaction complex built by
Mobil Oil Indonesia (now ExxonMobil) cost approximately $3 billion.290
However, if gas is discovered in sufficient quality and quantity, and if
adequate infrastructure for the transport of gas exists or can readily be
contemplated, the gas discovered can become the fuel supply for powergeneration plants, built to meet electricity needs of the host country, nearby
nations, and the region as a whole. In the energy chain, the conversion of
natural gas discovered at the wellhead into electricity can be classified as the
“midstream” progression of an “upstream” exploration project such as the
Vietnam Deal.291 Accordingly, as a continuation of the Vietnam Deal, this
Article will next dissect a typical independent power project (IPP) in which gas
discovered upstream is used as fuel to generate electricity as a commodity for
sale (the “IPP or Midstream Transaction”).292 The IPP Transaction is selected
because it is typically financed via Project Financing, a legal and business
concept crucial to “Third World” economic development.
A. Anatomy of an IPP Transaction. The IPP Transaction is an
integrated, multi-deal energy transaction consisting of several related
agreements, concurrently negotiated and coordinated. At the heart of the
transaction is the Power Developer (or Power Supplier, or at times called the
Independent Power Producer), which is the entity responsible for developing
the Power-Generation Facility (“Facility”) and supplying electricity to buyers.
The agreements constituting the IPP Transaction consist of the following:
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(i) an agreement between the Power Developer and an expert contractor
for the “Engineering, Procurement, and Construction” (the “EPC
Function)” of the Facility (the “EPC Contract”);
(ii) an agreement between the Power Developer and an expert operator
for the “Operation and Maintenance” (the “O&M Function”) of the
Facility (the “O&M Contract”);
(iii) an agreement between a gas supplier and the Power Developer, who
agrees to buy gas from the gas supplier as fuel for the Facility (the “Gas
Sales Agreement” or “Fuel Supply Agreement”); 293
(iv) a long-term electricity sale-purchase arrangement (called “Power
Purchase Agreement” or “PPA”) executed by the Power Developer and
buyers of electricity. The PPA (or a cluster of PPAs) constitutes the core
economics of the IPP Transaction because the PPA provides the income
stream used to pay off the costs of Facility construction and operation,
as well as the costs of gas fuel.294 The income stream can last for
decades, and is used to pay off loan proceeds over the years. According to
a joint study by the World Bank and USAID, PPA terms in Asia and Latin
America may range from 14 to 40 years.295
(v) an optional “Implementation Agreement” executed by the Power
Developer with the host government. This agreement sets the regulatory
framework and standards for the project, based on, or in addition to, the
applicable local law. The Implementation Agreement may act as the
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broader regulatory overlay, infusing its effect into all other agreements
that constitute the IPP Transaction.
All of the agreements described above constitute “Project Documents,”
which must be reviewed not only by the parties, but also by financing
institutions contemplating commitments to finance the project. Parties to these
Project Documents constitute principal “Project Participants” in the IPP
Transaction, each providing a critical function as described below:
296

(i) The Power Developer undertakes to develop and own the Facility. The
Power Developer can be a single company, a consortium, or a joint
venture, either incorporated or unincorporated. Where the joint venture
is incorporated under the law of the host country, the result is a Project
Entity bearing the juridical status of the host country. All Project
Participants who contribute capital and hold equity interests in the
project are functionally shareholders of the Project Entity.
(ii) The EPC Contractor undertakes the EPC Function and executes the
EPC Contract with the Power Developer for the construction of the
Facility.
(iii) The O&M Contractor or Plant Operator is responsible for the O&M
Function and executes the O&M Contract with the Power Developer for
the maintenance and operation of the Facility.
(iv) The Fuel Supplier is responsible for the supply, transportation, and
delivery of fuel to the Facility. (Where gas from the upstream discovery
becomes the source of fuel for a gas-fired facility as in the Vietnam Deal,
fuel supply is provided by the IOGC that has discovered gas upstream.
The IOGC may decide to act as the Power Developer, thereby wearing a
“double hat”).
(v) The Power Purchaser executes the PPA with the Power Developer,
and hence provides the income stream for the project. The Power
Purchaser can be governments, municipal authorities, or public utility
companies in the region.
(vi) The host government or its designated entity can be a Power
Purchaser, or it can simply act as the overseeing regulatory authority
who controls the utility sector or the project. The host government may
also execute an optional Implementation Agreement with the Power
Developer.
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B. IPP Transactions, Project Financing, and “Off-Balance-Sheet Accounting
Because of its self-sufficient nature, the IPP Transaction is the classic
international business transaction typically funded via Project Financing. The
structure of an IPP Transaction can best be explained in connection with
Project Financing as a legal and business concept.
For several decades, Project Financing (sometimes called “Segregated
Financing”) has enabled billions of dollars of funding for economic
development projects in the “Third World.” The term, therefore, is also used to
refer to a specialty banking practice within the practice of law, focusing
exclusively on this type of financing transactions. Simply stated, Project
Financing is a financing method based solely on the merits of the project, rather
than on the creditworthiness of the project sponsor. In the classic, purest form
of Project Financing, all parties to the integrated deal (including bankers or
financiers) look to (i) future revenues generated by the project as the source of
funds from which project loans will be paid; and (ii) the assets of the projects,
whether physical or as contractual rights, as security or collateral for the loans.
In traditional corporate financing, lenders typically have recourse to all of the
project sponsor’s assets and revenues. The structure of a Project-Financed
transaction limits the lender’s security to the assets and cash flow of the project
itself, typically under the rubric of a project company formed specifically to
construct, own, and operate the project facility.297 The loan is either with
limited recourse or completely no recourse to the project sponsor, resulting in
no encumbrance on the sponsor’s balance sheet. Hence, the sponsor can
maintain its general creditworthiness despite the high debt-equity leverage ratio
that may have been incurred by virtue of its sponsorship of international
Project Financed transactions. The sponsor may contribute about 20 to 40
percent of the investment as equity, with the remainder infused strictly as
project debts.298 (For its equity contribution, the sponsor may use its earnings,
raise money on the international or domestic capital markets, either as debt
securities or equity securities, or otherwise obtain funding or loans via
commercial sources and/or via the Multilateral Institutions. The sponsor can
also spread risks by sharing equity contribution with other companies). Overall,
Project Financing enables the sponsor to limit its risk exposure to its own
equity investment in the project.
From the lender’s perspective, under Project Finance principles, where it
is contractually established that the project can pay for itself over an extended
period of time, bankers may be persuaded to make loans based on
demonstration of the project’s long-term self-sustaining capabilities and
economic viability. Such demonstration of viability and assurances of an
297
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uninterrupted income stream are evidenced in the contractual arrangements
among the Project Participants. Accordingly, in order to determine whether
Project Financing is appropriate, commercial lenders will closely scrutinize
Project Documents for any risks of disruption to the income stream or
impairment of project assets. Lenders will examine the contractual language of
all Project Documents to decipher whether these risks of loss have been
adequately treated via transfer to the third party, or assumed by an
economically able Project Participant. If the lender or financier sees any
untreated or uncovered risk of loss, it will either turn down the request for
Project Financing, or ask for additional guarantees or other credit enhancement
tools. These tools may alter the nature of financing from the classic form of
Project Financing to a more hybrid form bearing more resemblance to other
traditional methods of financing.299 The lawyering and business skills lie in the
prospective prediction and mitigation of risks via tightly negotiated contractual
language, as well as in the financial and legal engineering that give lenders the
necessary comfort in not seeking recourse beyond the project itself. The
documentation for an international “Project Financed” investment is among the
most complex and voluminous of any financing transactions, and will
encompass all kinds of debt and equity arrangements, credit support facilities,
as well as credit enhancement tools to give lenders the assurances needed.300
The purest, classic form of IPP Project Financing is also described as
“Non-Recourse Financing” because loans proceeds will be paid solely from the
future income stream or cash flow generated by the project, “without recourse”
to the assets, or as individual obligations of the Power Developer or other
Project Participants. In such pure Non-Recourse Financing method, the existing
assets of a corporate sponsor are unencumbered by the debts. (In contrast, in
hybrid (rather than classic) Project Financing, lenders may still have “limited
recourse” directly or indirectly to the assets of the corporate sponsor or
equivalent. For example, the sponsor’s parent company may have issued a
corporate guarantee to secure the sponsor’s performance or to guard against
financial losses suffered by others resulting from the sponsor’s nonperformance. Such guarantee may provide lenders recourse to the parent
company’s corporate assets in case of loan defaults. As another example,
bankers may require the sponsor to obtain a surety bond, or a Standby Letter of
Credit issued by the sponsor’s bank to guard against the sponsor’s default.301
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(In the case of a Standby Letter of Credit, the issuing bank granting the credit
will make good the financial loss occasioned by the sponsor’s default, but
ultimately the issuing bank will look to the corporate accounts or assets of the
sponsor – the issuing bank’s customer – via an indemnity or reimbursement
agreement executed separately between the issuing bank and the sponsor as a
condition precedent to the bank’s issuance of the Standby Letter of Credit.))302
For decades, the corporate sponsor has enjoyed the single most
important benefit of pure or classic Non-Recourse Project Financing: the “offbalance sheet” accounting treatment, whereupon the liabilities incurred by the
project are not reported on the corporate sponsor’s balance sheet (The sponsor
may still disclose the transaction under the textual Management Disclosure and
Analysis or footnotes to the financial statements, depending on whether the
sponsor and its auditors deem the project to be material to the financial picture
represented).303 Off-balance sheet treatment is appropriate because there has
been no encumbrance of corporate assets and the debt had produced no effect
on the balance sheet of the corporate sponsor. Corporate sponsors prefer pure
or classic Non-Recourse Project Financing, and will bend backward to obtain or
structure funding as such. The end result is evident -- the high-risk “Third
World” development project in question will leave no effect on their assets,
credit, or balance sheet.304
To a limited and highly technical extent, the post-Enron legislation, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, has taken away this “safety-net” from the
corporate sponsor. Section 401(a) of the Act added a new Section 13(j) to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by requiring public companies to disclose in
their 10K Annual Report and 10Q Quarterly Report all “material off-balance
sheet transactions, arrangements, obligations, and other relationships of the
issuer with unconsolidated entities.”305 The SEC has interpreted “off-balancesheet arrangements” to include “Variable Interest Entities,” defined by FASB
Letters of Credit Rules, the International Standby Practice (ISP 98),” 45 Wayne L. Rev. 1865 (Winter
2000).
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Interpretation No. 46 (FIN 46), as contractual, ownership or other pecuniary
interests in an entity that change with changes in the entity’s net asset value.306
Simply stated, “Variable Interests” are investments or interests that will absorb
a portion of the entity’s expected losses if they occur, or receive portions of the
entity’s expected residual returns if they occur.307 FIN 46 describes Variable
Interests Entities to include Project-Financed investments and certain leaseback financing techniques. So, depending on how an IPP Transaction is
structured (for example, which entity owns which interest, and receives income
or absorbs losses in what manner or through what legal structure), nowadays,
under the widely cast net of Sarbanes-Oxley and in the SEC’s view, an IPP
Transaction may have to be disclosed in corporate public filings if it qualifies as
a “Variable Interest” under FIN 46.
Hence, with Sarbanes-Oxley, management and its auditors may no
longer have the discretion whether to disclose off-balance-sheet Project
Financed transactions that may arguable meet the definition of FIN 46. It
should be noted, however, that Sarbanes-Oxley was not designed to address the
structures of foreign direct investment (FDI) transactions and their Non- or
Limited-Recourse Project Financing methods, which have been conducted by
U.S-based public companies for decades, all over the world. Instead, the
legislation was specifically designed to deter the recurrence of the “Enron-type”
of fraudulent practice aimed to dodge tax and accounting scrutiny via the use of
“Special Purpose Entities” (SPE) such as subsidiaries or limited partnerships
set up solely for a special project. The “Enron” ills addressed by Sarbanes-Oxley
are the hiding of debts, hiding of poor-performing assets, and quick execution of
related-party transactions at prices that are inherently suspicious, via the use
of SPEs. For example, a company may try to shift liabilities and assets to an
SPE owned by it in order to manipulate and evade accounting and reporting
requirements -- the SPE may borrow funds, yet the debts are not shown in the
books of the sponsoring parent; the company may transfer poor-performing
investments to the SPE so that declining value will not have to be recognized by
the sponsoring parent; or, the company may execute related-party transactions
without regard to arms-length negotiated prices.308 These situations are
completely distinguishable from legitimate SPEs set up in accordance with a
host country’s legal requirements for the specific purpose of conducting a
foreign direct investment overseas, which, by virtue of its non-recourse
financing structure, may enjoy legitimate “off-balance sheet” accounting
treatment.
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Overall, the new “off-balance sheet” disclosure requirement of SarbanesOxley is to promote transparent financial reporting in the interest of the
American investing public, rather than to address corporate FDI transactions or
“Third World” beneficiaries of those transactions. At the same time, the “catchall” safeguard of federal securities law’s anti-fraud provision in connection with
the purchase or sale of securities, Section 10b of the Exchange Act and SEC
Rule 10b-5,309 will continue to safeguard the American trading public against
fraudulent disclosure or non-disclosure of corporate transactions in all relevant
aspects.
C.

Risk Allocation as Core Principle for Project Financing and IPP
Transactions, and the Dynamics of Lawyering.

Even though “off-balance-sheet” accounting may inherently be suspect, it
cannot be generalized that FDI Non-Recourse Project Financed transactions are
per se indicia of any allegedly fraudulent intent on the part of the sponsor.
Instead, these transactions typically involve the sponsor’s “good faith” risk
assessment analysis in the course of its business judgment. Unless NonRecourse, Off-Balance-Sheet Project Financing is available, the corporate
investor is reluctant to take on high-risk FDI transactions in faraway land, on
foreign territories with political and legal concepts alien to the U.S-trained
business executive or lawyer. To ban or invalidate all such financing methods is
not what the post-Enron legislation purports to do, as the Act only imposes a
more intricate and more complete financing reporting requirement aimed to
protect the U.S. investing public. Without the type of financing structure that
helps buffer the corporate sponsor against investment risks, the corporate
sponsor may not invest in a foreign country unless the profit margin is
extremely high, which quite often is attributed to drastically cheaper labor and
raw materials – the same type of consideration facing the colonists of the 19th
and early 20th centuries. (In the colonist model, all Political Risks were
eliminated because the colonist government simply took over the territory and
became the “Third World” monarch!).
At the onset, therefore, it must be noted that international Project
Financing and risk-allocation principles go hand in hand and should not be
segregated as unrelated concepts. Although I have preciously discussed project
risks in upstream petroleum projects in Case No. 1, to provide a thorough
understanding of the dynamics of deal negotiation, a more in-depth focus on
risk assessment is necessary at this point in the context of IPP Transactions
and their enabling funding device, Project Financing.
From the owner-developer’s perspective, risk allocation involves more
than merely obtaining financing or purchasing insurance. Risk allocation
principles seek to control and quantify potential losses for purposes of financial
planning. Overall, risk management techniques may typically include the
following considerations: 1) risk avoidance (for example: foregoing the project);
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2) loss prevention (for example: taking steps to reduce loss frequency such as
providing drivers’ defensive driving training and imposing drug-testing
procedures to prevent automobile accidents); 3) risk retention (for example:
setting up reserves to pay for future losses); 4) risk transfer (for example:
spreading risks through joint ventures, indemnification agreements, or
assignments of interest); and 5) simply purchasing insurance or a surety bond
(payment of premium for a third party to assume all quantifiable future risks of
loss).310 When the costs of all these risk management steps exceed the
anticipated profit, the first step – risk avoidance – may become the conservative
business decision not to invest or engage in the project.
Under these risk management concepts, even the highly volatile Political
Risks inherent in “Third World” environments can scientifically be managed like
any other project risks. Economists, lawyers, and business executives have
long argued that even the most “slippery” and speculative Political Risks can be
quantified and estimated for purposes of economic calculations,311 and can be
treated via loss prevention plans or contractual means. For example, the
following loss prevention measures may be appropriate to avoid the risk of
expropriation in an international project: 1) the investor should keep a low
profile in the host country and designate government relations personnel to
develop rapport with the local authorities; 2) the investor should utilize local
industries and employ native personnel in order to build local support and
alliance and to develop worker loyalty in the host country; 3) the investor
should avoid geographical over-concentration and should locationally diversify
its international investment portfolio; and 4) last but not least, the investor
should involve the government in equity sharing, in order to get governmental
long-term support.
Risk allocation principles are supported primarily by two economic
theories: 1) the fundamental theory of exchange, and 2) the general theory of
competitive equilibrium.312 Under the “exchange” theory, parties to an economic
transaction are better off if each produces the type of goods or services for
which the party has comparative cost advantage, and hence risks should be
shifted to the party best equipped to prevent its causation. Under the
“competitive equilibrium” theory, optimum production is reached when the cost
to the provider equals the benefit to the receiver of products. Accordingly, a risk
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should be shifted until the cost of the risk equals the benefit of shifting it
elsewhere.313
A risk, in simplified business or economic frame of reference, is a
possibility of financial loss. Certain commercial or business risks center around
business relationships and may not be insurable because those risks may
involve the speculative loss of the chance to make a profit, rather than physical
and tangible losses that can be transferred to an insurance company at a
premium.314 (Most insurance contracts will exclude speculative losses from
coverage.) Nonetheless, in an IPP Transaction, the costs of risks that are not
insurable must still be absorbed or assumed by a responsible party in order for
the project to sustain its economic health. When a risk is shifted or allocated to
a party, it means that such party agrees to bear the costs of such risk because
the party is most equipped to prevent or control the risk. This is where risk
management principles and the practice of Project Financing coincide and
overlap.
To bring home the risk-assessment philosophy underlying Project
Financing, there is a need to re-examine the overall risk-allocation patterns of
energy projects. Upstream” petroleum exploration projects such as the Vietnam
Deal are typically not funded by Project Financing. It is not unusual for an
IOGC holding a Participating Interest in an oil and gas exploration project
abroad to rely on its own assets (rather than borrowed funds) to finance the
exploration venture,315 although the reputation and technological power of the
IOGC may attract additional investors to share capital, as illustrated by the
Vietnam Deal. (In the Vietnam Deal, the IOGC successfully brought in Russian
and Japanese partners to share risks.)316 The unavailability of Project Financing
in upstream projects is obviously due to the high and speculative appraisal
risks involved in exploration activities.317 However, once the IOGC has
discovered petroleum in commercial quantities such that projected investment
return or an income stream is readily ascertainable, the IOGC may be able to
borrow funds to take the project through the expensive Development and
Production phases. Project Financing may be available at that time. 318
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In contrast, an IPP investment, as the midstream progression of a
commercial gas discovery, may ideally be suitable for Project Financing. In an
IPP Transaction, prospective revenues from the sale of electricity secured by
long-term contracts are used to discharge loan payment obligations. To satisfy
the Project Financier, any risk of disruption to the revenue stream must
sufficiently be buffered and covered via appropriate contractual risk transfers.
Such contractual risk transfers may include express indemnification, warranty,
or other remedy provisions, or otherwise be explicit or implicit in the delineation
of rights and obligations among the Project Participants. The contractual riskallocation mechanism is contained in a complex set of legal agreements, with
each Project Participant assuming a special function and contributing a
different expertise. All Project Documents must be tightly negotiated and
drafted, such that all risks of loss will have been treated or shifted to the
entities most suited to assume the risks. Such party will ether absorb the risk
as part of its bargained-for benefit of the deal, or it will charge other Project
Participants a premium for assuming such risk, ultimately raising the price of
the contract in question. Business sense dictates that no risk will be allocated
or reallocated among the Project Participants without a premium.319
Accordingly, when risks are contractually shifted, identifying the party who
should assume the risk and affixing a premium pay for the cost of risk-taking
become crucial matters in IPP negotiation. While each project carries its own
basket of risks, there may be risks common to all projects in the same industry.
Risks involved in IPP Transactions are particularly exacerbated by high capital
outlays, long construction and operation periods, and potentially unstable gas
and electricity markets.320 The importance of the energy and utility sectors
further reinforces the impact IPP Transactions may produce on the national and
regional economy and, ultimately, upon “Third World” debts.
The job of the lawyer as planner, drafter, negotiator and reviewer of all
such contractual transfers is undoubtedly essential. Depending on the
corporate culture, quite often lawyers team up with business and technical
personnel in the identification of project risks, even though the task at hand
may not purely be legal. In that sense, the lawyer has a unique opportunity not
only to represent the interest of her client as a Project Participant and in the
allocation of risks, but also to oversee and observe the macro-economic impact
of balancing contractual risk allocation patterns, in order to achieve certain
level playing field and fairness. In fact, the risk allocation mechanism behind a
project is what drives the legal issues, shapes the legal structure of the deal,
and hence in turn creates legal norms via the formation of lex contractus. I will
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illustrate the interdependence between legal issues and risk allocation by
examining, as an example, the treatment of Facility construction and operation
risks in an IPP investment.
D.

Relationship between Risk Management and Legal Structure – An
Example of Contractual Risk Allocation in the Construction Phase of
an IPP Investment.

The IPP Transaction consists of two principal phases: (i) the shorter-term
construction of the Power-Generation Facility,321 and (ii) the longer-term
distribution and sale of electricity to buyers and end-users.322 All risk allocation
principles in general construction contracting apply to the first phase of an IPP
investment.
As I already stated, risk-allocation techniques determine the legal
structure of the construction deal. This can be illustrated via four distinct legal
issues in construction contract negotiation:323
(i)
Type of contractor compensation: whether the EPC Contract should
be structured as fixed price or cost plus;
(ii)
Type of contract delivery method: whether the contract should be
single-sourced or multiple-sourced;
(iii)
Type of remedies or damages: for example, whether liquidated
damages should be imposed upon a party for certain types of event; and
most importantly,
(iv)
Type of equity structure, which dictates the legal organization of the
Project Entity that serves as the Power Developer: whether the project
should be structured to include Vendor Equity or Government
Participation.
1.
Type of Contractor Compensation: The manner of compensation
–whether fixed price or cost plus -- can operate to shift the general risks of
construction cost overruns or changes in costs entirely to the construction
contractor. In a “fixed-price” contract, the risks of unexpected costs or cost
variations are assumed by the contractor, who undoubtedly will raise the fixed
price of the contract in order to absorb costs of the risks. If, however,
construction cost overruns are occasioned by the Power Developer, the later will
321
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be in a better position to control or absorb the risks, and a “cost-plus” type of
contract will better serve such goal. On the other hand, a cost overrun caused
by a political force majeure is typically within the control of the host
government, which may act as a Power Purchaser in the project. In such a
case, the Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) is the proper place and means to
allocate the risk of construction cost variations ultimately to the host
government. The PPA may also revert the risk of such cost variations back to
the Power Developer, who, in such a case, will undoubtedly charge the host
government a higher “Monthly Capacity Payment” (the cost of consuming
electricity to certain level of capacity)324 to compensate for the Power Developer’s
assumption of risks. Or, the host government may be asked to financially
guarantee the obligations of their affiliated Power Purchasers. Such sovereign
guarantee is the legal tool that serves to allocate risks of cost overruns
ultimately to the buyers of the commodity and the host country.325
2.
Type of Contract Delivery Method: In construction contracting,
“Contract Delivery Method” refers to the organizational structure that governs
the relationships among Project Participants such as architect,engineer, owner,
construction contractor, and service or supply subcontractors.326 As illustrated
below, the Contract Delivery Method – a legal issue -- can become, and has
been used as a risk-allocation technique.
In the “Traditional Contract Delivery Method,” the owner hires, first,
an architect and/or an engineer to design the project, and, second, a general
contractor to build the design. 327 Construction performance risks are thus
transferred to two sources: the design professional, and the construction
professional. The owner will consequently be isolated from design issues,
depending on the specific contractual risk-allocation language negotiated with
each of the two contractors. This method of risk transfer is sometimes called
“Multiprime Contracting” (as opposed to “Single-Source or Single-Point
Contracting”).328
The construction phase of an IPP investment typically is modeled after a
different Contract Delivery Method called “Design-Build,” suitable for projects
324
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in which the owner must require that the facility meet specific performance
such as output or air quality standards. Because the Power-Generation Facility
must meet quantitative electricity output as well as qualitative performance
requirements, it is better off being constructed via the Design-Build method.
The importance of output or standardized performance criteria necessitates the
transfer of all performance risks to one single source, accomplished in one
“turn-key” operation. More importantly, because most IPP investments are
“Non-Recourse Project Financed,” the Power Developer must select a
construction contracting method that minimizes the risks to the financial and
technical integrity of the project. The Design-Built approach utilizing the
technical expertise of one single source for all technical fronts minimizes the
chance of fragmented disputes and, hence, serves the “Project Financing”
purpose well.329
Specifically, Facility construction is typically handled via the execution
and implementation of an Enginnering, Procurement, and Construction
(EPC) Contract, also known as “Turnkey” or “Single-Point” contract. The
owner holds only one party, the “EPC Contractor” (often an international
engineering and construction firm) responsible for the entire Facility, its output
and “Commercial Operation.”330 Only one contractor (as opposed to multiple
contractors) will handle all functions – from engineering and design to
procurement of supplies and parts, and ultimately construction of the Facility.
Upon timely completion and successful performance testing, the EPC contractor
will “turn the key” over to the owner and limit its risk exposure to the honoring
of warranty obligations. This single-source method of contracting reduces
management time, streamlines negotiation, lowers overall costs, enhances
accountability, and enables faster completion in satisfaction of specific
performance and output standards.
3.
Type of Remedies or Damages: From the owner-developer’s
perspective, the risk-allocation pattern in the Design-Build method, however, is
not diversified. If things go wrong, the owner must rely on only one source for
recovery or compensation. Accordingly, the owner must be protected by predetermined, well-calculated contractual remedies. If the EPC Contractor fails
any of its obligations (whether it be Facility output, Commercial Operation, or a
target completion date), the owner-developer must impose very high and
precisely calculated liquidated damages as a means of remedying risks of loss.
Pure legal issues such as the imposition of liquidated damages thus become the
primary mechanism to allocate the risk of delay in Facility completion or the
contractor’s failure to achieve target performance. Such delay or failure will
interfere with the pre-determined income stream to be expected from scheduled
electricity sales. The party who occasions the delay or failure, or is in the best
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Michael Loulakis, “Power Generation Contracting Forms,” from Construction Project Form Book
(Wiley Publications 1994) at 259.
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The EPC Contractor may obtain the services of subcontractors, although it remains primarily liable to
the owner-developer regarding all aspects of the EPC Contract. See also Note 143 for a definition and
discussion of “Commercial Operation.”
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position to prevent such delay or failure, must therefore be responsible for
paying liquidated damages, or otherwise making good all financial losses, in
amounts sufficient for the owner-developer to ultimately cover loan proceeds
and for the project to continue without interruption. That party may be (i) the
EPC Contractor, if the delay or failure occurs with respect to the completion or
performance of the Facility; or (ii) the O&M Contractor (the Plant Operator), if
the delay or failure occurs in connection with the ongoing operation and
maintenance of the Facility. However, if the delay or failure of performance is
attributed to political force majeure events, the host government, or the Power
Purchasers, may ultimate be made to bear the costs by way of an increase in
the “Monthly Capacity Payments,” payable to the Power Developer.
4. Type of Equity Structure -- Variation of Financing Structure and
Legal Organization to Accomplish Risk-Spreading Objectives. At least three
variations in the equity structure and legal organization of an IPP investment
have been devised by Project Participants in order to accomplish risk-spreading
objectives:
(i)

The Power Developer may seek equity participation from the EPC
Contractor, O&M Contractor, or Fuel Supplier as a means of
enhancing proper project performance (“Vendor Equity
Financing”).

(ii)

The Power Developer may seek equity participation from the host
government in order to reduce Political Risks (“Government
Participation”); and

(iii)

IPP investments may also be structured as the Build-OperateTransfer (BOT) or Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT) model,
which, for decades, has enabled several large-scaled infrastructure
development projects in the “Third World.” This model spreads
project risks to the international public sector, via Multilateral
Financing such as World Bank funding, or funding by the
Regional Development Banks.331

These risk-spreading mechanisms, however, may occasion new vices,
which can be examined by scrutinizing the special legal issues raised by the
afore-mentioned financing and structural variations.
a.
Vendor Equity Financing. Within the Design-Build model, the
EPC Contractor may opt to be included in the owner-developer consortium or
Project Entity. This is called the “Vendor Equity” structure of financing,
331

See Notes 22 and 339, supra (discussing Multilateral Institutins). See also World Bank press release,
“Vietnam Project to Help meet Power Shortfall; MIGA and ADB Support Phu My 3 Power Project,” (Jan.
3, 2-2004), found at http://www.worldbank.org.vn/news/press_24_01.htm (construction of power plant
supported by funding and guarantees provided by MIGA and the Asian Development Bank); Press Release
from Siemens, “Siemens Builds Largest Private Power Plant in Vietnam” (Oct. 13, 2003) (announcing first
combined-cycled power plant in Vietnam built by Siemens Power Generation as turnkey project structured
under the BOT legal framework).
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referring to the inclusion of services or good providers or suppliers (“Vendors”)
in project ownership.332 In IPP investments, Vendor Equity typically includes
equity interest held by the EPC Contractor, the O&M Contractor, or the Fuel
Supplier.333 (For example, in the Vietnam Deal, the IOGC who found gas
upstream might decide to undertake the development of IPP midstream as a
Power Developer. In that case, the IOGC would own both the fuel and the
Power-Generation Facility, meaning it would be selling fuel to itself in a Vendor
Equity structure.)
Overall, inclusion of Vendor Equity in the Project Entity increases
expertise base in the owner group, helps diversify capabilities, secures loyalty
from vendor-suppliers, improves accountability by making them an integral
part of the project and, quite often, also increases the owner group’s chance of
success in international competitive bidding (via the joining of forces that form
a de facto cartel). But the benefits gained are also the potential source of vice:
the Vendor Equity structure concentrates a number of major international
corporate players into one owner group, typifying the often-taken-for-granted
monopolistic characteristic of “Third World” economic development. A group of
allied companies – a self-selected group of dominant players – controls the
energy and utility sector and, hence, a substantial portion of the economic
landscape of a country or region.
Concerns raised by Vendor Equity goes beyond the monopolistic pattern
it may illustrate. An inherent conflict exists in Vendor Equity analogous to
conflicts-of-interest issues raised by “related-party transactions” in U.S.
financial disclosure law.334 A vendor may have dual objectives – to participate
in profit-sharing as a part owner of the Project Entity, and, at the same time, to
profit from selling and supplying goods and services to the Project Entity of
which he/she is a part. Negotiation for services or supply contracts between the
Project Entity and the vendor will inherently include aspects of self-dealing,
raising issues as to whether such negotiation is truly at arm’s length.335 Yet, the
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deal and its related-party transactions may or may not be disclosed, depending
on the financial disclosure requirements under the law of either the home or
host jurisdiction. (Naturally, the legal systems of host jurisdictions are often
under-developed). If self-dealing results in high costs, such costs are ultimately
passed on to the inhabitants of the “Third World,” which eventually may lead to
more austerity or even more international debts incurred by the “Third World”
nation.
b.
Government Participation. The same inherent conflict of interest
exists in a Government Participation structure, when the host government or its
designated SOE is included as equity owner of the Project Entity. The Project
Entity, partly owned by the host government, may negotiate a Power-Purchase
Agreement under which electricity will be sold to the host government or its
political subdivisions as Power Purchasers. The government may be acting in a
dual capacity: as seller and buyer both. The Project Entity will negotiate price,
terms, and conditions of the electricity sale with the government as one of its
shareholders, who also serves as the market regulator. Expectations of armslength dealing are thus less linear and less clear. The chance exists for a
corrupt or inefficient governmental apparatus (if that is the case) to be enriched
at the ultimate expense of “Third World” inhabitants, as well as the shareholder
public back in the foreign investor’s home base.
It is evident, therefore, that in both Vendor Equity and Government
Participation, contractual measures are needed to eliminate or minimize the
risk of less-than-arms’-length negotiation, and to help delineate functions and
capacities in order to prevent self-dealing and price manipulation. (This is the
reason why in World-Bank-funded IPP Transactions, the Multilateral Agency
will assist the host government, supposedly in designing (i) a workable utility
rate-making or regulatory framework, and (ii) a model Power Purchase
Agreement based on sound economic principles.) Preventive contractual
measures may include procedures to assure arms’ length terms; setting
parameters for contractual capacities of the parties; defining terms and
conditions for withdrawal in the event of conflicts of interest, and/or similar
safeguards to assure both quality services and fair and equitable dealings. In
off-balance-sheet, unregulated “Third World” deals, these contractual
safeguards may result from the parties’ own will, rather than a matter of
mandatory protection for the larger public good. (The only regulation may rest
in the hand of a self-interested “monarch,” whose lack of experience and capital
may also be coupled with a corrupt and inefficient bureaucracy.)
Private-sector Project Participants, nonetheless, may view Government
Participation as a necessity, as it brings to the IPP investment two principal
risk-allocating advantages: (i) Government Participation can qualify the project
for Multilateral Financing, since the Multilateral Agencies will only lend money
to nation-states or their SOEs and not to private parties; and (ii) Government
Participation can reduce Political Risks. The involvement of the host
government as equity partner in the IPP investment helps reduce the risks of
335
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materially adverse governmental action or governmental interference – why
interfere if the government owns a stake in the project itself, since adverse or
intervening sovereign action may cut against the government’s own commercial
interest? For example, in facility construction, Government Participation
alleviates such political risks as government-imposed changes in site
conditions. (In the Design-Build model, the owner-developer often takes the
entire responsibilities over information and condition regarding project sites,
including land, access, right of way, existing core facilities, as well as support
infrastructure typically owned or controlled by today’s “monarchs.” It is
therefore beneficial, efficient and desirable for the project if the host government
occupies the owner-developer role.) Now that the “monarch” has entered the
deal as a shareholder-investor, it will have all the incentive needed to support
the project long-term and to protect its foreign partner, who happens to control
the technology needed for the construction and operation of the Facility.
c.
The Build-Operate-Transfer or Build-Own-Operate-Transfer
(BOT/BOOT) Legal Model for Infrastructure Building. To further the riskallocation goal of a Government Participation structure, a separate legal model
has been devised and made applicable to the development of “Third World”
infrastructure, called Build-Own-Transfer (BOT) or Build-Own-OperateTransfer (BOOT).
The terms are self-explanatory:
In the BOT/BOOT
structure, the developer builds, owns and operates the Facility for a definite
term. After a period of time (long enough for the developer to recoup its
investment and earn the desired profit), the developer is contractually obligated
to transfer the facility to the host government or its designated SOE, which will
then own and operate the infrastructure from that point forward. This transfer
of ownership and operation satisfies the host country’s national interest, and
enables the infrastructure to become a public operation. Initially, the developing
nation has no technology or managerial know-how to construct and operate
infrastructure systems, and must therefore invite foreign participation in those
projects.336 Eventually, the government would want infrastructure to be part of
the political economy free from foreign control.
Because of the importance of infrastructure, many developing nations
have enacted law or promulgated regulations establishing the legal framework
for the BOT/BOOT model, thereby elevating the model into legal mandates. The
local law mandating the BOT/BOOT form for infrastructure investment projects
may require the incorporation of a BOT Company or BOT Entity to serve as
the developer of a particular infrastructure project.337 The BOT/BOOT structure
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may also involve both Vendor Equity and Government Participation, in which
case both vendor-supplier group and the host government functionally become
shareholders of the BOT Entity.
For decades, the BOT/BOOT structure has channeled billions of dollars
of both private and public funding into “Third World” economic development,
and has become quite popular in Asia and Latin America.338 Its popularity in
Africa, central Asia, and certain parts of central or Eastern Europe will
undoubtedly be forthcoming, if not already in existence. If the BOT Entity
involves Government Participation, the BOT Entity may qualify for Multilateral
Financing, 339 since the Multilateral Agencies will only loan money to member
states, but not to the private sector (with the exception of the International
Finance Corporation (IFC), the commercial arm of the World Bank.)340

Inc., on file with author, cited with client permission). In 2001, Vietnam signed an contract for the
development of a 715 MW gas power plant with French State-owned Electricite du France (EDF) under the
BOT scheme, making the power plant the first BOT project awarded under international bidding
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The application of the BOT/BOOT legal norm to an IPP Transaction
begins with the prerequisite finding that the Power Generation Facility, as well
as any gas processing, liquefaction, and transportation facilities (such as gas
pipelines), be part of national infrastructure building. This can be a legal
conclusion either clearly stated in the local law, or otherwise accepted as a
norm of practice by the business, legal, financial, or Multilateral community.
Without electricity as a critical infrastructure or pipeline systems to deliver
energy sources to the market, the national economy and natural resources
foreign investment can be retarded or incapacitated. Once the IPP investment
and all support facilities have qualified as infrastructure building, with
Government Participation, the IPP Transaction and related deals may receive
World Bank or Regional Development Bank funding and assistance, in addition
to private Project Financing. The BOT/BOOT structure that encompasses
Government Participation and combines both private Project Financing and
Multilateral Financing enables the Power Developer to accomplish two riskallocation objectives: (i) to reduce Political Risks by according the host
government a direct long-term financial interest in the project, and (ii) to
spread investment risks to inhabitants of the developed nations. If the project
fails, the corporate sponsor can be risk-free, except for its chance to make a
profit, or any equity contribution it may have made out of its own pocket.
In summary, the midstream segment of the Vietnam Deal is a classic
scenario for the structuring of a BOT/BOOT legal model that involves both
Vendor Equity and Government Participation. Such a structure leaves much
room and opportunity for related-party transactions tainted with classic
conflicts of interest and potential self-dealing – one Project Participant may have
its foot in several functions in the project. The structure evidences a close-knit,
long-term, and interdependent relationship among private Project Participants,
the Multilateral Institutions, and the “monarch.” 341 In masterminding and

PowerFund helps bring private international investors to privately sponsored IPP investments in the
developing economies. Blumental, 16 Berkeley J. Int’l L. at XXX.
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See George Shultz, “Ten Commandments for Evaluating Risk on Private Infrastructure Projects,”
Bechtel Power International Private Power Forum (Amelia Island, Florida November 9, 1995) (written
copy of the speech was made available as of November 27, 1995) (Mr. Shultz was formerly President of
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implementing such a structure, the IOGC that has discovered gas as fuel
supply for a gas-fired Power-Generation Facility will tend to look to dominant
industry players that share its corporate philosophy and investment style,
especially those who have established track records of successful partnerships
with the IOGC and the same “monarch.” This means that the selected Project
Participants may have participated in joint operatorship or may have held joint
interests with the IOGC’ elsewhere in the global economy, and/or may have
successfully partnered with the host government in other national projects. In
fact, typically all dominant players must have the approval and blessings of the
host government. Close-knit partnerships with “monarchs” by a group of selfselected players continue to be the undeniable and inescapable profit-making
pattern for the international petroleum and energy sector in “Third World”
economic development.
Needless to say, cloaking an allegedly corrupt government as the project
sponsor and equity owner in order to guarantee payment and profit for the
private sector via Multilateral or Bilateral financing can be a dangerous
proposition. This danger is amply illustrated in the scandal involving the
outrageously costly and hazardous Bataan Nuclear Power Project in the
Philippines.342 Bataan was the biggest independent power project undertaken
in the history of the Philippines, constructed in 1977 and completed in 1984.
Activists allege that the project was the means for the corrupt Marcos
government to enrich itself. By sponsoring the project and partnering with USbased Westinghouse, the Marcos were able to obtain public funding via the U.S.
Export-Import Bank (ExIm)343 Such public money was used to pay, among
others, Westinghouse (including, naturally, its desired profit for constructing
and outfitting the nuclear plant), and to benefit the Marcos allegedly by way of
illicit commissions payable to their alleged “cronies”.344 According to activists,
international inspectors considered Bataan a health, safety and environmental
hazard, and the Philippines ended up experiencing severe outages leading to a
national power crisis, since Bataan never produced the expected volume of
electricity. Notwithstanding the plant’s hazardous and inoperational status, the
“beneficiaries” of Bataan, the “consumers, taxpayers, and host communities” of
the Philippines, and not the ousted Marcos, ended up having to pay the ExIm
debts (a total of direct loans and guarantees estimated at $900 million), which

“You probably want to think about international partners. The IFC is a leading candidate, and the
World Bank group generally, because obviously it gives you a certain kind of insurance policy,
because countries do not want to alienate this potential source of future finance...” (emphasis
added).
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contributed substantially to the Philippines’ impoverished conditions and debt
crisis.345
E.

A Critical Look at Project Financing and the Reality of Large-Scaled
“Third World” Economic Development.

Despite its utility, the BOT/BOOT structure illustrates at least three
windfalls created in the current funding patterns for “Third World” development
projects:
(i)

The interdependence between Multilateral Financing and Project
Financing, and the stimulating effect the former produces upon
the latter;

(ii)

The triple benefits enjoyed by corporate sponsors whose projects
qualify for Project Financing; and

(iii)

The real-life influence that name-brand corporate identities may
have on the risk assessment process that determines eligibility for
Project Financing, thereby confirming the monopolistic and
exclusive nature of large-scaled “Third World” development project
sponsorship.

These three windfalls are discussed below.
(i) The interdependence between Multilateral Financing and Project
Financing.
Among the most profound impacts of the BOT/BOOT structure is the
effect that such a structure may produce upon project risk assessment in the
determination of Project Financing eligibility. Not only does the BOT/BOOT
structure enable public funding such as World Bank or Regional Development
Bank loans, but it may also increase the success chance for qualifying related
projects for private Project Financing, thereby stimulating the involvement of
the private sector. In that sense, Multilateral Financing and Project Financing
are interdependent. The availability of Multilateral Financing in BOT/BOOT and
other infrastructure projects motivates the corporate sector to seek
partnerships with the Multilateral Agencies in nation-building, even if the
corporate goals are purely profit-seeking and not nation-building. Such a
partnership can generate more foreign direct investments for the host country,
not only because private investors will benefit from the availability of
infrastructure, but also because Multilateral Financing acts as assurance for
private lenders and financiers, and hence can practically become a risk
management device to mitigate against the host environment’s Political Risks.
In simple terms, Multilateral Financing has the same effect as the corporate
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investor’s “de facto” insurance policy.346 The presence of Multilateral Financing
and their credit support facilities in a developing nation helps ease the private
sector’s anxiety, constituting the type of backing by the developed nations that
make private investors feel safe.
Consequently, not only is the private sector more likely to invest, but it
will actively assist the host government in meeting Multilateral Funding
qualifications. Specifically, although the World Bank does not fund upstream
energy projects, it generally supports privatization of certain segments of the
energy chain that may be considered part of nations’ infrastructure building,
and hence will finance and/or guarantee projects that fall within its funding
criteria.347 As of the end of the millennium, a commentator reported that out of
the $17-20 billion of World Bank’s annual funding, approximately $2-3 billion
goes to IPP and approximately $1 billion goes to oil and gas midstream projects
annually.348 The pipeline project in the Republic of Chad is an example of
World Bank support available to the oil and gas industry in its partnership with
the Republic.349 The gas development project offshore Vietnam sponsored by
British Petroleum (BP), BP’s accompanying pipeline project to transport its gas
onshore, and the construction of gas-fired power-generation plants in Vietnam
using offshore gas as fuel, supported by Asian Development Bank and MIGA,
are all evidence of an integrated IPP Transaction benefiting from the
combination of Multilateral Financing, BOT financing, and private sector
investment.350 IOGCs, Power Developers, their multinational contractors and
suppliers, as well as their private bank syndicates will readily cooperate and
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assist host governments in the application for Multilateral Funding and credit
support.
The same stimulating effect has amply been observed with respect to
loan conditions established by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for the
developing economies. Although the IFM has no direct role in the financing of
international energy projects, its goal as a global economic and monetary
monitoring institution greatly impacts the risk assessment process performed
by private lenders, at least in two separate aspects:
First, payment for energy as a commodity in a host country may be
made in the local “soft” currency and must be converted into a “hard” currency
such as the U.S. dollar or the Euro to service project debts and to be
repatriated as investor returns. IMF policies and rules for its member states,
articulated in its Articles of Agreement,351 purportedly help stabilize and prevent
local currency collapses, as well as reduce the risk of currency fluctuations in
the local economy. Thus, a host country’s membership in the IMF can serve as
a bedrock to ease private lenders’ anxiety.
Second, as a Bretton Woods institution, the IMF lends money to
member states to help correct these countries’ fiscal problems. IMF loan
conditions, reflective of its economic policies, are purportedly designed to
assure repayment of “Third World” debts. Accordingly, private bankers lending
money to “Third World” projects have looked to IMF loan conditions as “risk
management” tools, and IMF loan conditions have typically been incorporated
into private loan agreements, serving as “risk assurances” to stimulate private
banks’ funding of “Third World” development projects.352 Syndicates of private
lenders have “ridden on the coat-tails” of not only the IMF but also other
“development” Multilateral Agencies, at times creating de facto “creditors’
cartels.”353
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When pushed to the limit, this stimulating effect and over-reliance on the
presence of the Multilateral Agencies in a host country can easily result in risk
assessment errors committed by the private banking industry. Risk assessment
errors can even be made by the Multilateral and Bilateral Agencies themselves,
since one may undoubtedly be influenced by the activities of the others within
the same country or region, let alone the fact that these institutions typically
share nation-state memberships. Principles of risk management are not an
exact science capable of mathematical precision at all times. Many subjective
factors come into play. The ultimate inquiry rests in whether or not the
financier or lender feels assured and comfortable with the prospect of recouping
its funds together with the desired interest. In reality, especially in an
international IPP Transaction, this level of assurance can be obtained in several
ways, some of which may have little to do with the mathematical calculation of
probability or risks. In fact, it is possible that the more substantial the financial
stake is, the more the assurance is stimulated by psychological comfort or the
totality of circumstances. The interdependence between Multilateral Financing
and private Project Financing illustrates this point. What’s more, the
interdependent, stimulating effect described above also leads to the undeniable
fact that all Multilateral Agencies, and not just the IMF, become the sheriff,
regulator, insurer, and rescuer of both public and private ““Third World”” debts,
even if some of them are not officially in the business of providing Political Risk
insurance – a function and specialty exclusively reserved for agencies such as
MIGA, Ex-Im, or OPIC.354 Further, when private and public loans are defaulted,
debt or loan work-out solutions, often proposed by the Multilateral Agencies
and/or major nation-contributors such as the U.S. to prevent global economic
crises, may lead to more severe loan conditions, which in turn will cause more
austerity and negative social and economic impact on “Third World” population.
355
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There has been no established international legal framework for sovereign bankruptcy. As one of the
largest contributors to the IMF and World Bank systems, and in the interest of major U.S. banking
syndicates who financed international projects, the United States has undertaken to structure “Third World”
debt “workout” solutions. In the “Baker Plan” – named after the then Secretary of State –new loans were
made to help developing nations pay interests, thus preserving the “book value” of defaulted loans. The
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(ii) The triple benefits enjoyed by the corporate sponsor whose
infrastructure projects qualify for Project Financing.
From the discussion above, the following scenario becomes highly likely:
If the IPP Transaction (and all related projects that may qualify as
infrastructure building such as gas processing, gas liquefaction, and pipeline
construction) are structured as the BOT/BOOT model eligible for both
Multilateral Financing and Project Financing, corporate sponsors that partner
with “monarchs” and the Multilateral Institutions may enjoy at least three
benefits.
The first benefit results from the fact that foreign investors need the
country’s infrastructure in order to conduct their profit-making enterprises.
The same infrastructure may even benefit the foreign investors’ various projects
in the region and not just in a single country. One can argue that under normal
circumstances, the cost of the infrastructure needed to support the investor’s
various projects should be considered business expenses to be borne by the
investor out of its own pocket (no more no less than overhead costs any
business enterprise may have to outfit, or no more no less than the costs of
hiring workers for production). Yet, if the corporate investor chooses to sponsor
the infrastructure project, it can even make profit from the infrastructure that
supports its other profit-making enterprises.356 In other words, the private
investor can take two bites of the same apple – to benefit from the
infrastructure and, at the same time, profit from the construction of the
infrastructure as a project sponsor. Further, by partnering with the “monarch”
and co-sponsoring the infrastructure project, via Multilateral Financing,

short- term solution of injecting more funding for the Third Word to satisfy interest obligations naturally
resulted in tougher new loan conditions and more austerity for the developing economies. In contrast, the
subsequent “Brady Plan” offered more long-term solutions: easing existing IMF loan conditions, reduction
of debt value, and provision of new financial guarantees to stimulate more private capital and export
growth. See, e.g,, Aronson, “Financial Institutions in the International Monetary System,” 12 Case West.
Res. J.Int’l L. 341 (1980); Power, “Sovereign Debt: The Rise of the Secondary Market and Its Implications
for Future Restructurings,” 64 Fordham L.Rev. 2701 (1996). See also Lichtenstein, “Aiding the
Transformation of Economies: Is the Fund’s Conditionality Appropriate to the Task?” 62 Fordham L.Rev.
1943 (1994) (discussing the G-7 Nations’ efforts to use the existing IMF structure to disburse aid to
Russia).
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as the socially desirable solution in the best interest of the global community. Tony McAdams, 9 J. Legal
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corporate sponsors can spread investment risks and transfer the costs of the
very infrastructure that serves them to other nation-states. Since the host
country that borrows Multilateral Funding will have to pay back those loans out
of its treasury, the risks are ultimately borne by the poor citizenry of the “Third
World.”
Second, although eligibility for Project Financing in principle is
supposed to rest solely on the evaluation of the project’s economic viability, in
reality, private bankers may be influenced by the availability of Multilateral
Financing in the project. Hence, corporate investors seeking Project Financing
stand to gain from this relaxed risk assessment process. Where Multilateral
Funding has been made available to a project, corporate investors may stand a
much greater chance of receiving favorable private Project Financing in the
same project, or in related ventures, including the construction of all other
support facilities necessary for their investment.
Third, classic Project Financing acts as an effective risk transfer
mechanism for corporate investors because of its “non-recourse” nature,
thereby constituting another layer of benefit. If the project fails, the corporate
sponsor is practically risk-free (other than any “down payment” or out-of-pocket
equity that it may have advanced, depending on the project).
On one hand, the utility of, and justification for, Project Financing in
“Third World” economic development are evident. Project Financing as a
concept stimulates private investment in the “Third World,” especially in
projects crucial to nation building. Without Project Financing, the undeveloped
areas of the world will remain undeveloped, since foreign aids among nations
and even Multilateral Financing cannot adequately supply the necessary
funding and carry the financial weight. Private bankers should be encouraged
to count on the ascertainable income stream evidenced by contractual rights in
order to pour more funding into the “Third World.” Without Project Financing,
developers may hesitate to initiate costly development projects on the
unfamiliar territories of the “Third World.”
On the other hand, Project Financing can create an anomaly. If the high
investment risks do not fall upon the corporate sponsor, under established risk
management principles, these risks do not just disappear. They are simply
shifted elsewhere, ultimately to the group of people who are the least equipped
and ill-prepared to bear the loss. In that sense, the economic theories behind
risk management philosophies discussed earlier have indeed been betrayed!
The accuracy of risk assessment methods depends on whether the information
taken into consideration is reliable and accurate. Imperfect information makes
imperfect risk assessment and, therefore, results in flawed risk treatment. If, for
any reason, the project fails, or the Power Developer goes under and fails to
perform (as in the case of Enron), bankers will hurriedly foreclose on the
project’s physical assets or will take over the stream of income. If there is no
income stream or the physical assets are inadequate or otherwise not salvable
to satisfy the debts (as in the case of the Bataan project is the Philippines
discussed earlier), bankers will have to face and absorb their risk-assessment
errors, without recourse to the developer’s corporate assets in the home
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jurisdiction or elsewhere. In the end, two groups of inhabitants ultimately bear
the risk of loss: 1) the inhabitants and taxpayers of the capital-exporting
countries will bear the financial impact of bank syndicates’ risk assessment
mistakes when loans are defaulted; and 2) the inhabitants of the “Third World,”
or the capital-importing countries, end up having no electricity yet still have to
pay project debts. Ultimately, the poor citizenry gets poorer and poorer, having
less and less economic means or disposable income because governments will
seek to levy and make good the financial losses from their citizenry. In the worst
scenario, since an IPP investment, viewed as an infrastructure development
project, is typically funded both by private money (through Project Financing)
and quasi-public money (through Multilateral Financing), the default of the
private sector sponsor may also cause the “Third World” nation -- a sovereign
sponsor -- to default on its international financial obligations,357 and a
transnational insolvency problem may arise leading to global economic crises.358
The use of Project Financing as the corporate sponsor’s risk-allocation
mechanism fatally flaws because it ultimately protects the corporate sponsor,
the party who is in the best position to assess future risks of loss, and who
benefits the most from the financial reward of the project, all to the detriment of
those beneficiaries whom the project is supposed to serve. Under scientific risk
management principles, those beneficiaries occupy the least advantageous and
the least equipped position to prevent or control the loss. In fact, they have no
control at all. The ultimate noble goal of “Third World” economic development in
the name of free market, in the worst case, will work to the severe disadvantage
of the poor and the weak.
(iii) The Monopolistic, Exclusive, and “Brand-Name” Nature of LargeScaled Project-Financed Transactions in Real-World Application.
If a giant corporate sponsor is suffering financially or its management is
deteriorating due to inefficiency or misconduct, the signs of financial ills and
troubled corporate operation will manifest themselves and trickle down all
operating units, and ultimately to those international projects funded via
Project Finance an ocean away. Yet, because of pre-Sarbanes-Oxley “off-balance
sheet” accounting treatment, coupled with the illusory psychological comfort
created by brand-name glory, the significance of potential financial and
management ills manifested in international projects easily escaped the
immediate attention of the investing and analyst community, making the
prospect of financial disasters appear further removed or remote. As an
incidental benefit of the Enron scandal, the prophylactic Sarbanes-Oxley
arguably helps prevent this misleading appearance by requiring disclosures of
certain “off-balance sheet” arrangements, but Sarbanes-Oxley does not change
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a Non-Recourse financing transaction into a Full-Recourse financing
transaction and, hence, does not help the lending community and the public it
serves. Nor does Sarbanes-Oxley help prevent or correct the lending
community’s risk management errors, committed at the time the project is being
contemplated, not at the subsequent time of disclosure in public filings or
reports, after the deal has been finalized. The Enron scandal illustrates the
danger of how brand-name corporate identities can psychologically distort and
imbalance private bankers’ risk assessment process.359
The Enron Corporation (Enron)’s 1999 10K Annual Report discussed the
Dabhol gas-fired power plant in the Maharashtra State of India (India’s
industrial heartland south of Bombay), developed by the Dabhol Power
Company (“Dabhol”), majority-owned by Enron.360 Dabhol was allegedly India’s
largest FDI project, valued at $2.9 billion.361 Dabhol’s revenues were counted
as part of the bigger business segment, Enron Wholesales Energy Services
(“Wholesales”), and reported collectively in Enron’s Financial Statements as
part of Wholesales business unit.362 Overall, by fiscal year 2000 – the year
preceding the scandal, Enron’s Wholesales Energy Operations and Services,
including power development and infrastructure projects in the developing
markets, were reported as Enron’s largest business segment, with sustained
growth rate of 48% annually over a five-year period,363 both domestically and
internationally. Yet, by the end of 2001, when the scandal was first uncovered,
the 2,184-megawatt plant had been shut down allegedly as a result of an
ongoing dispute between Dabhol and its only customer (the state utility
authority of Maharashtra) over non-payment of power supply.364 Around this
same period of time, Dabhol also served notice of terminating its sale of power
to the state utility authority. This meant that the income stream from which
loan proceeds were serviced would not be forthcoming.
Enron’s financial meltdown threw the Dabhol project into more
uncertainty. In the middle of the power purchase payment dispute, news from
America arrived that Jeffrey Skilling, the CEO who was instrumental in Enron’s
transformation from a power development and pipeline business to an energy
trading company,365 had resigned only after 6 months on the job, forewarning
359
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the corporate giant’s subsequent financial collapse.366 At some point, Dabhol’s
core physical assets were allegedly listed on the high priority sale by either the
financially distressed Enron or its prospective buyer, Dynergy of Houston,
Texas, who eventually rescinded the acquisition after conducting a due
diligence review of Enron’s operations and records. The press reported that a
consortium of Indian lenders led by the Industrial Development Bank of India,
who apparently were once impressed by the mighty brand-name Enron, and
whose exposure in the form of loans and guarantees amounted to
approximately $1.5 billion, unsuccessfully attempted to stop the transfer of the
Dabhol assets during Enron’s financial meltdown.367 Assuming that the transfer
actually occurred arguably pursuant to U.S. bankruptcy law, who but the poor
people of India and its industrial heartland will bear the consequence of this
asset loss and the stand-still of the Maharashtra power-generation system?
The Dabhol power purchase dispute originated long prior to the Enron
financial scandal, presenting peculiar facts and allegations, yet receiving
relatively modest attention, if any at all, from the U.S. investing or analyst
community, perhaps due to the fact that the dispute was couched as an
incident of a nation-state buyer’s default in a developing economy so far away,
with cultural and business practices so alien to the American mindset. Or,
perhaps it is widely known to the investing public and its analyst community
that such a project was non-recourse to Enron. The peculiar dispute was
reported by the international press as early as February 2001, when Dabhol
sought to invoke a $50 million sovereign guarantee provided by the Indian
government, allegedly because Maharashtra had refused to pay for Enron’s
power supply.368 Both the local and central governments refused to honor the
guarantee, citing as reasons Enron’s technical failures in meeting contractual
terms.369 The local utility buyer, in particular, complained about Enron’s
exceedingly high prices (often calculated in accordance with long-term
mathematical formula provided in the PPA).370 The dispute also halted the
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construction of Phase II of the power plant project.371 U.S. diplomats, at that
time, reportedly stood behind Enron, warning that India’s default on the
sovereign guarantee might endanger future FDI projects in the country.372
Apparently, the mighty name Enron, at that time, stood parallel to the
American interest.
The circumstances surrounding the Dabhol dispute might have
suggested not only Enron’s internal ills, but also a pattern of difficulties in the
relationship between the foreign power developer and Maharashtra’s
government buyer in the implementation of the relevant Power Purchase
Agreement. This problem could certainly be characterized and foreseen as a
materialized Political Risk. The risk, however, was not completely without
warning, yet the lenders involved did not seem to be affected by any such
warnings, judging from the scarcity of press reports relating any public reaction
by the relevant lending community. The Dabhol project had experienced
difficulty caused by the relationship between Enron and the local provincial
government right at the inception and during the early phases of the project.
The early signs of ills had generated a volume of rather scandalous publicity. As
of 1994, Dabhol was reported as the high-profiled power project that received
India’s full sovereign attention and promise of “fast-tracked approvals,”
evidenced ultimately by the 12-year guarantee provided by the central
government to make good any defaults on bills unpaid by the individual power
buyer-provincial state. Perhaps this sovereign support was all justified, since
the $2.6 billion project was conceived and made feasible by two brand-name
U.S. corporate giants – Enron Power Development Corp. of Houston, Texas, and
General Electric Co. of Fairfield, Connecticut (General Electric is the known
manufacturer-supplier of turbines and generators for power-generation
facilities).373 (The U.S.-based international engineering and construction firm,
Bechtel, was also allegedly involved in Dabhol as a contractor.)374
The Dabhol investment contract had been negotiated by Enron with a
previous state government headed by the then ruling political party, as part of
India’s national movement for economic reform commenced in 1991. The reform
movement allegedly replaced former socialist policies with more rigorous freeenterprise implementation to attract more foreign investment from the West.
Subsequently, there was a change of guards in local government leadership,
and, well into the fall of 1995, the new local officials in Maharashtra decided to
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cancel Dabhol, viewing it as “against the interest of the locale and its people.”375
Local officials claimed that the previous negotiation was one-sided and
whatever Enron wanted was granted to it. Likewise, the president of the
opposition party in India reportedly claimed that Enron executives took
advantage of economic reforms, and were doling out bribes and kickbacks to
Maharashtra state politicians in order to secure the power project.376
Notwithstanding the controversy, by 1996, Dabhol was reported as “back on
track,”377 and Enron resumed construction, after reducing the costs charged for
electricity in response to nationalist objections,378 and after receiving the
Maharashtra state’s formal offer to revive the cancelled project.379 In July of
1996, Dabhol received final approval and blessings from the Indian central
government.380 By 2001, the Dabhol project was shut down, and the heatedly
disputed income stream come to a definite stop.381
The “brand-name” pitfall of Project Financing goes beyond the type of
risk assessment errors that might have contributed to Dabhol’s depressing
story. The substantial size and impact of large-scaled Project-Financed
transactions make them a natural fit for sponsors that are major energy MNCs
who bring with them to the Third World their bankers, hotel chains,
international law firms, international accounting firms, international
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engineering firms, as well as other brand-name international contractors. In
fact, quite often, the banks, law firms, accounting firms, and other service
industries (the “Service Providers”) will go “Third World” first, in order to lay
out the support structure for their wealthy clients, who will then “go” second,
only after their comfort level has been satisfied via the work of the Service
Providers. The Service Providers will send to the “Third World” those employees
who uniquely can demonstrate cultural and linguistic abilities, as well as the
flexibility and courage to operate in “sub-standard” living and working
conditions of a transitional economy – those individuals that America’s
“diversity project” helps recruit. Quite often, when the Fortune 500 business
executive’s flight hits the “Third World” runway, their lawyers and accountants
are already lining up to greet him/her with their billable hours and timesheets.
The network of all these players works such that the players feed business to
one another to the exclusion of smaller entrepreneurs, except for those local
“privileged few” who are selected or recommended by the government due to
their close-knit connections with government officials, a suspect link that may
lead to the Fortune 500’s derivative liability under the U.S. Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (assuming that corporate “knowledge” of their local agents’ bad
acts can be established).382
Following is a specific example of how this close-knit network may work
to the great disadvantage of talents from the local community, using the law
practice as an illustration. In Vietnam (as the investment environment for our
1994 Vietnam Deal), except for a couple of small boutique international law
firms with established track record in the country prior to the Communist
takeover of 1975, small local law firms had no chance to compete with MNCs’
Service Providers. This was extremely ironic because the task of advising MNCs
involved the interpretation of esoteric Vietnamese law (often appearing on
yellow paper in types coming from a manual typewriter), which quite often
looked alien to lawyer trained in a developed jurisdiction. Yet in the early
1990s, the timeframe for our Vietnam Deal, the international law and
accounting firms, either U.S. or U.K. based, dominated the legal and business
advisory scenery in the country. The excuse used by the foreign investor
community was that either local law did not exist, was not enforced, did not
work for or apply to foreigners, or corporate clients had no comfort in using
local lawyers due to these lawyers’ Communist indoctrination and deficiency in
the Anglo-American capital market. These stereotypical assumptions were
made, even though (i) the local tort and criminal law of the host jurisdiction
had little to do with any Anglo-American capital market model,383 and even
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process, and whether the system of law is workable.
In general, in their “country report”-style of providing advisory services, international legal advisors to
foreign investors in the developing nations tend to focus on the countries’ civil and commercial law
systems (or lack thereof), as well as these countries’ memberships in the Multilateral and Bilateral
Institutions, rather than looking into the civil tort and criminal justice systems of the host countries. This
decision tends to reinforce Fortune 500 management and general counsel’s notion that what is important to
them is a country’s aspirations to invite foreign commercial interests. Hence, the Fortune 500’s focus is on
the investment climate and the country’s foreign investment and natural resource laws. These “commercial
interest” types of law receive General Counsels’ priority consideration, and are artificially segregated from
the country’s human rights and civil liberty records, or the relationship between a government and its own
citizens.
For the following two reasons, I seriously question the soundness and wisdom of this segregation. In my
view, the civil tort and criminal justice systems of a host country should be the first thing the international
counsel needs to look at, and this task requires the full cooperation and utilization of the native legal
scholars, regardless of differences in training or backgrounds.
First, criminal justice and civil tort systems, whether viewed as legally simplistic or complex and
sophisticated from the perspective of the U.S-trained lawyer, would provide the most direct and most
profound insight into a society and its curve of development, as these foundational systems speak for
human relations in society, the interaction between citizens and the State, and the role occupied by the
sovereign state in private lives.
Second, foreign investors and their employees do travel, live, work, and engage in economic and
commercial activities in the host nation. How can they then ignore the civil tort and criminal justice
systems that govern the general population, unless there is an implicit understanding that the foreign
investors are privileged or supreme citizens who are above the law?
In summary, I think that the “country report” accompanying the foreign investor to a foreign land should
begin with the country’s constitutional and political frameworks, as well as the country’s civil tort and
criminal justice systems. These topics require and demand the intimate involvement of, and constant
consultation with, the native lawyers during the client advisory process, right from the start of any FDI
projects.
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though (ii) both HaNoi and Ho Chi Minh City (the former capitalistic,
entrepreneurial Saigon, once fully exposed to America’s legal system and
constitutional framework) were inundated with middle-aged or senior-citizen
former lawyers well-trained in French civil and commercial law and/or Soviet
legal principles, which made up the then legal system of Vietnam. (Any capital
market model, in the hay days of Vietnam’s economic development, was being
drafted by government cadres in consultation with Western lawyers sent by the
new-coming investors, leaving the well-trained civil law and Soviet law scholars
of Vietnam as second-class citizens performing interpreter and translator roles,
at a minuscule fraction of the cost of an expatriate Western lawyer practicing
international business on Vietnam’s soil. Those Western IBT lawyers worked in
collaboration with their privileged few “local counsel” who were often highranking party members selected and recommended by the host government.)
The foregoing esoteric example involving the private international law
practice typifies the close-knit alliance of corporate brand-names that
disadvantages local talents. The same pattern of monopoly384 exists when
“brand-name” corporate players are involved in Project-Financed IPP
Transactions -the forming of a self-feeding network that dominates the
natural gas and utility sector in the “Third World.” A couple of law-school
hypotheticals can help demonstrate how the tendency to favor brand-name
corporate identities will inescapably and undoubtedly influence bankers’ risk
assessment process.
Hypothetical #1: Suppose that my students, Reid and Megan, want
to open a restaurant chain in the new Afghanistan. They would like to have a
Project-Financed loan from J.P. Morgan Chase (which, at the time this Article
was finalized, was contemplating acquisition of Banc One).385 Having learned
principles of Project Financing, Reid and Megan have managed to secure several
catering contracts from business offices in the new Afghanistan. Under each
contract, Reid & Megan, LLC, will provide hamburger lunches to all U.S.
expatriates craving for American food, and those native employeees who want a
“taste” of the American fast good culture. Reid & Megan will also handle
banquets for all these offices at each and every American holidays celebrated by
U.S. expatriates in Afghanistan. Under the terms of these catering contracts, for
the next five years, these businesses will pay for a minimum number of meals
all year round regardless of whether or not those meals are actually consumed
by their employees – a “Take or Pay” concept analogous to gas sales terms in
the energy sector: a gas buyer will pay for the supply, whether or not it actually
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Haven: Yale University Press 2000).
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takes delivery of the gas.386 These “Take or Pay” terms are to secure and
stabilize long-term supplies of a scarce and unpredictable commodity in a
seller’s market. These “Take or Pay” terms are possible because Reid & Megan
is the only supplier of hamburgers and American food in Afghanistan. The
income stream produced by these catering contracts is sufficient to pay for debt
services for the next five years.
Applying classic Project Financing principles, J.P. Morgan Chase should
have no problem financing the Reid & Megan deal, judging solely on the
economic viability of its restaurant and catering project (as evidenced by tightly
secured contractual rights producing a steady future income stream for five
years). Nonetheless, J.P. Morgan Chase bankers may inescapably be influenced
by the two youthful and non-famous project sponsors, who have not
demonstrated any experience in the food industry, in international business, or
in the country of Afghanistan. In classic Project Financing, none of those factors
should matter, since only the income-producing certainty of the project should
drive the risk assessment process. Nonetheless, there is a great chance that the
bank will still require Reid’s and Megan’s parents to guarantee the debt, or an
examination of at least two years’ financials by Reid & Megan showing its prior
income in the food service business, which my two entrepreneurial students do
not have. Reid & Megan LLC has no “brand-name” appeal or corporate
reputational identity, which apparently Enron of Houston had with respect to
its Dabhol project, prior to its scandalous collapse. The classic principles of
Project Financing might have been applied full force and favorably to Enron’s
Dabhol, but not to Reid & Megan. Yet, J.P.Morgan Chase may feel differently
when the name of Reid & Megan LLC is replaced with McDonald’s Corporation,
even if the project and its supporting catering contracts remain exactly the
same. Although corporate brand-name is undoubtedly a factor in any kind of
business judgment, here, in the context of Project Financing, it has diluted the
very principle underlying the funding concept – it is the project, not the project
sponsor, that should provide the basis for lending or collateralization.
Hypothetical No. 2: Assume further that Reid and Megan had been
able to pull together a group of petroleum engineers trained by the prestigious
School of Mines in Colorado. Together they formed a company to participate in
“Third World” natural gas and IPP investments via the procurement of finders’
fees or technical consulting contracts in exchange for a minimal equity interest
of approximately 0.1%. Suppose that they were able to procure such an interest
in a contemplated pipeline construction in the new Iraq. Again, my two
students went to J.P. Morgan Chase. The same dubious concerns might still
characterize the loan application process because of Reid & Megan, LLC.’s lack
of “brand-name” appeal and track record, even though under Project Financing
principles, bankers should be looking at the project, and not the project
sponsors. Suppose further that Reid & Megan switched their investment and
substituted Iraq with the Republic of Chad. The bankers might still be
reluctant. Suppose, finally, that Reid & Megan showed the bankers contracts

386
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between it and Exxon-Mobil, guaranteeing Reid & Megan’s finder’s fee in the
pipeline and oil production project currently undergoing in Chad, which already
received Multilateral Funding, and was co-sponsored by Exxon-Mobil,
Chevron-Texaco, and Shell.387 The bankers might just change their view about
Reid & Megan’s Project Finance eligibility at that time, having been influenced
by (i) the “brand-name” appeal, credibility and glory of Exxon-Mobil as a
Fortune 5 entity, (ii) the mighty strength of the de facto “oil cartel” behind the
Chad project; and (ii) the added assurances of Multilateral Financing already
accorded to the overall project and the host country.
I have taken the liberty of speculating on what J.P.Morgan Chase
bankers might have done with my two students and their Limited Liability
Company, only to illustrate my point: Project Financing can operate as an
exclusive privilege for corporate giants and sponsors of large-scaled projects. To
fully realize the goals of free enterprise and to maximize the best utility of
Project Financing as a stimulant for “Third World” economic development, the
concept must apply with rigor and fairness to the smaller entrepreneurs who
take a chance with a “Third World” investment environment. The Multilateral
Institutions, in their free-enterprise economic mission, should provide the
fullest support to these small foreign or native entrepreneurships. This can only
be done if the Multilaterals regard economic development projects and related
infrastructure building in a broader and more flexible light. Without such
multilateral support and a breakthrough in real-world application of Project
Financing, very few small or medium-sized entrepreneurs can afford to compete
against, for instance, the consortium of Exxon-Mobil, Shell/Dutch Royal Group,
Bp-Amoco, and Chevron-Texaco in poverty-stricken Chad..Nor could any
entrepreneurships formed by returning East Indian Americans have competed
successfully against mighty Enron executives in the mid-1990s in a project like
Dabhol, which turned out to be a sour experience for India. When these smaller
entrepreneurs could successfully raise funding, or pull together their lifetime
savings to pursue their “American dream” in the “Third World,” they would
most likely become the easy targets for bribery requests, or selective adverse
material governmental action (MAGA), since typically they had no “brand-name”
corporate clout to protect them, unless they somehow could tap into an existing
network of governmental connections and benefits, which in all likelihood might
carry grave FCPA implications. The smaller, independent entrepreneurs taking
a chance with the “Third World” would operate in the worst risk scenarios.
In the experience of Vietnam, a good number of disappointed and
bankrupt Vietnamese American entrepreneurs (or returning Vietnamese
expatriates from other developed nations such as France or Canada) have
become witness to the failed American dream. For example, on May 15, 2003,
the Wall Street Journal reported the sad story of two young Vietnamese who
returned to their former home from their adopted home overseas in order to
successfully operate a telecommunications business, after helping Nokia and
Samsung obtain an 80% share of the local market.388 (The popularity and high
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usage of cellular phone in developing nations may surprise the American
public, but the high usage may also include volumes of international, longdistance, and business calls made by the business and expatriate
community.)389 According to the Wall Street Journal, the brothers’ newly formed
company allegedly surged to $40 million in sale in 2002, but their success story
did not last long. The Vietnamese government recently arrested both young
entrepreneurs, accusing them of tax invasion and confiscating their business
and inventory – something that it would probably not have done to Fortune 500
executives who might legitimately have got paid offshore for services rendered in
the country. Countless similar stories never made it to the Wall Street Journal
for the benefit of the observing public. They became part of the continuing
untold sad stories of exiled Vietnamese after half a century of war and
bloodshed that had sent them away from their former home. Neither the allure
of the “American Dream” nor the ennobled economic development of their root
culture has saved these daring entrepreneurs from heartaches and
bankruptcies.
In summary, the instigation of small business involvement in “Third
World” economic development must be the joint project for the multilateral
community, the private lending community, as well as governmental agencies of
the home jurisdiction (entities such as the Small Business Administration or
various state authorities and Chambers of Commerce in the U.S). In the new
global age, new visions and new roles for the smaller or medium-sized
entrepreneurship must be born. In its purest form as an economic development
stimulant, Non-Recourse Project Financing, after all, should not be just a
benefit and risk transfer mechanism for conglomerates of the powerful and the
rich.
###
PART C
REFLECTION, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSION:
THE ROAD TO TRAVEL
The Need for Reflection
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I have by now unveiled before you certain transactional legal issues that
may conttribute to the pattern of “Third World” economic development projects
in the petroleum and energy sector. The lawyer plays a pivotal role in the
forming of such pattern. This role deserves some reassessment.
The prospect of an equitable global economy was envisioned half a
century ago when the Bretton Woods Multilateral Institutions were created in
the aftermath of World War Two and the global depression. The World Bank has
since proclaimed, as its motto, that its “Dream is A World Free of Poverty.”390
The new millennium calls for an examination, empirically and conceptually, of
this mission’s progress, not as a critique of the World Bank, but rather as a
suggested focus for researchers of the global economy. 391
Recent events have afforded the American public an opportunity to
reassess the role played by corporate America in foreign relations and “Third
World” economic development. I recall seeing an interview of school children on
national TV during the September 11 crisis. One schoolgirl asked the
interviewer: “Why do those people hate us so much?”
The program ended there without an answer.
I am not sure there can ever be a comfortable or exhaustive answer to
the child’s question. On network television back then, in the heart of the
September 11 national wound and the peak of patriotism, it was not the kind of
question we wanted to face. But the innocent question brought to our
consciousness the perplexing root causes of anti-American sentiments that
fertilized extremists’ atrocious behaviors, in an era where supposedly all worlds
should become one. In searching for an answer to the child’s question, it is
natural to focus our attention on U.S. foreign policies.392 What can easily be
overlooked is the role of that “Quiet American”393 who, outside the political
arena, has long contributed to the image of Americans abroad.
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Among these “Quiet Americans” are the corporate executive and his/her
corporate lawyer, both of whom jointly map global development for profit. They
travel to remote locations of distinctive ancient cultures to strike deals.394 In the
discrete ways that often characterize economic confidential negotiation, they
become de facto ambassadors of the American way of life and the showcase of
its influence abroad. Quite often, and acceptably so, cultural sensitivity is
overshadowed by economic goals. But it goes without saying that in order to
participate in the global economy, it is no longer adequate for an international
executive and his/her lawyer just to surround themselves with their
international “Service Providers.” Nor is it adequate for the pair to arm
themselves with a manual, “Doing Business in XYZ jurisdiction,” or a nicely
compiled “country report” on a nation’s foreign investment legal framework and
governmental structure, often curiously described in American legal jargon.
If this is not enough, what will, then? The gravity of contemporary
geopolitical issues and the complexity of today’s world necessitate a
reorientation of perspectives and outlook.395
Five Suggestions:
I advocate the following five points, as part of what I consider an overall,
systematic “public interest” approach to international deal-making.
1)

Systematic Training on Multiculturalism for the International
Business Executive or Legal
Practitioner, and Rewriting the
Agenda of MNC Corporate Counsel

Both the IBT executive and his/her lawyer should be trained on
multiculturalism, and made cognizant of their “de facto ambassador” role. This
training should be similar to the training of foreign service officers without the
political overtone.396 I think of the traveling corporate executive and lawyer
specializing in “Third World” projects as those who have taken the “road less
traveled” envisioned by Robert Frost.397 On such road less traveled, the traveler
394
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encounters burdens as well as benefits. More exotic life opportunities present
unconventional responsibilities. The “de facto ambassador” role goes with the
job, regardless of choice, because our world is getting extremely complex from
all fronts, and all actors have become interdependent.
Likewise, the agenda of corporate counsel should be reevaluated and
rewritten. It is no longer sufficient to devise minimal legal compliance. The
artificial division between non-economic human rights concerns and private
economic law is already blurred and should be alleviated, because, at the end of
the day, for the transnational corporation, both platforms can be translated into
contingent or actual liabilities and monetary losses.
Many strata of the international community see the aspirational rule of
law, whether it be public or private international law, as the rule that serves
humanity. A “post-industrial sensibility” throughout the developed countries is
being called to the center stage of policy-making, toward the search for some
sort of a moral consensus in a world of differences and in the aftermath of
several corporate scandals and tragic world events.398 Part of the challenge is
the articulation of a “corporate morality” attached to a legal fiction such as the
corporation. As an English jurist once declared, “corporations have neither
bodies to be punished, nor souls to be condemned. They therefore do as they
like.”399
But even if such moral consensus may be far from reality, undoubtedly
and justifiably, issues such as international human rights, cultural property,
and environmental issues should be part of the corporate counsel’s agenda,
considering, inter alia, the recent spur of class action lawsuits against U.S.based corporations by foreign workers, and recent United Nations’ renewed
human rights initiatives.400 Specifically, companies in the extractive industry

398

William M. Sullivan, “Morality in America,” The Responsive Community at 79-82 (Fall 2002),
reviewing Alan Wolfe, Moral Freedom: The Search for Virtue in a World of Choice (New York: W.W.
Norton 2001); Lawrence E. Mitchell & Theresa A. Gabaldon, “If I Only Had a Heart: Or, How Can We
Identify a Corporate Morality,” 76 TUL.L.REV. 1645 ) (2001-2002); Beth Stephens, “The Amorality of
Profit: Transnational Corporations and Human Rights,” 2002 Berkley J. Int’l L.45 (Stefan A. Riesenfeld
Symposium 2001).
399

Edward, 1st Baron Thurlow, English Jurist and Lord Chancellor (1731-1806).

400

Jenna Greene, “Gathering Storm: Suits that Claim Overseas Abuse Are Putting U.S. Executives on
Alert and Their Lawyers on Call; “Plaintiffs Using 18th Century Law Against Companies” (Legal Times
July 21, 2003) (discussing foreign plaintiffs’ suits against MNCs based on Alien Tort Claims Act:
ExxonMobil was sued over the hiring of Indonesian solders as security guards; Unocal was sued over
Burma pipeline; IBM was charged with supplying computers that enabled South African government to
create devices to control black population; Ford Motor, General Motor, and Daimler Chrysler were named
for providing armored vehicles to patrol townships; Citigroup, J.P. Morgan Chase, and Credit Suisse were
sued for providing funding to South Africa to expand its police apparatus). See also Sub-Commission on
the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2002), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/2/55sub.htm. Accord

143

have recently become the renewed target of scrutiny due to lawsuits brought
under the Alien Tort Claims Act.401 It is incongruent to have U.S. public interest
lawyers and workers of INGOs and NGOs running around a developing country
advocating and monitoring human rights compliance, while U.S. corporate
executives are ignoring that aspect of reality, and, instead, concentrate solely
on negotiating, outwitting, and partnering with the “monarch.” A short-term
profit focus or the rush toward deal closings, without considering the real
party-in-interest – the inhabitants of the developing economies -- is the shortsighting of ultimate corporate goals and accountability. Corporations are
citizens of every market and community in which they operate. In the U.S., the
same message has been spoken through the doctrine of social responsibility,
made applicable to the corporation’s role by state incorporation statutes as well
as by caselaw.402 Similarly, aspirational international law also recognizes the
doctrine of corporate social responsibility via the “social contract” theory – that
the multinational corporation, by doing business, enters into a “social contract”
between it and the host society.403
2)

Expanded Ethical Concepts Governing Lawyers to Accommodate A
Legal Transnational Practice

To date, the role of the international business transactional (IBT) lawyer
in ““Third World”” economic development remains at best an elusive mystique.
Her job involves an undecipherable, esoteric specialty in the eye of the
international legal community. Two reasons explain the myth about the IBT
practice: First, the number of truly full-time IBT lawyers is relatively small
compared to the legal community at large.404 Second, what they actually do can
be as imprecise and incomprehensibly exotic as the flexible nature of the
curriculum of IBT courses in accredited law schools, quite often shaped by the
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individual view and previous work or research experience of the professor who
teaches the course. The mystique is not clarified any better by the generally
vague and non-standardized publicity material of law firms that hold
themselves out as having an “international practice.”405 While the practice or
teaching of torts, contracts or criminal law can definitively be contoured, IBT
can be anything that involves a cross-border touch or emphasis: the highly
structured administrative practice of international trade concentrated in
Washington, D.C., the mammoth documentation of bank financing performed
at a lawyer’s desk in New York City, the “quickie” finalization of an international
sale on a form invoice and purchase order anywhere in the U.S., the intensive,
nerve-wrecking negotiation of oil and gas interests in remote locations of the
earth, or simply the routine handling of a business immigration visa by a smalltown practitioner.
U.S. courts as well as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have
recognized licensed practitioners as “officers of the court,”406 owing
responsibilities not only to clients, but also to the integrity of the profession and
the justice system symbolized by the bench and the courthouse. The concept of
lawyers as “officers of the court” should have its counterpart in a transnational
practice.407 The IBT lawyer should be cloaked with the responsibility, not only to
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zealously advance the cause of her client, but also to make a contribution to the
goals of harmonizing national laws, toward the building of a “rule of law”
system accepted by the “civilized nations.”408 Whether or not IBT lawyers go to
court, they should be made cognizant of their role as “officers” or “members” of
such an international legal community working toward and sharing the “rule of
law” common to all civilized systems of national laws. The public interest
(concepts of ordre publique in civil law)409 should not just be used to defend
national sovereignty. Ordre publique should underlie the continued development
of the “internationalization” and “legalization” trends, but only toward
acceptance of a nucleus of universal legal concepts constituting modern
international law, whether economic or humanitarian.
At the negotiation table, notwithstanding the IBT lawyer’s role as zealous
advocate for her investor-client, she is, and should be in the best position to
strike the balance between private profit incentives and the public interest. In
the effective representation of her client, she should also be mindful of the
overall ethical duty to advance the public good. This “double hat” function is
implicit in the role of any lawyer, domestic or international. The notion,
however, should eventually be expressed or incorporated explicitly in modern
Codes of Professional Responsibilities all around the nation, as well as by the
various voluntary bars, in order to accurately reflect the realities of today’s
global economy.
3)

Use of Voluntary Corporate Compliance Programs as a Means to
Police MNCs’ Conduct, under a “Management-Based/Enforced SelfRegulation” Model.

The enforceability of a “Universal Code of Multinational Corporate
Conduct” project has been talked about for years, among U.N. work groups as
well as among institutions and legal academia.410 Still, the project has not
uncertainties). For a comparative analysis of the international legal practice, see Peter Roorda, “The
Internationalization of the Practice of Law,” 28 Wake Forest L.Rev. 141 (1993). See also Lauren Frank,
“Ethical Responsibilities and the International Lawyer: Mind the Gaps,” 2000 U.Ill.L.Rev. 957 (2000).
408

Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, Section 102 (1987).

With respect to ethical issues involving corporate counsel, see, generally, Ralph Nader & Wesley J. Smith,
No Contest – Corporate Lawyers and the Perversion of Justice in America, xxiv-xv (1996); Cf. George A.
Riemer, “Zealous Lawyers: Saints or Sinners, 59 Ore. St. Bar Bull. 32, 32 (1998); Lawrence J. Fox,
“Lawyers’ Ethics According to Nader: Let the Corporate Clients Beware,” 12 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 367,
372-73 (1999); Ronald Gilson, “Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing,” 94
Yale L.J. 239, 241-43 (1984) (“When my question – what does a business lawyer really do – is put to
business lawyers, the familiar response is that they ‘protect’ their clients, that they get their clients the
‘best’ deal...”).
409

See, e.g., See, e.g. Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (EEC) Art. 16 (1980)
(incorporating concept of “Ordre Publique” in convention’s language).

410

See The Global Compact, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/Portal/; The Global Compact is a voluntary
corporate citizenship initiative seeking to support nine labor, human rights, and environmental principles.
Proposed by U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan and launched at U.N. Headquarters in New York on July
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become a reality. If we cannot come to an enforceable consensus of how to
govern the conduct of MNCs, then we must let them govern themselves, and
oversee that self-imposed process.411
I suggest that the overseeing function start with the MNC’s home
jurisdiction, and that a “management-based,” “enforced self-regulation,” or
“mandated self-regulation” model be utilized as the legal framework to address
this perplexing challenge.412 Such a “management-based” regulatory model, to
be administered by the MNC’s home jurisdiction,413 should utilize the MNC’s
voluntary “corporate compliance policies and programs” (already in existence in
most, if not all, U.S.-based publicly traded companies) as the tool to achieve
regulatory social goals.414 The end result I hope for is the “double dosage” of
public scrutiny so that MNCs will impose upon themselves a “public interest”
approach to international deal-making. (My hope is built, first, on the commonsense philosophy that humans’ desire to “look good” before a scrutinizing
audience is just as strong as their desire to become powerful and rich; and,
second, on the more sophisticated philosophy underlying U.S. corporate
securities “disclosure” law – that full and accurate “disclosure” results in the

26, 2000, the Compact is not a regulatory instrument. It does not police, enforce, or measure corporate
behaviors; see also The CERES Principles (endorsed by 19 U.S.-based publicly traded companies and
directed by U.S.-based institutional investors, public interest groups, and environmental organizations)
(UNCTAD.1999b); Draft Commentary on the Norms of Responsibility of Transnational Corporations and
Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/XX,
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/WG.2/WP.1. See also The Social Responsibility of Transnational Corporations (U.N.
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 1999); Jamie Cassels, “Outlaws: Multinational
Corporations and Catastrophic Law,” 31 Cumb. L. rev. 311 (Cordell Hull Speakers Forum 2000-2001)
(discussing Union Carbide catastrophe in Bhopal, India; pointing out that both international law and
voluntary codes of conduct are general statements of unenforceable principles).
411

Ans Kolk, Rob van Tulder & Carlijn Welters, “International Code of Conduct and Corporate Social
Responsibility: Can Transnational Corporations Regulate Themselves?” 8 Transn’l corp. No. 1, 143-180
(April 1999). See also Kathryn Gordon, “The OECD Guidelines and Other Corporate Responsibility
Instruments: A Comparison” (OECD Dec. 2001), and “Codes of Conduct – Exploring Their Economic
Significance” (OECD May 11, 2001), found at http://www.oecd.org/dtaoecd/0/15/2681579.pdf (OECD
initiative: comparison of MNCs’ codes of conduct), and http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/46/36/2075173.pdf
(OECD publication of MNC code of conduct and guidelines).
412

Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, “Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to
Achieve Public Goals,” 37 Law & Society No. 4, 691, 694-95 (2003) (citing Ian Ayres & John
Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (New York: Oxford Univ.
Press 1992); John Braithwaite, “Enforce Self-Regulation: A New Strategy for Corporate Crime Control,”
80 Mich. L.Rev. 1466-1507 (1982).
See also, e.g., Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, “Environmental Management Systems and the New
Policy Agenda,” in C. Coglianese & J. Nash, eds., Regulating from the Inside: Can Environmental
Management Systems Achieve Policy Goals? (Wash. D.C. Resources for the Future Press 2001).

413

Elisa Westfield, “Globalization, Governance,and Multinational Enterprise Responsibility,: Corporate
Codes of Conduct in the 21st Century,” 42 VIR. J. INT’L L. 1075 (2002) (advocating cooperative approach
between MNCs and headquarters’ government).
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I will save the precise or detailed construct of the model for another day.
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best balancing of market forces toward the self-correction of inefficiencies and
defects.)415
The “management-based” model of “enforced self-regulation” has been
presented and debated in both management and legal academic literatures, in
connection with different issues such as environmental or product safety
concerns. Also called “mandated self-regulation,” the model allows regulators
to intervene at management’s planning stage (rather than at the output stage).
The model aims to achieve regulatory social goals by allowing management to
exercise its creativity in performing a “self-critical analysis and evaluation” of
the organization’s internal programs.416 Whether regulators will approve,
ratify, or review management plans, or otherwise require subsequent auditors’
certification of compliance will distinguish a “management-based” approach
from a traditional “information disclosure” approach, although both models
seek to provide greater availability of information to a concerned public. The
“management-based” approach places the responsibility for decision-making
and program design with those who possess the most information on risks and
the control of risks. This model can be less costly and more effective than
traditional government-imposed standards, and can improve employee morale
and cooperation, since workers will tend to look at their own organization’s
rules as being more “reasonable” than onerous government-imposed rules.417
The model also helps mitigate problems associated with limited government
resources and creates incentives for firms to seek innovative solutions.418
The term “management-based” distinguishes the model from specific
government regulations directed at firms’ output performances. In its most
flexible form, management-based regulation need not be regulation at all, but
rather serves as a voluntary option for firms. Market forces will cause firms to
voluntarily devise, create, and comply. Because the model shifts the focus of
policy-making from governments to private parties, it should be viewed as a

415

For a detailed capture of federal and state implementation of the disclosure philosophy, see J. Robert
Brown, The Regulation of Corporate Disclosure (3d Ed. Aspen 2002), in particular Section 2.01, at p. 2-3
(regulatory environment and historical perspective).

416

The notion of “self-critical analysis” has been implemented in the securities industry’s self compliance
programs in order to help the securities broker-dealer firms satisfy their legal duty to supervise and to
police their own staff. Broker-dealers’ self-compliance programs serve regulatory preventive purposes,
create effective compliance means by placing compliance functions within the firm’s normal operations,
accommodate the particular needs and circumstances of the firm, incorporate businessmen and women’s
creativity by cloaking them with regulatory power, and hence constitute a better means to monitor and
achieve compliance goals. See, e.g., John Walsh, “Right the First Time: Regulation, Quality, and
Preventive Compliance in the Securities Industry,” 1997 Col. Bus. L. Rev. 165.
417

Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, “Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to
Achieve Public Goals,” 37 Law & Society Rev. No. 4, 691, 694-95 (2003) (citing Ian Ayres & John
Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (New York: Oxford Univ.
Press 1992); John Braithwaite, “Enforce Self-Regulation: A New Strategy for Corporate Crime Control,”
80 Mich. L.Rev. 1466-1507 (1982).

418

Colgianese & Lazer, 37 Law & Society Rev. No. 4 at p. 696.
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regulating strategy, rather than a body of statutory or regulatory criteria. This
type of strategic governmental intervention is often needed to address some of
more intractable public policy concerns, for which governments have not been
able to design uniform standards. The down side of the model lies in the fact
that it does not necessarily guarantee optimal result – firms may just go
through the motions or “game,” or simply consider the new law an additional
nuisance, turning the “regulator” into a business “risk.”419 The inherently
adversarial nature of the relationship between businesses and their government
in the U.S. has prompted a small number of authors to suggest an alternative
“cooperative approach” to the interaction between the regulator and the
regulated -- a model more typically observed in Europe and Japan. These
authors urge policymakers and the academy to utilize a comparative method to
the study of regulatory models across borders, although the jury is still out
concerning the efficacy of cooperative methods of legal enforcement.420 Other
authors have urged, overall, a “consultative and cooperative” preferred
approach to the development and implementation of international standards for
the global community, as part of the “legalization” movement.421
An effective management-based model will depend on the types of
mandates regulators choose for various purposes, as well as the extent of
government involvement or oversight included in the model. Such mandates
must aim to create incentives for a “cooperative” model of enforcement that
improves the regulated entity’s public image, client base, and business goodwill,
rather than the traditional adversarialism in which businesses view regulators
as “nuisances,” “risks,” or “threats” to their existence, or simply an impediment
to their thriving economic growth. To be effective, the mandates chosen must be
aimed at the areas of overlap between firms’ private interests and the public
interest in order for maximize the model’s benefit.

419

In the most recent survey of some 1,394 CEOs globally during the fourth quarter of 2003, “overregulation” was rated as the number one risk by CEOs (the biggest threat to their business). Global
terrorism was rated as the fifth risk factor. See Marc Champion, “CEO’s Worst Nightmares: An Old
Bogeyman Replaces Terrorists Atop the List: Regulators” (Wall Street Journal Jan 21, 2004).

420

See, e.g., Regulatory Encounters: Multinational Corporations and American Legal Adversarialism, Ed.
By Robert A. Kagan and Lee Axelrad. (University of California Press: Berkeley, Los Angeles and London
(2000), reviewed by Sidney A. Shapiro, 50 Amer. J. Comp. L. 229 (2002). See also Sanford M. Jacoby,
“Corporate Governance in Comparative Perspective: Prospects for Convergence,” 22 Comp. Labor L. &
Policy J. 5 (2000) (comparing models of corporate governance between the U.S., Japan, and western
Europe in order to assess trends of convergence). It should be noted, however, that the strong U.S.
economy in sharp contrast to the more mediocre Japanese and European economies in the last decade may
tend to imply the superiority of the U.S. model, if efficiency and wealth optimization are the standards for
evaluating governance models. Overall, more concise studies and better empirical data are needed to
render meaningful conclusions to the comparative analysis. Id. at 25-32.

421

See, e.g., Herbert V. Morais, “The Quest for International Standards: Global Governance vs.
Sovereignty,” 50 Kansas L.Rev. 779, 815 (2002). Accord Elisa Westfield, “Globalization, Governance,and
Multinational Enterprise Responsibility,: Corporate Codes of Conduct in the 21st Century,” 42 VIR. J.
INT’L L. 1075 (2002) (advocating cooperative approach between MNCs and headquarters’ government).
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One such area of overlap can be inferred from the fact that U.S.-based
MNCs have long voluntarily devised corporate compliance policies and programs
to curtail and police employee conducts, as well as to ensure compliance with
existing U.S. laws and foreign laws where MNCs do business.422 (The same selfcompliance trend and practice have long been established in the broker-dealer
securities industry).423 These policies and programs are part of MNCs’ legal
defenses in litigation or in the event a government investigation is initiated.
Where legal liability is found, these policies and programs can be taken into
consideration by the judicial officer under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.424
Continuous emphasis on compliance training has already dominated the
lives of international business executives and lawyers, considering the complex
regulatory framework of U.S. laws with extraterritorial effects, among which are
the Department of Commerce’s export control, Department of Treasury’s foreign
asset control, Department of State’s munition control, and the joint effort of the
Department of Justice and the Securities & Exchange Commission over foreign
corrupt practices.425 This emphasis has amply been evidenced by the wide
range of corporate compliance programs in place in today’s MNCs’ internal
reg
ulations, 426 as well as by the myriad of widely advertised continuing
education programs organized by the American Practicing Law Institute (PLI).427

422

See The Social Responsibility of Transnational Corporations (U.N. Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) 1999) (discussing Shell/Royal Dutch Group’s and Mattel, Inc.’s self-imposed
codes of conduct); see also ChevronTexaco’s Corporate Responsibility Report, found at
and
http://www.chevrontexaco.com/cr_report/overview_strategy/about_this_report.asp,
http://www.chevrontexaco.com/cr_report/social_issues/.

423

John Walsh, “Right the First Time: Regulation, Quality, and Preventive Compliance in the Securities
Industry,” 1997 Col. Bus. L. Rev. 165.

424

United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual section 8A1.2, Commentary 3(k); accord
Don Zarin, Doing Business Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (PLI 1999), at 10-2.
425

See, e.g.,Michael Deal, “Tactical and Practical Considerations in Defending Export control
Enforcement Actions,” 15 Int’l Q. No. 2, 163-188 (April 2003); Peter Fitzgerald, “Hidden Dangers in the
E-Commerce Data Mine: Governmental Customer and Trading Partner Screening Requirements,” 35 The
Int’l Lawyer No. 1, 47-70 (Spring 2001) (identifying all governmental regulations and control over export
shipments and outbound international business transactions). See also Notes 76-80 and 440-448, supra
(identifying U.S. laws with extraterritorial effects and governmental control over business transactions as a
result of U.S. economic sanctions taken against foreign nations).
426

For General Electric’s compliance program, see
http://www.ge.com/en/commitment/ehs/compliance/ehs_compliance.htm. Enron’s Code of Ethics and
Corporate Compliance Policy are now available on-line following the scandal, illustrating the lips service
exhibited by certain members of Enron management.
http://www.thesmokinggun.com/graphics/packageart/enron/enron.pdf
427

For various Practicing Law Institutions courses on corporate compliance for international business, see,
http://www.pli.edu.
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In the marketplace, these voluntary corporate compliance policies and
programs have either stated the “bare-bone” minimum expectations, or they
have voluntarily included all aspirations for a higher and more detailed level of
legal compliance and ethics. Or, quite often, publicly traded corporations have
fluctuated their written policy statements and programs on a spectrum between
the two extremes. I suggest that new law in the home jurisdiction be enacted,
requiring publicly traded corporations to devise and disclose corporate
compliance programs designed specifically for their investments and economic
conduct overseas. The contents of these programs, however, are completely
voluntary. These international business corporate compliance programs will be
required by the new law to be reported and filed with an overseeing nonpartisan Commission appointed by the President, serving a set term.428 These
voluntary programs will serve as the self-imposed standards for U.S.-based
multinational corporations. The public will be able to scrutinize these selfimposed programs, which subject the MNCs to constant scrutiny and pressure
by the poll of community opinion. This disclosure law serves to increase the
level of public exposure, awareness, and more constant idea-stimulating
debates. In other words, MNCs are given a free hand to set their own standards.
Once the standards are set, MNCs will be motivated to implement them via
measurable programs, if all such programs are required by law to be disclosed
to the public. The ensuing public debate will lead to self-regulation. Since MNCs
are already competing against one another for favorable public opinion, under
this model, eventually industries will come up with their own universal code of
conduct.
The proposal that the SEC should impose upon U.S.-based MNCs social
accounting and social audit obligations and disclosures, at least with respect to
environmental and civil rights issues, has already been injected into academic
discourse and legal advocacy since the 1970s.429 Likewise, the concept of
corporations’ self-governance and voluntary compliance with social goals has
recently been brought to the attention of policymakers. The Clinton

428

The concept of an ad hoc governmental work group formed to review or scrutinize corporate data for a
specific purpose and as part of a voluntary “notification” process initiated by the companies is already
present in U.S. law. For example, under the Exon-Florio amendment to the Defense Production Act of 1950
(enacted as part of the Omnibus Trade and competitiveness Act of 1988), the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States (CFIUS) is an ad hoc governmental body acting as delegatee of the
President to review incoming foreign investment and protect the U.S.’s national security interests. See
Exon-Florio Amendment to the 1988 Trade Act, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 5021, 102 Stat. 1425 (1988)
(codified at 50 U.S.C. app. 2170 [hereinafter "Exon-Florio," or "the Amendment," or "Exon-Florio
Amendment"].
The issue of whether a new government body should be created, or whether the SEC should undertake the
oversight function, is reserved for another day.
429

Cynthia A. Williams, “The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency,”
112 HARV.L.REV. 1197, 1273-99 (1999); Douglas M. Branson, “Progress in the Art of Social Accounting
and Other Arguments for Disclosure on Corporate Social Responsibility,” 29 VAND.L.REV. 539, 580-627
(1976). Advocates went to court to urge corporate disclosure requirements on environmental and civil
rights compliance, but the SEC prevailed in resisting such efforts. Branson, 76 TUL. L. REV. 12071,
1220-21 (2001-02).
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Administration issued the Model Business Principles in 1994, although the
Principles did not provide for implementation or enforcement, and in 1997, it
approved the apparel industry’s Workplace Code of Conduct, which reflected an
agreement between the industry and various human rights groups.430 In 1997,
two legislative proposals were tabled for U.S. lawmakers toward the goal of
establishing voluntary codes of conduct for corporations, although neither was
enacted into laws. The notable trend, as pointed out by a commentator, has
been to encourage proactive self-regulated solutions volunteered by MNCs as an
effort to correct or enhance their public corporate image, at least in the
consumer goods and manufacturing sector and in the community of
governmental contractors.431 The public benefit of encouraging corporations’
voluntary disclosure and self-compliance programs with respect to antidiscrimination laws has also been tabled by commentators for public
debates.432
In whatever form the final regulatory model may take, voluntary
corporate compliance programs must extend beyond minimal compliance with a
set of U.S. laws having mandatory extraterritorial effect. Specifically, the
program should include detailed mandatory training for key expatriate and
international business personnel on international relations, multiculturalism,
cultural sensitivity, and geopolitical awareness, as I have suggested above.433
These compliance programs may also include what the MNC views as its goals,
responsibilities, and implemention of self-imposed guidelines governing the
MNC’s international workforce, foreign asset base, and investment strategies.
The disclosure must be made under the “Plain English” rule, a principle already
incorporated into the SEC’s disclosure requirements and guidance.434 As
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U.S. State Department, Promoting the Model Business Principles, found at
http://ww.state/gov/ww/about_stat/business/businss_principles.html&gvt, cited in Elisa Westfield,
“Globalization, Governance, and Multinational Enterprise Responsibility,: Corporate Codes of Conduct in
the 21st Century,” 42 VIR. J. INT’L L. 1075 (2002); tim Shorrock, “Workplace Agreement Gets White
House Nod., J.COM. April 15, 1997 at 5A; Bob Herbert, “In America: A Good Start,” N.Y. Times, April
14, 1997.
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Elisa Westfield, “Globalization, Governance, and Multinational Enterprise Responsibility,: Corporate
Codes of Conduct in the 21st Century,” 42 VIR. J. INT’L L. 1075, 1098-1101 (2002); Good Corporate
Citizenship and Federal Procurement Incentives Act, H.R. 2071, 105th Cong. (1st Sess. 1997); Corporate
Code of Conduct Act, H.R. 2782, 107th Cong. (2001) (previously introduced in June 2000 as the Corporate
Code of Conduct Act, H.R. 4596, 106th Cong. (2000).
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See,e.g., Cheryle Wade, “Racial Discrimination and the Relationship Between the Directorial Duty of
Care and Corporate Disclosure,” 63 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 389 (2002).
433

Cf. David Kahane, “Dispute Resolution and the Politics of Cultural Generalization,” Negotiation
Journal 5-27 (January 2003) (advocating the use of multicultural contexts in devising deliberative processes
for dispute resolution and negotiation, even if generalizations about cultural identifies and values must be
utilized for lack of a better alternative).
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See Plain English Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 38,164 (Jan. 14,1997), adopted in Exchange
Act Release No. 39, 593 (Jan. 29, 1998).
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Professor Jacqueline Lang Weaver has lamented, “the key to preventing Enrontype scandals is disclosure...[but] [w]hat good is disclosure of something that
almost no one can understand?” 435
In summary, socially responsible citizenship in the world community by
corporate America has an important role to play in the global economy. Short of
an accepted universal Code of Conduct, the regulatory model to be used for
governing MNCs should start with the home jurisdiction, modeled after the
enforced self-regulation approach I discussed above. The model will turn the
burden of being regulated into an opportunity for corporate America to
showcase its social responsibility voluntary compliance.436 Ultimately, the selfregulation model must be elevated to a global level as part of the “legalization”
or “internationalization” movement, and hence should not remain solely with
the home jurisdiction. In other words, similar self-regulation models should be
implemented in the Northern hemisphere (where most MNCs were formed or
headquartered), among the developed nations sharing the same policy
concerns. Otherwise, anamolous inequity will exist among MNCs. For example,
U.S.-based MNCs will be burdened with the cost of funding and implementing
the self-regulation model, whereas other MNCs may be able to escape such
financial burdens simply because their home jurisdictions have not endorsed
the same or similar model. This will result in the loss of competitive
disadvantage for U.S.-based companies, causing them to be demoralized, and
rendering the self-regulatory model ineffective.
4)

Integration of Certain Prophylactic Principles of Law into the
International Deal-Making and the “Legalization” Movement

The analysis of transactional patterns portrayed in this Article lends
itself to certain legal concepts that can drastically change the landscape of
current legal and business norms. However, the time and space constraint of
this Article, as the beginner of a series, does not permit me to explore these
legal solutions here in depth. I will, however, summarize my suggested legal
solutions here, as a starter for further discussion elsewhere or on another day.
Consistent with the “source” doctrine in international law,437 certain
general principles of law common to civilized nations should be incorporated
into modern transnational economic law. Specifically, to help safeguard against
the potential ills explored in this Article, the following three legal concepts
should govern certain types of business partnership between “Third World”
governments and the private sector.
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Jacqueline Lang Weaver, “Can Energy Markets Be Trusted? The Effect of The Rise and Fall of Enron
on Energy Markets?” 4 Houston Bus. & Tax L.J. 1, 147 (2004).
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Accord Herbert V. Morais, “The Quest for International Standards: Global Governance vs.
Sovereignty,” 50 Kansas L.Rev. 779, 816 (2002) (advocating shifting part of the burden of
enforcing standards to the marketplace that has more effective incentives for compliance and performance).
437

Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, Section 102 (1987).
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a) The “Public Trust” theory and Government as the People’s Agent:
Property collectively belonging to the people is held in a “public trust”
administered by the sovereign state.438 In industries where the state claims
resource ownership for the “people,” the government holds the “people’s”
property in “trust,” resulting in the creation of certain loyalty, care, and goodfaith duties implicit in the role of governments as the “people’s”
representatives.439 Whether acting in a sovereign or commercial capacity, a
“Third World” government or its negotiating instrumentality is simply an agent
of the people.440 Governments must, therefore, discharge their fiduciary duties
in the execution and performance of contracts governing the disposition, use,
and exploitation of “the people’s” property.441

438

See, e.g., Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 N.J.296, 303, 294 A.2d 47
(1972) (certain land “belonged to the sovereign but for the common use of all the people…”). The genesis
of this principle is found in Roman jurisprudence, which held that “by the law of nature, the air, running
water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea…were common to mankind…” Justinian, Institutes
2.1.1 (T. Sandars trans. 1st Am. Ed. 1876). That natural resources located beyond a nation-state’s
continental shelf and exclusive economic zone belong collectively to humankind is also the tenet
underlying the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Co. A/CONF.62/122, opened for signature
Dec. 10, 1982, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994).
439

In the context of property belonging to Indian tribes and other “aborigines of America,” U.S. courts
have considered the government as trustee owing fiduciary duties to the people, measured by the same
strict standards applicable to private trustees. See Ahuna v. Department of Haw’n Home Lands, 64 Haw.
327, 640 P.2d 1161 (1982) (recognizing Hawaiians as beneficiaries of trust; government as trustee, stating
that “the trust obligations of [government] toward beneficiaries...may be determined by examining wellsettled principles enunciated by the federal courts regarding lands set aside by Congress in trust for the
benefit of other native Americans, i.e. American Indians, Eskimos, and Alaska natives...”). See also United
States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391 (1973); Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.s. 286 (1942) (“Under a
humane and self-imposed policy...in many acts of Congress and numerous decisions of this Court, [the
government] has charged itself with moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust. Its conduct,
as disclosed in the acts of those who represent it in dealings with the Indians, should therefore be judged by
the most exacting fiduciary standards.”)
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See, generally, John Pratt & Richard Zeckhouser, “Principals and Agents: An Overview,” in J. Pratt &
R. Zeckhauser, eds., Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business, Boston, Harvard Business School
Press (1985). For a stronger advocacy of government’s fiduciary duties derived from agent-principal
relationship, independent from the archaic “public trust” doctrine; see Lloyd R. Cohen, “The Public Trust
Doctrine: An Economic Perspective,” 29 Cal. W. L. Rev. 239 (Fall 1992) (“Government officials are, in an
economic and legal sense, agents. The principals of government agents are the people...[T]he insufficient
incentive of government agents to protect collective rights in property...suggests the merit of a procedural
remedy that allows or even encourages private persons to assert collective rights. We might view this as
something analogous to a shareholder’s derivative suit in which the individual shareholder brings suit on
behalf of and for the benefit of the corporation. I emphasize that this problem, to the extent that there is
one, calls for a procedural, rather than a substantive remedy. It merely confuses the matter to call this
remedy an exercise of so parochial a thing as the public trust doctrine...”) (emphasis added).
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For a representative commentary on the origin of the “public trust” doctrine, see Lloyd R. Cohen,
“The Public Trust Doctrine: An Economic Perspective,” 29 Cal. W. L. Rev. 239 (Fall 1992) (“The public
trust doctrine comes to us from English common law that was at least tangentially related to earlier Roman
law”). For an articulation of the modern public trust doctrine applicable in environmental protection
context, see Joseph Sax, Defending the Environment: A Strategy for Citizen Action 163 (1970).
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b) The “Corporate Derivative Fiduciary Duty” theory: As contractors
of governments acting as agents for the “people,” MNCs must derivatively
exercise duty of care, good faith, and loyalty owed to the “people,” and must
discharge those duties in the performance of their investment contracts with
governments, whether or not such duties are expressly embodied or delineated
in contractual language.442 In this sense, corporate entities contracting with
governments for “sub-agents” of the “people.”443 Certain types of FDI contracts
executed by government as “agent” of the “people” should be construed in light
of this “fiduciary duty” overlay.
c) The “Third Party Beneficiary” theory: Correspondingly, where the
government holds property in “trust” for the people, there exists in every
contractual agreement between MNCs and host governments a silent and
innumerable group of parties in interest: the “people” as third party
beneficiaries of all such investment contracts.444 As the natural consequence of
the “Public Trust,” “Government as People’s Agent,” or “Corporate Derivative
Fiduciary Duty” theories, both the MNC’s shareholder public445 and the people
of the “Third World” should be regarded as “third party beneficiaries” of MNCs’
partnerships with governments. The interests of these two groups of “third
party beneficiaries” (quite often standing an ocean apart) may conceptually
conflict, but ultimately can be brought together to a meeting point of
consensus. The negotiation process, in which the IBT lawyer plays a pivotal
role, can become the bridge upon which compromises are reached and mutual
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In U.S. common law, under limited circumstances, the U.S. Supreme Court has confirmed that
government contractors can enjoy the type of sovereign immunity often derived from, or attached to, the
government’s status. See, e.g., Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820 (1976). See also Lamb v.
Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., 835 F. Supp. 959 (W.D. Ky 1993) (applying government contractor
defense to preclude contractor liability when judgment would expend itself upon public treasury). The
following question should be raised: If a civilized, developed jurisdiction such as the U.S. has derivatively
extended the benefit of the government’s status to a private contractor, why can’t the fiduciary duties
imposed upon the government be similarly extended to the same private contractor acting on the
government’s behalf?
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In Government of Rwanda v. Rwanda Working Group, 227 F. Supp. 2d 45 (D.D.C. 2002), the federal
district court recognized that a person who contracts with a foreign government for the performance of
services may have agreed to act as the government’s agent and hence will owe the foreign nation a
fiduciary duty and a duty of loyalty, as judged under U.S. domestic law.
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See Joshua Karliner, The Corporate Planet: Ecology and Politics in the Age of Globalization (1997);
Tony McAdams, 19 J.Legal Studies Education at 249 (globalization strives for the riches of the global
market, while leaving the “people invisible”).
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The notion that shareholders may directly or indirectly benefit or be injured by corporate management’s
actions is firmly established in U.S. corporate law via the procedures of either derivative suits or direct
class actions. See, e.g., Palmer v. U.S. Savings Bank of America, 553 A.2d 781 (N.H. 1989); Marx v.
Akers, 88 N.Y.2d 189 (N.Y. App. 1996); Federal Rules of Civil Procedure R. 23(a) and (b); 23.1. See
USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 23(2004). However, only in very narrow circumstances have U.S. courts
recognized a shareholder’s right to sue as third party beneficiary of a contract between the corporate entity
and a third party. Glass v. U.S., 258 F.3d 1349 (C.A. Fed. 2001) (shareholder had third party beneficiary
status only if contract expressed promissor’s intent to benefit shareholder personally and independently of
his or her status as shareholder).
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economic goals achieved, but this must be done with the “people’s” interest in
mind.
These legal concepts are nothing new. They have inherently been
acknowledged in existing business and legal norms under national laws,
although their full impact has not been made mandatory or formally proclaimed
to be for the benefit of “Third World people.” For example, FDI contracts in the
petroleum and energy sector already recognize the role of the host government
as sovereign power granting foreign investors access to natural resources, land,
and surface use, all proclaimed under national laws to be owned or controlled
by the state on behalf of the “people.” In fact, these concepts exist in U.S.
jurisprudence and do not have to be recognized as part of customary
international law446 in order for them to be enforceable against U.S.-based
MNCs with respect to their conduct abroad. The U.S. as a sovereignty has
always proclaimed that its “jurisdiction to prescribe”447 has valid extraterritorial
effect, which enables it to curtail the conduct of its nationals and citizens
abroad. This extraterritorial effect as an extension of U.S. sovereign power has
provided the basis for several bodies of important U.S. laws and regulations,
with very harsh and far-reaching sanctions and impact, both for the protection
as well as for the curtailing of U.S. nationals’ economic behavior overseas.
Examples of these “ET effect” laws include federal income tax law,448 export
control law,449 federal anti-trust laws,450 the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA),451 economic sanctions law,452 certain aspects of U. S. anti-
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Custom is a source of international law is created through the practice and opinion (opinio juris sive
necessitates) of states, and by behavior by a state when it acts out of a sense of legal obligation. Rebecca
M. Wallace, International Law 9, 15 (2d ed. 1992). Accord Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations
Law of the United States §102(2) (Revised 1986).
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Vagts, Transnational Business Problems, Chapter 1 “A Basic Introduction to Public International
Law,” at pp. 6-8 (2d ed. Foundation Press 2001); See also David J. Gerber, “Prescriptive Authority:
Global Markets as a Challenge to Notional Regulatory Systems,” (paper prepared and made available at the
Conference on Transnational Business Transactions sponsored by the Association of American Law
Schools and the European Law Faculties Association) (Barcelona, Spain, June 1-3, 2003).
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See, e.g., Tax Reform At of 1976 (15 U.S.C. Section 999, implemented by Treasury Guidelines dated
Jan. 23, 1978).
449

Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 2401 et seq. (continued by Executive Order 13222, dated
August 17, 2001, and implemented by regulations administered by the Bureau of Export Administration
(BXA) found at 15 C.F.R. Part 774; Sections 736.2; Part 744; Part 746, Section 742.8-10; Part 742;
Sections 734.4, 740.3(d), 736.2, and 770.3. See also Export Administration Regulations:; Simplification
of Export Administration Regulations, 61 Fed. Reg. 12714 (March 25, 1996). For a non-U.S. view, see
Harris, “The Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Export Controls: a British Perspective, 19 N.Y.U.J. It’l L.
& Policy 959 (1987).
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See, e.g., Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations (U.S. Dept. of Justice and
Federal Trade Comm. April 5, 1996); John H. Chung, “The International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance
Act of 1994 and the Maelstrom Surrounding the Extraterritorial Application of the Sherman Act,” 69
Temple L.Rev. 393 (1996).
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15 U.S.C. Sections 578m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2 and 78dd-3,78ff.
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discrimination in employment laws,453 the Carriage of Goods at High Sea Act
(COGSA),454 the Federal Bill of Ladings Act (FBLA), 455 and most recently, the
USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.456
Further, these legal principles do have support in existing international
law, and customary international law is part of the law of the United States. The
traditional concept of “statehood” in international law implies the integration of
three elements: 1) the “people”; 2) their territory; and 3) their representative
government. If one of these three integral elements is missing, there is no
statehood or sovereignty under international law.457 The interest of the “people,”
therefore, is an integral part of any sovereign voice, yet the voice of the host
government is not always synonymous with the voice of the “people.” At best,
the notion that governments can best represent the interest of citizenry is like a
rebuttable resumption -- in “Third World” business deals, whether governments
effectively act for the “people” may present a gap between law and reality.
5)

Incorporation of Two Practical Procedural Safeguards into the
Current Pattern of Dispute Resolution Methods in International
Deal-Making

International business disputes are often resolved via either institutional
or ad hoc arbitration.458 Where an arbitration award is non-binding or otherwise
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U.S. economic sanctions are imposed against the following countries: 1) Iran (31 C.F.R. Part 535 et.
seq. And 31 C.F.R. Part 560 et seq.); 2) Burma (31 C.F.R. Part 537 et seq.); 3) Sudan (31 C.F.R. Part 538
et. seq.); 4) Lybia (31 C.F.R. Part 550 et. seq.). See also Terrorism Sanctions Regulations and Terrorism
List/Governments Sanctions Regulations CHECK (31 C.F.R. Part 595 et seq. and 31 C.F.R. part 596 et
seq.) and U.S. antiboycott laws, implemented by Bureau of Export Administration (BXA) regulations, 15
C.F.R. part 7601. Other controls under the administration of the Department of State include the Office of
Defense Trade Controls (22 U.S.C. Section 2778 et seq.), the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (22
C.F.R. Part 120 et seq.) and the U.S. Munitions List (22 C.F.R. Part 121).
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See, e.g., William Carmell, “Application of U.S. Anti-discrimination Laws to Multinational
Employers,” Int’l Quarterly Vol. 15-2, 289-329 (2003) and all statutory provisions, regulatory provisions,
and caselaw cited therein.
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The Carriage of Goods at Sea Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1300 (1994).
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The Federal Bill of Lading Act. 49 U.S.C. § 80107 (1994).
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Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
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See, e.g., Blond, Fenton, Johannesen, Johnson & Wertman, Blond’s International Law (Marafino Edited
Sulzburger & Graham Pub. Ltd. NY 1991); Restatement 3d of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States §201 (Revised 1986).
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See, e.g., Mark Baker & Arif H. Ali, “Risk Management in International Commercial Transactions:
Arbitration and Alternative Dispute Resolutions,” Int’l Quarterly Vol. 15-2, 252-288 (2003); see also Ian
Brownlie, Lecture: “The Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes in Practice,” 7 Pace Int’l L.Rev. 257
(1995); William S. Slate, “International Arbitration: Do Institutions Make a Difference?” 31 Wake Forest
L.Rev. 41 (1996). See also Michael D.Goldhaber, “Arbitration Survey: Major European Arbitrations,”
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is challenged as invalid, or where arbitration has not effectively been agreed to,
or otherwise cannot be enforced under the applicable law, there exists an
opportunity for the foreign investor to bring a lawsuit against the host
government or its SOE, or vice versa. (Suits will also have to be brought to
enforce an arbitral award.)459 Where to file suit may practically depend on those
assets of the defendant that are readily available for attachment or subject to
judgment execution, together with other jurisdictional and “forum non
conveniens” principles under the law of the forum where suit is filed (lex fori).460
The interpretation of international economic law by judicial and arbitral
tribunals must include these “third party beneficiary,” “public trust,”
“government as people’s agent,” and “corporate derivative fiduciary duty”
concepts. These concepts must be applied to the adjudication or resolution of
international disputes, as courts, arbitrators, and legal drafting workgroups
seek to doctrinally “internationalize” cross-border business contracts in order to
supplement and harmonize national laws, toward the formation of a rule-of-law
system that hopefully meets the consensus, conscience, and confidence of our
modern civilized world.461

The National Law Journal (September 15, 2003) (surveying ten disputes going to arbitration: from oil
pipelines to satellites, of $700 million or higher at stake).
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U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York
Convention), June 10, 1958, 21 UST 2517, 330 UNTS 38. The Convention is implemented in the United
States by 9 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (2000). See also Europcar Italia, S.p.A. v. Maiellano Tours, Inc.,
156 F.3d 310 (1998); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Berg, 61 F.3d 101(1995); Robert H. Folsom, Michael
Wallace Gordon, & John A. Spanogle, Jr., International Business Transactions in a Nutshell, .66-70 (6th ed.
2000) (discussing enforcement of arbitral awards and the New York Convention).
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For an assortment of secondary sources and commentaries discussing U.S. caselaw applying concepts
of personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens to the litigation of international disputes, see Maltz,
“Unraveling The Conundrum of the Law of Personal Jurisdiction: A Comment on Asashi Metal Industry
Co. v. Superior Court of California,” 1987 Duke L. J. 669; L.W. Newman and d. Zaslowsky, Litigating
International Commercial Disputes 29, 85 (West 1996); Juenger, “A Shoe Unfit for Globetrotting,” 28
Univ. Cal. Davis L.J. (1995); Prince, “Bhopal, Bougainville and OK Teri: Why Austalia’s Forum Non
Conveniens Approach is Better,” 47 Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 573 (1998); see also Restatement (Third) of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States, section 421 (1987); Republic of Bolivia v. Philip Morris
Companies, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 2d 1008 (S.D. Texas 1999) (transferring suit filed by foreign government
against U.S.-based MNC to District of Columbia).
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The doctrinal tension between a universal model of positivism and a relative multicultural concept
allowing for variations of standards has been an ongoing debate in modern international jurisprudence. The
post-Second World War efforts at a universal human rights framework, via U.N. documents such as the
various post-World War II human rights conventions, see http://www.un.org/partners/civil_society/mhr.htm, illustrate that a relative degree of success in attempting universal normatives can be achieved over
time. However, the problem and challenge continue to be the teeth, and the enforcement realism of the
current universal human rights framework. Universal human rights law, therefore, continues to be regarded
as “soft” or aspirational law, rather than “hard” law having the effect of the “mandatory rules.” But a set of
aspirational universal standards that can serve as a checklist or goals is still better than no standards at all.
Law has both a prescriptive as well as an expressive function. In its expressive function, law allows a
society of free men and women to declare behavioral standards and articulate “our aspirations for the kind
of society we wish to be.” Stephen L. Elkin, “Libertarian Confusions,” The Responsive Community 49-58
(Fall 2002) (discussing Richard Epstein’s “The Principles of a Free Society”).

158

While the aforementioned legal concepts are sound and can even be
viewed as jurisprudentially conventional, real-life issues do emerge in their
application to certain FDI contracts. One such perplexing legal and practical
issue is the challenge of identifying new causes of action for the “people,” or
according legal standing and parties-in-interest status to potential litigants for
access to the adversarial and decision-making processes, both nationally and
internationally. Specifically, in contract negotiation, as well as in arbitral
proceedings or lawsuits, who can speak the voice of the “peoples/third-party
beneficiaries,” apart from the governments? (Currently, the voice of the people
at times can be heard ad hoc and isolatedly, primarily via public opinion often
expressed outside the developing nation, or in the work of international public
interest or shareholder activism groups. The voices expressed by these groups
can also be politicized or fragmented in their own esoteric way. Public opinion
often varies and can highly be politicized by tension and competition among
various interest groups, especially in our pluralistic global community.)
Instead of attempting to resolve substantively these perplexing and
potentially highly politicized issues, I will simply advocate two practical
procedural solutions:462
a) Because the voice of the “third party beneficiaries” can relatively be
represented by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)/International NonGovernmental Organizations (INGOs), 463 and other shareholder activist groups,
these public interest organizations should be given limited access to the
negotiation of FDI projects receiving Multilateral Financing, even though these
groups are not parties to the investment contracts.464 As a matter of mandatory
procedure, these groups must be invited to participate in the negotiation, at a
minimum, in the form of written inputs presented to governments, the MNCs,
462

My choice to use procedural solutions to incorporate substantive law has support from at least one
commentator. see Lloyd R. Cohen, “The Public Trust Doctrine: An Economic Perspective,” 29 Cal. W. L.
Rev. 239 (Fall 1992) (“Government officials are, in an economic and legal sense, agents. The principals of
government agents are the people...[T]he insufficient incentive of government agents to protect collective
rights in property...suggests the merit of a procedural remedy that allows or even encourages private
persons to assert collective rights. I emphasize that this problem, to the extent that there is one, calls for a
procedural, rather than a substantive remedy. .”) (emphasis added).
463

More than 10,000 NGOs have developed around the globe as grassroots, public interest responses to
global “civic” concerns. Organizations such as Amnesty International (human rights), Oxfam (poverty,
hunger), and Greenpeace (eucology) have become highly visible and powerful. Anthony Giddens, The
Third Way and Its Critics at 123, 144 (2000); Tony McAdams, “Globalization: New Demands for the
Legal Environment of Business Course,” 19 J. Legal Studies Education 239, 247 (2001). The growth of
NGOs suggests the vitality of an information market for the commercial future of the world. Id.
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For an account of the history of recent partnership between NGOs and MNCs in the corporate ethics
crusade, see Ethan B. Kapstein, “The Corporate Ethics Crusade” (Foreign Affairs September 1, 2001). See
also Morton Winston, NGO Strategies for Promoting Corporate Responsibility, 16 Ethics and International
Affairs 71 (Spring 2002). See also Hannah L. Buxbaum, “Conflict of Economic Laws: From Svereignty
to Substance,” 42 Va. J. Int’l L. 931 (2002) (“International, regional, and non-governmental organizations
– rather than treaty negotations between sovereigns – have...played an increasingly important role in the
development of law applicable to transnational activity”).
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and the various work groups within the Multilateral Institutions, with
mandatory responses from these parties as a condition for funding. The
negotiating parties to a deal will thus be placed directly under the pressure of
formally responding to public scrutiny and to address public interest
arguments during the formation of investment contracts. The selection of the
participating public interest groups can depend on the recommendations of the
Multilaterals and other international organizations, including the United
Nations and its various organs, and priority should be given to locally formed
NGOs.465 This procedure does not compromise confidentiality objectives,
because in most cases, high-profiled multi-million-dollar FDI projects receiving
Multilateral Funding are physically visible, and already attract publicity and
scrutinizing news coverage. This limited “participating” procedure will also force
the Multilateral Institutions to voluntarily implement more transparency to
their internal workings and application of funding criteria.
b) Decision-makers in dispute resolution – whether judges or arbitrators
– should be mandated to consider voices of these same public interest groups
by way of amicus curiae briefs, testimonies, or equivalent. In this regard,
confidentiality requirements traditionally accorded institutional or ad hoc
arbitration proceedings should be waived, but only to a limited extent. The
resolution of international contractual disputes has traditionally been purely
economic in substantive nature, and has remained private and confidential
from a procedural perspective. Final resolutions have been popularized only by
the mutual consent of the parties involved.466 The determination as to which
INGOs/NGOs, or any other public interest groups may be allowed access to an
otherwise confidential and private proceeding, and to what extent, can rest in
the capable hands and sound discretion of judicial and arbitral tribunals, who
already are called upon and charged with the expertise to make many decisions
and to exercise discretion routinely in dispute resolution.
At a philosophical level, incorporating a “public interest” approach to
MNCs’ international business deal-making as a way of monitoring MNCs’
behaviors is not a novelty concept. Similar proposals have been made to change
the existing legal framework of corporate governance, although the effectiveness
465

Unfortunately, only approximately 15% of NGOs are from the developing countries. See Errol E.
Harris & James A. Yunker, Toward Genuine Global Governance: Critical Reactions to ‘Our Global
Neighbors’ at 48 (1999). Tony McAdams, 19 J. Legal Studies Education at 241.
466

See, e.g.., U.N. Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Rules Article 32(5);
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Rules Article 23(2); American Arbitration Association (AAA)
International Rules Article 21(4), 27(5) & 28(5), Article 6 of Appendix I and Article 1 of Appendix II;
London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) Rules Articles 10(4) & 30. Hong Kong International
Arbitration Centre Mediation Rule 12(i); accord Kenji Tashiro, “Quest for a Rational and Proper Method
for the Publication of Arbitral Awards,” J. Int’l Abitration 97 (XXXX); Charles S. Baldwin, “Protecting
Confidential and Proprietary Commercial Information in International Arbitraition,” 31 Tex. Int’l L. J. 451
(1996); Hans Smit, Confidentiality, Articles 73 to 76 9 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 233 (1998); www. Pca-cpa.org,
www. Iccwbo.org/court/English/arbitration/rules.asp, www. Un. Or.at/uncitral, www. Adr.
Org/rules/international_arb_rules.html.
See also International Bar Association (IBA) Ethics for
International Arbitration, Section 9; AAA Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes (1977),
reprinted in Code of Professional Responsibility 5 (Rena A. Garlin ed. 1986), Canon VI(B), at 10.
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of these proposals in real-world dynamics remains questionable. For example,
proposals to install “public interest directors” in Board composition have been
challenged as merely serving a “window-dressing” function. In reality, these
directors were regarded as antagonistic spies, were met with suspicion and
treated with lack of cooperation and, hence, were often denied resources or
information access. Eventually, they became co-opted into the mainstream
culture, were transformed, and ultimately turned counterproductive to their
original public interest mission. Likewise, proposals for corporate “social
accounting” and “social audits” have also been criticized as “window-dressing,”
unnecessarily increasing corporate expenditures without effectively furthering
social goals.467 Accordingly, in whatever form the “management-based” selfregulation model may take, it should avoid the shortcomings of previous
proposals. Its measurability, therefore, must be based on a “disclosure” or
“monitoring” template that accomplishes all of the three following objectives: (i)
allows management to become truly self-motivated in the competition for
improved public image and goodwill in the marketplace; (ii) allows socially
conscientious institutional investors and third-party institutions direct access
to corporate governance; and (iii) allows regulators to effectively foster both
management incentives and public-interest third-party input.
Rethinking
Globalization,
Legal
Regionalism,
Harmonization and Standardization of Law

International

A global market is one in which geography, political or cultural norms do
not restrain demand and supply. In a global market, economic functions are
based on transnational interdependence. As such, the very notion of
globalization threatens and undermines the sanctity of sovereign power.
Globalization thus occasions the need for an integrated regulatory network in
which sovereign mandates must be reconciled and compromised to avoid
conflicts. Private enterprises will support such a network because it reduces the
cost of compliance as well as the cost of dispute resolution under various
national regimes. Because globalization enables the convergence of national
substantive rules and legal norms, it serves the mutual interests of all economic
and governmental actors.
International institutions have been, and will continue to be created to
serve this goal. The WTO and NAFTA are examples of institutional frameworks
created in the past decade, but these frameworks represent the perspective of
governments. At the same time, the grouping of nation-states to develop legal
norms (for example, a “regionalism” approach to the development of
international economic law typified by the European Union model) has also
forced nation-states to table their mutual interests and develop common
grounds for “legalization.” Efforts to harmonize national legal rules by the U.N.
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), the International Institute
for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT), the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC), and other international legal work groups also demonstrate
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See, e.g., Douglas M. Branson, “Corporate Social Responsibility Redux,” 76 TUL. L. Rev. 1207, 12131214 (2001-2002).
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this “legalization” trend. Yet, these institutional voices and efforts have not
always truly reflected the interests of all market participants, especially those
“Third World” inhabitants whose demand and supply needs are directly at
stake.
The harmonization of national laws does little to serve the global market
if harmonization starts from systems of national laws that serve the unitary
voices of corporate giants supported by renewed “monarchies” as their business
partners. In order for legal harmonization and economic globalization to be
meaningful, the voices of “Third World” constituents who should be third party
beneficiaries of certain government-private sector contractual arrangements in
their countries should drive the goals of global economic development, just as
much as other institutional voices have already participated in the process. But
who is to speak the voice of such constituents? The regional and international
law-drafting processes pioneered by work groups from the developed nations
must be reexamined and expanded to include voices of other actors.
Specifically, these processes must include input of international and local
public interest groups representing the voices of “Third World” inhabitants, as
diversely and as widespread as possible.
In examining the action and policy of the Bush Administration, liberal
scholars have cautioned that unilateralism will intensify gaps and conflicts
among political, economic, and religious cultures, confirming their notion that
the U.S., or the “West” it symbolizes, is imperialistic.468 Only true
multilateralism worked from the “bottom up” in terms of the development
ladder, rather than the “top down,”469 can adequately address these issues. So
far, the Multilateral Agencies, MNCs and governments have all become partners
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See, e.g., Michael J. Kelly, “The Bush Foreign Policy 2001-2003: Unilateralist Theory in a Multilateral
World, and the Opportunity for Change Offered by Iraq,” CITE (contrasting unilateralism against
multilateralism, quoting President George W. Bush:
“Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are
with the terrorists…”
citing President’s Message to Joint Session of Congress Responding to the Terrorist Attacks of
September 11, 2001, Pub. Papers (September 24, 2001)).

See also Raneta Lawson Mack and Michael J. Kelly, Equal Justice in the Balance: America’s Legal
Responses to the Emerging Terrorist Threat (2004).; Harold Hongju Koh, “Rights to Remember,” The
Economist (October 31, 2003) (Professor Koh, currently Dean of Yale Law School, discussed how
September 11 event changed America’s approach to human rights).
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Scholars have referred to the trend of unfettered capital-driven force as “globalization from above,”
distinguishable from ‘globalization from below,’ which encompasses the notion of the welfare state. See
Tony McAdams, 19 J. Legal Studies Education at 268, citing Richard Falk, Predatory Globalization: A
Critique 13-17 (1999) (“[G]lobalization from below…would work to humanize and democratize the process
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globalization-from-above [patterns]). Accord Dorval Brunelle, Alternative to Globalization (Black Rose
Books Winter 2004) (suggesting “World Economy and Fair Trade” as alternative to “Globalization and
Free Trade”; advocating engagement at both local and global levels).
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in ““Third World”” economic development, in ways that may not always benefit
the native inhabitants. Although the Multilaterals, in their fifty years of history,
have been subject to much scholarly and community criticism with respect to
their economic policies,470 they have also been praised for the de facto
expansion of their original goals – a phenomenon described by commentators as
the “mission creep.” This “mission creep” embraces other public concerns into
the bundle of “economic considerations” traditionally characterizing the
Multilaterals’ missions.471
This is the current status of “economic
multilateralism” and “Third World” economic cooperation at the beginning of
the new millennium.472
Globalization will only bear its fruits if it gives birth to a truly stronger,
healthier, and all-encompassing “middle class” that transcends national and
cultural borders. The emergence of such a borderless middle class will quickly
alleviate the clash between the culturally or economically dominant and the
culturally or economically oppressed, because the overall economic model
strives to include all. To achieve this vision, all diverse voices and interests
should be reflected in the pattern of global economic development.
But even if the voices of INGOs, NGOs, and public interest groups are
included and legitimized as part of negotiation and dispute resolution, this
liberalization or expansion of processes does not necessarily assure that the
interest of “Third World people” is adequately protected. The protection of these
“third party beneficiaries” can only be ultimately achieved in the formation and
development of international economic law itself.473 Whether influenced by a
common-law or civil-law system, the harmonization of law, as well as the
accompanying legal drafting and development processes should not be left
isolatedly to national courts or confidentially shielded arbitrators who
determine outcomes of disputes on an ad hoc, case by case basis.
Harmonization should become part of an agenda that join together all
economic, political, and public interests. Watchdog functions must be
accomplished through 1) the dynamics of special interest lobbying and
promulgation of multinational regulations by the MNC’s home country under its
prescriptive jurisdiction; 2) the law-making processes of the host country,
whereupon the public interest voices are consulted and allowed to be involved
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See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents (Norton 2002), Brink Lindsey,
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Daniel D Bradlow, “Should the International Financial Institutions Play a role in the Implementation and
Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law,” 50 Kansas L.Rev. 695, 707-09 (2002).
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in the drafting stages; and 3) last but not least, long-term meaningful political
changes in the developing economies. Only responsible and competent
governments can truly bring about true economic prosperity for the “Third
World” public, but this can only be achieved if equal opportunities in
education become available to “Third World” inhabitants as a necessary
infrastructure for the future. Otherwise, regime changes in response to political
chaos will simply be the outcome predicted in George O’Well’s classic Animal
Farm474 – there is a change of guards, but the new guards are just a different
manifestation of the old ones. This has been the hard fact of our world. The
lesson of Vietnam (as we have been discussing the Vietnam Deal) should set a
“déjà vu” path to be watched out for, with respect to central Asia and oil-rich
Iraq currently awaiting stabilization and development.
The Role of MNCs and the Need for a Formalized Public Interest
Approach Toward International Deal-Making
The world community continues to face serious issues such as the
eruption of violence, military aggression, or act of war, all legitimized by slogans
of national security, religions, and territorial principles. Addressing these issues
isolatedly in accordance with the political agenda of countries’ leaderships is to
ignore the true undercurrent dynamics and the synchronized, cause-and-effect
nature of these issues. Root causes, direct or indirect, contributing or primary,
must be examined. Perhaps one such root cause is the increasing gap between
the rich and the poor, regardless of national borders. Perhaps another such root
cause is the disguised return of colonialism and monarchies, whether intended
or coincidental. It is hoped that this Article helps identify a small part of the
landscape upon which some of these root causes may have arisen, ultimately
raising these issues to a different level of awareness.
Despite the rapid privatization process since the collapse of Marxism as
an absolete economic model in Europe, the nation-state nonetheless remains
the major economic force in the developing countries, and is likely to retain its
role in the foreseeable future. The continuing state involvement in business
transactions with MNCs occasions a number of contractual techniques that
become legal norms by repetitive and prevalent usage and impact. The fact that
the MNC-host government contract remains the main tool for patterning global
economic development is not a vice in itself. After all, freedom of contract and
the exercise of bargaining power are the gist of free enterprise. What may be
problematic is the way in which the contract is formed and implemented. The
goal, therefore, is not necessarily to eliminate these partnerships, as they are
essential to nation building and the development of a world economy. Instead,
there is a need for a formalized mechanism to enable public scrutiny of these
partnerships. These partnerships must be examined, perhaps with more
transparency, notwithstanding their confidential nature, via the direct
participation of independent public interest actors, such that changes can take
place in the way these partnerships are formed and shaped. Such a formalized
“public interest” approach to the formation and interpretation of foreign
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investment contracts in certain industries comports with the spirit of what
scholars have considered as the compassionate “Third Way” movement to global
economics. The “Third Way” movement advocates “social democracy” based on
social commitments to the poor and the disadvantaged without undermining
free market.475
MNCs do not categorically qualify as “bad guys” just because they are
rich. Modern society’s extraordinary economic and technological progress
brought about by major corporations is undisputed. What IOGCs are doing in
the worldwide petroleum and energy sector simply reflects what humans have
been doing since the beginning of history – the uncovering of natural resources
to serve the needs for human survival and technological betterment. Today, if
armed with a better breed of corporate counsel and executives, together with a
differently focused, self-imposed corporate code of social responsibility, MNCs
are among the group of actors best situated to address global issues – from
poverty, inequality, race, gender and religious discrimination, child labor,
environmental pollution, overall workforce abuse and exploitation, as well as
the wise and effective use of state-of-the-art technology to serve humankind.
This “social responsibility” mission is only possible via the individual awareness
and changing attitude of the MNC international executive and his/her lawyer,
working in pair as they continue their globe-trotting. The focus on MNCs should
not be the rhetoric of holding money or power as the source of evil, since free
enterprise should freely be at work. Rather, scrutinizing MNCs’ conduct should
constitute a wake-up call regarding the need for a formalized, systematic public
interest check-and-balance approach toward the internationalization of law.
Overall, considering all angles of public debates, the stern critic and
thoughtful policymakers should question whether the ultimate objective of the
multilateral process – the eradication of “Third World” poverty, as administered
via institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO -- has
adequately been discharged, and how government-MNC partnerships have
helped or have hurt “the dream of a world free from poverty.” As the first step,
new legal mechanisms must be made available for exclusive and confidential
MNC-host government partnerships to formally include the voices of “Third
World” inhabitants via independent public interest advocacy. No solution will
emerge overnight, but as a starting point and for many years to come, this
Article hopes, at a minimum, to invite a dialogue on how these new legal
mechanisms must be structured and implemented.
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